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Many Nobel Laureates and thousands of academic papers have espoused the concept that risk 
is compensated by return. However, the low volatility anomaly - the phenomenon where low-
risk stocks display markedly higher returns than the market portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis 
and vice versa - contradicts this basic finance principle of risk-return trade-off and is possibly 
one of the greatest anomalies in finance. Among the explanations for this anomaly are, the 
behavioural bias of overconfidence, agency problems and the type of manager compensation. 
This study investigates and confirms the low volatility anomaly on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) using the risk-adjusted return measure of the Sharpe ratio. According to the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, this is not expected to happen and consequently offers no 
explanation for this phenomenon. This study applies the Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) 
formalised within the framework of Chaos Theory, to explain the existence of the low volatility 
anomaly on the JSE.  
Building upon the Fractal Market Hypothesis to provide evidence on the behaviour of returns 
time series of selected indices of the JSE, the BDS test is applied to test for non-random chaotic 
dynamics and further applies the rescaled range analysis to ascertain mean reversion, 
persistence or randomness on the JSE. The BDS test confirms that all the indices considered in 
this study are not independent and identically distributed. Applying the re-scaled range 
analysis, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE All Share Index appear relatively efficient 
and riskier than the FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index, which exhibits significant persistence and 
appears to be less risky and less efficient contrary to the popular assertion that small cap indices 
are riskier than large cap indices. 
The study further analyses the three fundamentals of the FMH namely, the impact of 
information, the role of liquidity and time horizon on the top 40 and small cap indices. 
Information is not uniformly distributed among the two indices as the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index 
receives more publications form sources such as newspapers, online publications and journals 
as well as JSE issued news and historical company news. The FTSE/JSE Top 40 also receives 
more analyst coverage than the FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index. Using the absolute and normalised 
volume of trade as a proxy for liquidity, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index exhibits a relatively higher 
level of liquidity than the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index. The study finds that domestic equity 
fund managers in South Africa hold in their portfolios, a disproportionately greater percentage 
ABSTRACT 
Page | V  
 
of FTSE/JSE Top 40 companies relative to other companies on the JSE and concludes that 
these managers contribute to the low volatility anomaly on the JSE. The study further concludes 
that in line with the FMH, lack of information and the illiquidity of the FTSE/JSE Small Cap 
attracts long-term investors who become the dominant class of investors on the index and are 
compensated for taking on the risk of illiquidity in the form of illiquidity premium and low 
volatility. The highly liquid FTSE/JSE Top 40, which has relatively high availability of 
information on the other hand attracts different classes of investors with differing horizons who 
take opposite sides of each trade as different classes of investors interpret the same set of 
information differently. The high liquidity and information leads to high volatility as investors 
continually adjust their holdings with the emergence of new information. The high volatility 
and subsequent underperformance of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 therefore is a cost of efficiency and 
liquidity (liquidity discount). 
Studies on the FMH are generally focused on market crashes. This study provides a novel 
approach by using the FMH to explain the low-volatility anomaly. This synthesis of the FMH 
and the low volatility anomaly provides an alternative technique of evaluating risk and also 
provides insights into the efficiency of financial markets and contributes to the literature on the 
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This chapter present an introduction and overview of the thesis and discusses the aim, 
objectives, scope and the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Introduction 
The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis has rekindled debates on the fundamental finance 
theories and their underlying assumptions particularly the Efficient Market Hypothesis and the 
assumption of rational investors. Classical financial theories however, continue to remain 
relevant even after the crisis. Eugene Fama popularly referred to as the father of modern finance 
won the 2013 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel Price 
generally called the Nobel Prize in Economics together with Robert J Shiller and Lars Peter 
Hanson. 
Starting with the modest concepts that at the core of all investment decisions is risk, that 
diversification is key to investing successfully, and that it is difficult to beat the market, 
classical finance theories and models remain the intellectual core of a myriad of powerful 
innovations in investment and in risk management (Bernstein 2007;2011). Even though the 
emergence of behavioral finance has challenged a significant number of underlying 
assumptions of classical finance, Daniel Kahneman, winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize in 
Economics, and highly regarded for his works in psychology of judgement and behavioral 
finance, observed that behavioral models could be very essential to institutional design, 
however it still remains unclear whether ultimately, they are going to have remarkable 
explanatory power for asset prices. (Bernstein, 2007). 
Notable among the underlying theories of classical finance is the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH). The EMH argues that security prices fully incorporate all available information and 
therefore always trade at their fair value, making it impossible to purchase undervalued 
securities or sell them at inflated prices. According to the EMH, it is thus highly unlikely to 
outperform the market through stock picking or market timing. The only way to get higher 
returns is to buy riskier investments (Fama, 1970, Fama and MacBeth, 1973, Malkiel, 1991, 
Malkiel, 2003, Yalcin, 2016). Contrary to the assertions of the EMH, the active management 
CHAPTER ONE 
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sector of the asset management industry is centred on the belief that asset managers can 
outperform the market because the market does not always incorporate all relevant information 
into asset prices. The active management industry therefore make use of among other 
strategies, fundamental analysis and analysts’ recommendations and opinions as well as 
publications by both analysts and academics in making portfolio decisions. The active 
management industry remains a significant player in the asset management industry and the 
activities of active managers in turn significantly affect the behaviour of financial markets. 
Studies on the low volatility anomaly have contracted the notion that it is possible to obtain 
higher returns without taking on higher risks. The low volatility anomaly is defined as the 
phenomenon where low-risk stocks display markedly higher returns than the market portfolio 
on a risk-adjusted basis, while high-risk stocks underperform significantly on a risk-adjusted 
basis (Blitz and Van Vliet, 2007, Baker et al., 2011, Blitz et al., 2013, Oladele and Bradfield, 
2016). This anomaly was discovered from two different sources - an academic source and an 
applied investment source (Marmer, 2015). From the academic perspective, the low volatility 
anomaly is attributed to the empirical testing of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by 
pioneering academics who found that “high-beta securities had significantly negative intercepts 
and low-beta securities had significantly positive intercepts, contrary to the predictions of the 
traditional form of the model.” (Jensen, Black and Scholes, 1972: 44). The low volatility 
anomaly, from an applied investment perspective on the other hand can be attributed to Haugen 
and Heins (1972) who discovered that monthly returns of stocks with lower variances over the 
long run, outperform stock portfolios with higher variance. Even with evidence of continuing 
critical empirical tests of the CAPM and the early claims of Haugen and other scholars, it took 
almost two decades before academic interest was reawakened on the concept of low volatility 
investing (Marmer, 2015).  
In 1991, Edgar Peters formalized FMH within the context of chaos theory to explain investors’ 
heterogeneity regarding their investment horizons (Peters, 1994). The concept of fractals 
emanates from the mathematics of fractal geometry and describes how a fragmented geometric 
shape can be broken down into smaller parts that still replicate the whole (Peters, 1994). FMH 
describes how financial markets behave similarly, with patterns repeated over different time 
periods, be it days, weeks, months or even business cycles (Peters, 1994; Velasquéz, 2009). 
The FMH posits that history repeats itself therefore, previous events that happened in financial 
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markets in the past will occur again in future (Peters, 1994).   Subsequent to the financial crisis 
of 2008, the FMH has gained traction as it has become evident that financial crises keep 
recurring more often than predicted by traditional finance theories. The FMH considers the role 
of liquidity, investor horizons and the effect of information through a complete business cycle 
(Velasquéz, 2009). Whereas the EMH provides no clarification for the low risk anomaly, this 
study applies the FMH to offer an explanation to the low volatility anomaly on the JSE.  
 
1.2 Context of the Study 
In a study on the Dow Jones Industrial average, Lento (2013) found that the fractal nature of 
time-series is related to the profitability of different types of trading rules and therefore 
investors who understand the fractal nature of time-series should alter their investment 
strategies between contrarian and trend trading rules when the Hurst exponent is less than 0.5 
and greater than 0.5 respectively. Where we are is a function of where we have been (Peters, 
1991). The past therefore influences the present. For example, even though it is widely believed 
that the toss of a coin is fair and unbiased, with an equal probability of the coin landing heads 
or tail, Diaconis et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence to prove that in tossing a coin in the 
hand, the outcome is biased towards turning up the same way it started – with a probability of 
51%. 
Several studies have shown that financial markets possess feedback systems and fractals and 
suggest that the assumptions of classical finance do not properly explain behaviours and 
characteristics of financial markets (Peters, 1991, Mandelbrot, 1997, Velasquéz, 2009b, 
Buchanan, 2013, Anderson and Noss, 2013). Time series of capital market prices seem to 
exhibit fractal properties. The implication is that, under enlargement, their patterns turn out to 
be increasingly complex, and appears to repeat itself, showing a pattern that is similar 
qualitatively to that of the overall structure (Anderson and Noss, 2013). Peters (1991) defines 
a fractal as an object in which the parts are in some way related to the whole.  
The behaviours of financial time series however do not occur in a vacuum but are as a result 
of the trading behaviours of the various market participants ranging from individual traders, 
professional day traders and professional asset managers. Arguably the asset management 
industry is the most significant player in capital markets. In South Africa, institutional investors 
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account for 40% of shareholding with largest shareholders on the JSE being government 
employees through the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) (Ambrosi, 2014). The 
total household savings in South Africa, which consists of collective investment portfolios 
(mutual funds), insurance companies and retirement funds amounted to R 8.1 trillion ($700 
billion) as at December 2014 according to the Association for Savings and Investment South 
Africa (ASISA) (ASISA, 2015) compared to the JSE’s total market capitalization of R 9.9 
trillion as at the same period. 
The behaviour of the time series of the various indices of the JSE will therefore be heavily 
influenced by the trading behaviours of the various players in the South African asset 
management industry. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Neoclassical economics and classical finance are based inter alia on the assumption of rational 
individuals, efficient markets and market equilibrium. These assumptions imply that markets 
correctly reflect prices and quickly adjust to new information making it impossible to profit 
from trading based on such information. In recent years however, as the financial crises are 
occurring more frequently than can be explained by traditional finance theories, questions are 
being asked about these assumptions. The MPT describes how risk-averse investors can put 
together portfolios that maximize expected return for on a given level of risk, stressing that risk 
is a fundamental part of higher reward. MPT however, is dogged with the low volatility 
anomaly, where low risk assets outperform high risk assets on a risk adjusted basis and is 
arguably one of the greatest anomalies in finance. Behavioural biases, agency problems, 
management compensation style etc. have been offered as an explanation for the low volatility 
anomaly.  
The FMH has been proposed as an alternative to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, however, 
studies on the FMH have been overly focused on financial crises while ignoring other market 
anomalies. To date, there is no existing study on the FMH that attempts to explain financial 
market anomalies in normal times where there are no crises. 
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1.4 Aim  
The aim of this study is to investigate the existence of the low volatility anomaly on the JSE 
and provide an alternative explanation for the low volatility anomaly on the JSE.  
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the study are as follows: 
• To investigate the existence of the low volatility anomaly on the JSE 
• To determine whether the times series of equity prices on the JSE are independently 
and identically distributed (iid). 
• To establish the fractal characteristics of the JSE 
• To investigate whether the selected indices of JSE exhibit a random walk 
• To ascertain the factors that may contribute to the low volatility anomaly on the JSE 
• To investigate whether the FMH explains the low volatility anomaly on the JSE 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
• Does the low volatility anomaly exist on the JSE? 
• Are financial time series on the JSE independently and identically distributed (iid)? 
• Does the JSE exhibit fractal characteristics? 
• Do the selected indices of JSE exhibit a random walk? 
• What factors contribute to the low volatility anomaly on the JSE? 
• Does the FMH explain the low volatility anomaly? 
 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
The study investigates the low volatility anomaly on the JSE by applying the Sharpe ratio. The 
study further investigates chaos on the JSE by first applying the BDS test and then the re-scaled 
range analysis. Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (1996) developed the BDS test which tests for 
correlation integral which measures how frequent temporal patterns are repeated in a given 
time series i.e. to spot non-linear dependence (chaos).  One benefit of the BDS test is that it 
does not require any distributional assumptions on the series to be tested. The study further 
applies the modified rescaled range (R/S) analysis pioneered by Hurst (1951) reviewed by 
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Peters (1994) and Howe, Martin and Wood (1997). A Hurst Exponent (H) of 0.5 denotes the 
series under investigation exhibits characteristics in line with the random walk theory. An H 
greater than 0.5 denotes persistence while an H lower than 0.5 denotes anti-persistence. The 
study applies the re-scaled range analysis to derive the Hurst Exponent for the FTSE/JSE All 
Share, FTSE/JSE Top 40 and FTSE/JSE Small Cap indices. Once H is computed, the 
autocorrelation within the time series (CN) is computed as well. The CN represents the 
percentage of movements in the time series that can be explained by historical information 
(Peters, 1994). A CN = 0 signifies randomness in the time series under consideration pointing 
to a weak-form efficient market where historical information cannot be relied on to outperform 
the market. 
The study further analyses the quarterly portfolio holdings of general equity mutual funds to 
investigate the proportion of their portfolios dedicated to selected indices. According to Baker 
and Haugen (2012), two of the reasons for the low-volatility anomaly are the structure of 
managers’ remuneration and agency problems that lead fund managers to include high 
volatility stocks in their portfolios.  This is to confirm whether South African fund managers 
contribute to the low-volatility anomaly on the JSE.  
The study investigates liquidity, availability of information and differing time horizons which 
are fundamental to the FMH to offer an explanation for the low volatility anomaly on the JSE. 
Analyses of the number of analysts covering stocks in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE 
Small Cap indices are also conducted using data from McGregor BFA. Further, the frequency 
of publication for companies in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE Small Cap over the 
previous one year from 1st January 2015 to 31st December 2015 also using data from McGregor 
BFA is conducted. A broad definition of publications is used which according to McGregor 
BFA, includes news from sources such as newspapers, online publications and journals as well 
as JSE issued news and historical company news relating to the companies.  
Finally, in order to compare the volume of trade between the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the 
FTSE/JSE Small Cap, the study normalizes the volume of trade for both indices by dividing 
the total volume of trade for each index for the year ended 31 December 2002 to 31 December 
2014 and divide this by the total free float stocks in the index in line with Ranguelova et al. 
(2015). The study applies this normalized measure of volume of trade to work out an average 
monthly number for each index. The normalised volume of trade serves as a proxy for liquidity. 
Page | 7  
 
1.8 Significance of the Study  
To date, studies on the FMH are concentrated on financial market crashes with no consideration 
for periods where markets are not in a crisis/panic situation albeit functioning inefficiently. The 
low volatility anomaly for example, represents one of such circumstances where markets 
behave contrary to how they are expected to behave according to traditional theories. This 
study applies the FMH to explain the low volatility anomaly and provides a unique synthesis 
of the FMH and the low volatility anomaly. It also applies the FMH to explain a phenomenon 
other than a market crash.  
 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
• Chapter One 
Chapter one is an introduction to the topic of this thesis and explains the main concepts as well 
providing the background to this study. It explores the major concepts relevant to the study 
from the classical concept of efficient markets to the FMH which has been proposed as 
alternative to the EMH to explain financial market behaviours and also a discussion of the low 
volatility anomaly. This chapter presents the rationale for the study and outlines its 
contributions to the academic literature on the low volatility anomaly and the FMH.  
• Chapter Two 
The chapter is a review of literature on the historical background of classical finance theories 
and the established body of thoughts in classical finance.  It explores the fundamental theories 
of classical finance developed over the years and how these theories transformed into very 
influential tenets in finance both in academia and industry. The chapter also discusses various 
criticisms of classical finance and empirical evidence of the anomalies that point out flaws in 
the underlying theories of classical finance. 
• Chapter Three 
This chapter discusses an alternative theory on the behaviour of financial markets. Although 
classical finance theories are based among other assumptions on rationality of market 
participants, efficient markets, and normal distribution, from the history of financial crises, it 
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becomes evident that financial market participants cannot be construed to be rational as 
suggested by classical finance and events that are assumed to be anomalies keep recurring more 
often than can be explained by classical finance theories. The chapter discusses chaos theory 
and the FMH which argues that differing investment horizons, liquidity and availability and 
interpretation of information inter alia determines the behaviour of financial markets. 
• Chapter Four 
Chapter four presents a discussion of financial crises, discussing some theories behind the 
occurrence of financial crises as well as a history of financial crises beginning with the tulip 
mania in the Netherlands, through to the Great Recession.  
• Chapter Five 
This chapter begins with an introduction to behavioural finance, discussing its origins and 
delves into the various behavioural biases that investors are prone to thereby making them 
behave contrary to what classical financial theories assume. The chapter further discusses 
arguments against the assumption that all behavioural biases are intuitively detrimental to 
optimal decision making. The chapter concludes by arguing that the various schools of thought 
contribute to the development of finance. 
 
• Chapter Six 
Chapter six presents a general overview of the asset management industry. With increasing 
calls for a classification of particular segments of the asset management industry as 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), a drive to protect the global financial 
systems by averting the failure of such SIFIs, or, in the event of a failure, curbing the 
subsequent adverse effects. The asset management industry plays a significant role in the 
stability or otherwise of financial markets. 
 
• Chapter Seven 
Chapter seven presents a discussion of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The chapter provides 
a brief history of the JSE, it business model as well as some major developments on the JSE. 
The chapter further discusses the JSE as an efficient markets and reviews literature on the 
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market efficiency of the JSE. The chapter also provides a brief review of literature on the spill 
over effects of international markets on the JSE 
 
• Chapter Eight 
This chapter discusses the data selected for the study and the methodology the study adopts in 
testing for the existence of the low volatility anomaly on the JSE as well as testing for non-
linearity and chaos on the JSE. Once the existence of chaos or otherwise is established on the 
JSE, the study sets out to investigate the fractal nature of selected indices and how the FMH 
describes the low volatility anomaly on the JSE by analysing liquidity, flow of information, the 
portfolio structure of equity fund managers and volatility patterns of the selected indices. 
The study applies the Sharpe ratio to measure the risk-adjusted performance of the selected 
indices of the JSE. This is to determine whether the low volatility anomaly exists on the JSE. 
The study then applies the BDS test to investigate whether the time series of the JSE are iid. 
To achieve the third objective, the study applies the rescaled range analysis to determine the 
fractal nature of the JSE. The variance ratio test is the used to test the Random Walk 
Hypothesis. To investigate the factors that contribute to the low volatility anomaly on the JSE, 
the study analyses the extent of analysts’ coverage, the frequency of publication and the volume 
of trade of the companies in the selected indices to achieve the fifth objective of the study. 
Finally, the study reviews the main arguments of the FMH and compares it with the findings 
of the stated objectives to ascertain whether there is empirical evidence to support the 
arguments of the FMH. 
• Chapter Nine 
Chapter nine presents the findings of this study on chaos on the JSE over the period of the 
study. The chapter also presents the findings on the low volatility anomaly on the JSE and a 
synthesis of the FMH and the low volatility anomaly by applying the underlying assumptions 
of the FMH to explain the low volatility anomaly.  
• Chapter Ten 
Chapter ten, the final chapter, summarizes the study and draws conclusions based on the 
findings.  
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1.10 Summary 
This chapter presented an introduction and background to this study.   The problem statement, 
the objectives, scope and significance of the study is also presented. As the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis fails to explain the frequency of financial market crises and other market anomalies, 
the Fractal Market Hypothesis has been suggested as an alternative to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. Studies on the   FMH however are overly concentrated on financial market crashes 
while ignoring other market anomalies.  This study applies the FMH to explain the low 
volatility anomaly on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
The following chapter discusses classical finance theories and the assumptions underlying 
these theories. The chapter also provides some historical background to classical finance 
theories and also discusses criticisms of classical finance theories and assumptions.
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Classical finance remains the bedrock of modern finance. In this study, we use the term 
classical finance and neoclassical finance interchangeably to represent rational finance which 
traces its roots to the rationality assumption of neoclassical economics (Beukes, 2011). Haugen 
(1999) offers a description of the evolution of finance as a distinct discipline and identifies 
three schools of thought namely, old, modern and new finance. The old finance school of 
thought is based on the nature of financial claims and the analysis of financial statements. 
Modern finance is centred on valuation and asset pricing rooted in rational economic 
behaviour. Under the paradigm of modern finance, the market is efficient, any inefficiency is 
short-lived and quickly eliminated through arbitrage. The pillars of classical finance are Miller 
and Modigliani’s arbitrage principles, Markowitz’s portfolio principles of Markowitz, Linter, 
Sharpe and Black’s capital asset pricing theory and the Black, Scholes and Merton’s option-
pricing theory (Statman, 1999). 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The aim of the chapter is to review theoretical and empirical literature on classical finance and 
analyze the various criticisms of classical financial theories relevant to this study. Inter-alia, 
the chapter discusses major finance theories such as the EMH, the modern portfolio theory 
(MPT), capital asset pricing model (CAPM), multifactor pricing models and the arbitrage 
pricing theory. 
The chapter further points out the inadequacy of the existing classical finance theories to 
explain major financial crises that have bedeviled financial markets over the years and delivers 
the background to the rise of behavioral finance as an alternative approach.  
 
2.2 Classical Finance Theories 
Classical financial theories still remain relevant even after the Global Financial Crisis. This is 
evident in the fact that Eugene Fama, popularly referred to as the father of modern finance, 
won the 2013 Nobel Prize in Economics together with Robert J Shiller and Lars Peter Hanson. 
CHAPTER TWO  
CLASSICAL FINANCE 
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Starting with the modest notion that risk is at the core of all investment decisions, that 
diversification is key to successful investing, and that markets are difficult to beat, classical 
finance theories and models still remain the intellectual core of a myriad of powerful 
innovations in financial and risk management (Bernstein 2007, Bernstein 2011, Asness 2014). 
Even though the emergence of behavioral finance has challenged a significant number of 
underlying assumptions of classical finance, Daniel Kahneman 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics 
winner notable for his works in psychology of judgement and behavioral finance observed that 
behavioral models could be very essential to institutional design, however it still remains 
unclear whether ultimately, they are going to have remarkable explanatory power for asset 
pricing. (Bernstein, 2007). 
In defense of classical finance, 1997 economics Nobel prize winner, Myron Scholes, argues 
that much of the blame for the recent financial crisis should be placed on those who pushed 
finance theories too far in practice and not on theories and models of economists (The 
Economist, 2009).  
Furthermore, 1995 winner of Nobel Prize in Economics, Robert Lucas, in an article in the 
Economist titled “In Defense of the Dismal Science” puts up a rebuttal of the criticism that the 
financial crisis provides evidence of the failure of economics stating: “One thing we are not 
going to have, now or ever, is a set of models that forecasts sudden falls in the value of financial 
assets,…This is nothing new. It has been known for more than 40 years and is one of the main 
implications of Eugene Fama's efficient-market hypothesis” (Lucas, 2009). 
While acknowledging the relevance of classical finance, the head of research and strategy at 
PGGM, a Dutch pension fund - Jaap van Dam – asserts that there is still a need to have a solid 
theoretical base, albeit equally important that these teachings are accompanied with the 
warning: “just a theory.”, while helping students to appreciate the limitations of the dogma 
(Fabozzi, Focardi and Jonas, 2014). It is therefore probable that classical finance theories will 
still remain the bedrock of finance both in academia and in the finance industry as majority of 
both academics and practitioners still admit that these theories continue to be relevant despite 
the wave of criticism these theories have faced subsequent to the financial crisis. 
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2.3 Historical Background 
In earlier periods, economists were not enthusiastic on analyzing markets theoretically, given 
that earlier ideas concerning financial markets were regarded as based on intuition, that were 
largely devised by practitioners. Financial markets were regarded more as casinos than proper 
markets (Beukes, 2011). According to Bernstein (2007), the collection of models, concepts, 
ideas, and systems expressed in the theoretical configuration of modern finance (what he refers 
to as Capital Ideas) emerged between 1952 and 1973 and owe almost everything to Alfred 
Marshall one of the founders of neoclassical economics.  
In the beginning of the 1950s, there were two mainstreams that formed the foundations of 
modern finance. First is Corporate Finance, set forth by Modigliani and Miller (1958). Then 
the other, centered on portfolio risk and return, commonly called the Modern Portfolio Theory, 
pioneered by Markowitz (1952), with later contributions from Tobin (1958) and Sharpe (1964) 
(Sainto, Savoia and Famá 2013). The predominant insight that brought it all about is that 
investors are only interested in portfolio returns and not about the idiosyncrasies of specific 
assets. The behavior of portfolios replaced the demand curves for singular stocks and modern 
finance as we now know it was born (Cochrane, 2009). 
In 1952, Nobel Laureate Harry Markowitz, a graduate at the University of Chicago, 
mathematically established that placing one’s investments in one security is an excessively 
risky strategy and that diversification is the closest any investor or asset manager can ever come 
to getting a free lunch (Bernstein and Boggs, 1997). Prior to this seminal work, serious journals 
regarded equity investment as too dubious and speculative for sober academic work (Bernstein 
and Boggs, 1997). Rumours had it that when he wrote his thesis, people in his department said 
it was nothing (Fama, 2013). In the defense, Milton Friedman suggested: “Harry, I don’t see 
anything wrong with the math here, but I have a problem. This isn’t a dissertation in economics, 
and we can’t give you a PhD in economics for a dissertation   that’s not economics. It’s not 
math, it’s not economics, it’s not even business administration.” (Bernstein, 1993: 102). 
Markowitz (1952) rebuffed the idea that investment portfolios should be based solely on the 
maximum expected return, since espousing this principle may cause two assets that have 
similar returns being allotted to the portfolio without any analysis of the risk. He further points 
out that a portfolio having the greatest expected return is not necessarily the portfolio with the 
least risk. After Markowitz’s seminal work, Tobin (1958) went a step further by adding to 
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Markowitz approach, the concept of money which led to the Two-Fund Separation Theorem. 
Tobin suggested that investors would diversify their investments between a single portfolio 
made up of risky assets and a risk-free asset with different risk appetites leading to differing 
combinations of the risk-free asset and risky assets. Tobin (1958) argued, using Keynesian 
Theory as a starting point, that investors select positions that fall between total investment in 
the risk-free asset and the portfolio of risky assets noting that investors prefer liquidity for two 
main purposes namely: 1) individual inelasticity to the expected interest rate and 2) uncertainty 
with regards to future interest rates. This implies that investors prefer liquidity because of the 
unpredictability of market risk or asset price fluctuations which may culminate in loss of 
wealth. 
The portfolio selection process according to Tobin (1958) is an amazingly simple matter, a 
procedure that begins with Markowitz’s efficient frontier1. In line with Markowitz, the riskiest 
portfolio is the one at the top, is not diversified, and includes only one security. However, as 
one comes down the frontier, the portfolio becomes progressively diversified by holding many 
securities. Just as Markowitz (1952), Tobin (1958) allowed for a risk-free lending rate in the 
process although Tobin (1958) took it a step further. One however reaches the end of what one 
can add to the portfolios on the frontier and therefore, further than that point is a composition 
of portfolios with an increasing amount of the risk-free asset. 
Tobin (1958) established that investors made their decisions through a combination of the 
portfolio of risky assets located on the efficient frontier with the risk-free asset leading to the 
Two-Fund Separation Theorem which asserts that two investment choices made by individuals 
are separate and independent and these choices are made of: 
i. Ascertaining the most efficient risky asset portfolio 
ii. Identifying the proportion of resources to be assigned to the risk-free asset and risky 
assets 
The Two-Fund Separation theorem is Tobin’s ultimate contribution which shows that the most 
efficient portfolio of risky investments is independent of individual preferences relating to risk. 
The only difference between an investor with a lower risk tolerance and an investor with a 
                                                          
1 The efficient frontier is the assortment of efficient portfolios from highest to lowest risk or from highest to   
lowest expected return 
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higher risk tolerance is the proportion of risk-free asset in the investor’s portfolio (Elton and 
Gruber, 1997; Dimson and Mussavian, 1999; Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2014). 
The CAPM originated from the economic theory devised from the works of Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965), Treynor (1962)2, and Mossin (1966) and it is possibly the most significant 
model to emerge in the early 1960s, which solved the strenuous mathematical calculation 
encumbrance of Markowitz‘s Modern Portfolio Theory .  In 1990, Bill Sharpe won the Nobel 
Prize in Economics, in recognition of a paper he had published twenty-six years earlier in 1964 
and also the primary accomplishment that won him the award. Sharpe’s original article which 
appeared in the Journal of Finance with the title, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Sharpe, 1964). The model posits that for any security, 
the expected return should be equal to the expected return of the market in excess of the return 
on a risk-free security, multiplied by the extent to which the security in question fluctuates in 
sync with the market (Bernstein, 2011). The measure of the extent to which a security fluctuates 
in sync with the market is the security’s “beta”3, which reflects the contribution of the security 
to the portfolio’s overall degree of riskiness (Bernstein, 2011).  
CAPM has two key messages if you critically analyze the model. First is the fact that it is 
imperative to consider a broadly diversified portfolio. This notion gave prominence to the idea 
of index funds (Bernstein, 2007, Bernstein, 2011). Secondly, one has to bear a higher beta value 
if one expects a higher return.  In an interview with the CFO Magazine, William Sharpe argued 
that the broader version of CAPM encompasses what type of risk one should expect to be 
rewarded for in the long-term and this will be the risk of performing badly in bad times and 
therefore if there is any reward for bearing risk, it just about has to be that. It is this, or otherwise 
the world makes no sense at all because if such risk is not rewarded, then there is no justification 
to believe that there is the existence of risk premium for equities rather than putting one’s 
money in the bank (Sharpe, 2000).  Sharpe therefore posited that in the world of CAPM 
therefore, beta measures how badly one will do in bad times meaning high beta portfolios or 
securities will perform exceptionally poorly if the market drops (Sharpe, 2000). 
                                                          
2 Unpublished manuscript 
3 Mathematically a security’s beta equals the covariance of the security’s returns with that of the market divided 
by the market’s returns variance. 
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Stephen A. Ross (1976) introduced the "arbitrage pricing theory" or APT which tackles some 
of the limitations of the CAPM. Ross posited that the fundamental thought behind the arbitrage 
price theory was not his unique concept, rather, this concept was the fundamental principle of 
all of rational finance theory which is: if the risk-return profiles of two securities are the same, 
then the price of these two securities must also be the same. If this is not so, then an arbitrage 
opportunity would exist, which would grant investors opportunities to earn excess profits by 
buying the low-priced security and disposing it off at the higher price. 
The idea behind the APT is that the completely distinctive fluctuations in a security’s returns 
must not carry any prices for risk because such risk can be diversified away by holding properly 
diversified portfolios. Therefore, expected returns on any security should be linked to the 
covariance of the security with the common elements or “factors” only (Cochrane, 2009). 
According to the APT, the expected return of a security is linear function of some theoretical 
market indices or several macro-economic factors and a factor-specific beta co-efficient 
represents sensitivity to variations in each factor.  
An arbitrage is essentially a risk-free profit. The APT is centered on the law of one price. 
Arbitrage presupposes that investors seek to take advantage of any excess profit opportunities, 
and in response, prices adjust therefore when a security deviates from its fundamental value, 
market participants react in such a way that prices revert to their fundamental values (Ross, 
1976). This assumption is also applied in option pricing theory proposed by Merton (1973) and 
Black and Scholes (1973), who utilized arbitrage in their analyses.  
At the University of Chicago, Lawrence Fisher and James Lorie in 1960, started a programme 
of research on the prices of securities and created the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), with a number of PhD students which included Eugene Fama. Eugene Fama was 
among the pioneers who utilized modern digital computers in conducting empirical finance 
research, and was the first to use the term ‘efficient markets’ (Durlauf and Blume, 2008). 
Eugene Fama developed the EMH through a published Ph.D. thesis in 1965 (Fama, 1965a). In 
1970, Fama published an evaluation of the theory and a confirmation of the hypothesis as well 
as refining the theory and adding the definitions for the three kinds of market efficiency (Fama, 
1970). Fama operationalized the EMH, arguing that if markets were working efficiently, then 
all public (and some private) information relating to any asset would be reflected immediately 
in its price. 
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The models and theories reviewed in this section among other models and theories paved the 
way for the formalization of financial economics as an established sub-discipline of economics 
which was accomplished through amalgamation of the findings from modern probability 
theories, financial econometrics and economic equilibrium and paving the way for the creation 
of  associations between the focal ideas of equilibrium in economics and empirical results in 
finance and in so doing, opening the way for the creation of theoretical interpretations for 
empirical results (Jovanovic, 2008). 
 
2.4 Mean Variance Theory and Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) 
The fundamental principle of the mean-variance portfolio theory is the idea that investors can 
assess the risk‐return trade-off of investment opportunities centered on the variances, expected 
returns, and correlations of those assets. Harry Markowitz (1952) is credited for this theory and 
according to Burton (1998:3), “Markowitz came along and there was light”. Prior to Harry 
Markowitz’s 1952 treatise on portfolio selection, there existed no theory on portfolio 
construction, the whole process was replete with just folklore and rules of thumb until 
Markowitz first made risk the cornerstone of portfolio management (Bernstein, 2007). 
The mean variance theory forms the foundations of modern portfolio theory (MPT) which is a 
finance theory which aims at the maximization of expected return of a portfolio for a given 
level of portfolio risk, or minimize portfolio risk over a given level of portfolio expected return, 
by selecting varying proportions of a number of assets. Harry Markowitz advanced MPT in a 
1952 paper (Markowitz, 1952) and a book in 1959 (Markowitz, 1959). According to Miller 
(1999), portfolio selection, as envisaged and published by Markowitz (1952), could be 
construed as the” big bang” of modern finance. Markowitz methodically developed what is 
now known as the risk-return trade-off in investment decision-making and mathematically 
deriving portfolios selection rule for the first time. Markowitz (1952) provided solutions to the 
questions of how to quantify risk, how to minimize risk and maximize returns and how capital 
should be allocated among different asset classes. This methodology formed the basis for all 
the subsequent theories regarding how risk can be quantified, how financial markets operate 
and how capital should be allocated by corporations (Bernstein, 1993). 
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• Description of the MPT 
Underlying Assumptions (Elton and Gruber, 1997, Francis and Kim, 2013): 
• All investors are risk averse (investors will choose less risk over more risk for any given 
level of expected return). Again, for a given level of risk, investors prefer more return 
to less return. It is however important to note that to some extent, all investors are risk 
averse even though investors may differ in their level of risk aversion. 
• No taxes or transactions costs. 
• Expected returns for all assets are known. 
• For all assets, the variances and covariances of returns are known. 
• To determine optimal portfolios, investors need to know only the variances, 
covariances and expected returns. Skewness, kurtosis, and all other elements of a 
distribution can be ignored by investors. 
The fundamental takeaway of the MPT is that investors should not focus on individual assets’ 
risk and return in a portfolio but rather, each asset should be selected based on its variations in 
returns relative to variations in the returns of all the other securities in the portfolio (Francis 
and Kim, 2013). MPT again describes how combining a number of risky securities can still 
lead to a low risk for the portfolio, as long as their price variations of the assets in the portfolio 
are not perfectly positively correlated.  
Figure 2.1: Effects of Portfolio Diversification 
Source: Adopted from Meir Statman (1987), cited in Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2014: 207) 
Page | 19  
 
Figure 2.1 depicts the effect of portfolio diversification. The figure shows that portfolio risk 
actually reduces with diversification although the power of diversification is limited by the 
systematic risk.  
The process of portfolio construction can be generalized to the situation of many risky assets 
and a risk-free security. This process can be broken down into three parts (Bodie et al., 2014).  
First, there is the identification of the combination of risk and return available from the group 
of risky assets. Second in the process is identifying the portfolio weights that make up the 
steepest capital asset line (CAL)4 representing the optimal portfolio of risky assets. The final 
process involves choosing a complete portfolio through a combination of the optimal portfolio 
with the risk-free security. 
The first step is to determine the risk–return opportunities available to the investor. The investor 
first ascertains the risk-return options available as given by the minimum-variance frontier of 
risky securities which is a graph of the least possible variance that can be achieved for a given 
level of portfolio expected return. With the input data for variances, covariances and expected 
returns available, the minimum-variance portfolio can be calculated for any desirable expected 
return. Figure 2.2 depicts the minimum variance frontier in a two‐asset scenario where, the 
only assets to be considered are Stocks A and B and the three‐asset scenario which includes 
Stock C. The benefits of diversification increase as the correlation between Stock C is not 
perfectly positive with either Stock A or Stock B. 
Figure 2.2: How Increasing the Number of Assets Affect Portfolio Diversification 
 
Source: Level II CFA Study Guide (2015: V5-137) 
                                                          
4 A graph depicting all feasible combinations of risk and accompanying return of a risk-free and risky asset. 
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The total risk, can be separated into systematic risk which is the covariance of the asset’s return 
with that of the return of the market portfolio and non-systematic risk. Systematic risk is the 
only relevant risk for decision making purposes. Figure 2.4 illustrates how diversification 
minimizes non-systematic risk for portfolios. The return variance of the portfolio is the total 
risk for the portfolio which is the systematic risk and the non-systematic risk. The horizontal 
axis illustrates the number of assets held in the portfolio. 
Extensive diversification however cannot eliminate risk in situations where common elements 
of risk affect all firms. In Figure 2.3, the standard deviation of the portfolio falls with an 
increase in the number of securities, but does not be reduce to zero. Risk can be categorised as 
market risk or systematic risk and non-systematic risk. The market risk is the risk that lingers 
even after diversifying extensively, this risk is attributable to the market and is also is also 
called the systematic or non-diversifiable risk. On the other hand, certain risks can be 
eliminated through diversification these risks are firm-specific risks and are referred to as 
diversifiable risk or unsystematic risk. There are empirical studies that support this analysis 
(Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2014).  








Source: Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2014: 207) 
 
As the number of asset held in the portfolio increases, the level of non-systematic risk is 
gradually eliminated or diversified away. This is supported by studies of different classes of 
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assets. A portfolio size of 20 randomly chosen assets for example, can completely remove any 
non-systematic risk and thereby leaving only the systematic risk (Drake and Fabozzi, 2010). 
In summary, one can improve a portfolio’s risk‐return trade-off by increasing the number of 
investable securities, and for any given level of return, the minimum variance portfolio will 
depend on: 
1. the individual assets’ expected returns,  
2. the variance of each asset 
3.  the correlations among the returns of the asset in the portfolio, and  
4. the number of assets in the portfolio.     
 
Problems with the CAPM and Mean-Variance Theory 
The CAPM and the Mean-Variance Theory are two pillars of modern finance, however, these 
models have been strongly criticized on both theoretically and empirically. The critique 
theoretically is that expected utility is fallacious, and some of the other assumptions underlying 
the models are invalid, and, paradoxical choices may be made if one adheres to the Mean-
Variance Theory (Levy, 2010). Empirically, the models are further criticized because rates of 
returns of assets are not normally distributed and the CAPM has only mediocre explanatory 
power (Levy, 2010). 
Allais (1953) shows that when using Expected Utility Theory in making decisions between 
pairs of alternatives, especially for those involving small probabilities, there may be some 
evidence of paradoxes (popularly known as the Allais paradox5) within Expected Utility 
Theory casting doubts on the validity of the Expected Utility Theory which among other 
assumptions, forms the foundation of the Mean-Variance Theory and CAPM. This paradox 
inspired the idea of using decision weights. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest Prospect 
Theory as a substitute theory to the Expected Utility Theory. They posit that investors 
misrepresent probabilities, make choices based on variations in wealth, are prone to loss 
aversion and tend to maximize the anticipation of an S-shaped value function containing a risk-
                                                          
5 Maurice Allais published a paper on a survey he had carry out with a hypothetical game. In the survey, subjects 
with in-depth knowledge of probability theory of probability and construed to behave rationally consistently 
violated the Expected Utility Theory. The game and its results are popularly referred to as the Allais Paradox. 
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seeking segment. Normative economic theories could be more appropriate for agents of 
artificial sort than for human agents, since Artificial Intelligence better adhere to idealized 
assumptions of rationality than people (Parkes and Wellman, 2015). 
Levy, Giorgi and Hens (2012) however, argue that although the Cumulative Prospect Theory 
and Prospect Theory conflict with the Expected Utility Theory, and violates some of the 
underlying assumptions of the CAPM, the CAPM’s Security Market Line (SML) is intact in 
the Cumulative Prospect Theory framework and therefore, the CAPM is also intact in 
Cumulative Prospect Theory framework. 
Baumol (1963), Leshno and Levy (2002) Levy, Leshno and Leibovich (2008), and Levy (2012) 
opine that the Mean Variance Theory is sufficient but it is not a necessary rule for investment 
decisions, and therefore not an optimal rule, precipitating an elimination of a segment, or some 
segments, of the efficient frontier away from the efficient set. The market portfolio 
consequently may be also removed from the efficient set, leading to a vague conclusion on the 
CAPM. 
      
2.5 Random Walk Hypothesis 
For many years, economists, finance academics and statisticians have been involved in 
developing and testing models of stock price behaviour. One of the important model that has 
emerged from this is the theory of random walks. Random walk is a stochastic process 
generated by the successive addition of independent, identically distributed (iid) random 
variables and is one of the main and well-studied topics in probability theory. 
In finance, random walk was made popular by Burton Malkiel, in a 1973 book, A Random 
Walk Down Wall Street. “Taken to its logical extreme, it means that a blindfolded monkey 
throwing darts at a newspaper's financial pages could select a portfolio that would do just as 
well as one carefully selected by the experts” (Malkiel, 1999: 24). 
The principle is that investors react promptly to any advantageous information in financial 
markets and thereby removing any profit opportunities. The implication is that asset prices 
always reflect all the information available therefore no profit can be obtained from trading 
solely based on information (Lo and MacKinlay, 2011).  
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Random walk and the EMH however do not mean the same thing as a random walk of asset 
prices does not necessarily mean the market is efficient or investors are rational rather, random 
walk implies that changes in asset prices are independent from each other (Brealey, 2012). 
Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2005) give a more technical definition of a random walk, expressing 
a random walk with a drift (δ) as a stochastic series 𝑋𝑡 that behaves as: 
𝑋𝑡 =  𝜕 +  𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑡+1                          𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 
The drift is simply the weighted average of probabilities for each price variation of the asset in 
the subsequent period.  
Smith (2008) tested the random walk hypothesis for 11 stock exchanges in Africa namely, 
Botswana, Ghana , Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Egypt, Mauritius, Nigeria, Morocco, South Africa, 
Tunisia and Zimbabwe from January 2000 to September 2006 applying a joint variance ratio 
tests with finite-sample critical values and rejects the iid random walk hypothesis in all the 11 
stock exchanges. The weekly returns in 4 of the selected stock exchanges (Nigeria, Egypt, 
South Africa and Tunisia) exhibit a martingale difference sequence. Smith (2008) concludes 
that liquidity is a major factor in determining whether a stock exchange follows a random walk. 
2.6 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
Prior to Fama’s EMH, no theory existed to explain why financial markets are so hard to beat, 
the recognition of such a possibility was non-existent (Bernstein, 2007). Eugene Fama is 
credited with the first use of the term ‘efficient market’(1965a) even though there is evidence 
that the concept was independently developed by Eugene Fama and Paul Samuelson 
(Samuelson, 1965) from two considerably unrelated research works which propelled both of 
them along two separate courses resulting in a number of other breakthroughs and 
achievements, all emerging from their related study, the EMH (Durlauf and Blume, 2008).  
In Fama’s 1965 paper titled: “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices,” (Fama, 1965b), he cites, 
inter alia, his prior study of serial correlations in the daily price fluctuations of 30 stocks that 
made up the Dow Jones Industrial Average index (“The Behavior of Stock Market Prices” 
(Fama, 1965a)). His conclusion was that the daily fluctuations had a very minimal positive 
correlation, approximating zero for all practical purposes. Fama (1965b, 56) defines efficient 
markets as: 
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“…a market where there are large numbers of rational profit 
maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict 
future market values of individual securities, and where 
important current information is almost freely available to all 
participants.”  
Figure 2.4 shows how in an efficient market, stock prices respond to new information plotting 
the response to prices of sampled firms targeted for takeover. The acquiring firms in majority 
of takeovers paid a substantial premium over the prevailing market prices, therefore any 
relevant information on an attempted takeover should trigger the stock price increase. 
 
Figure 2.4: How Stock Prices Respond to New Information  
Source: Adopted from Keown and Pinkerton (1981), cited in Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2014: 
351) 
The figure displays how stock prices increase spectacularly on the day the news is made public 
but there is no further movement in prices after the date of the announcement, implying that 
prices incorporate the new information, which by the end of the trading day, includes the 
probable enormity of the takeover premium. 
Patell and Wolfson (1984) provide a more dramatic confirmation that swift reaction to new 
information may be found in intraday prices proving that majority of the stock price reaction 
to announcements of corporate dividends or earnings happens within ten minutes of the 
announcement. A study by Busse and Green (2002) provides a good demonstration of such 
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rapid assimilation. Busse and Green (2002) tracked minute-by-minute equity prices of 
companies that appeared on the “Morning” or “Midday Call” segment of business news 
television channel CNBC.  Minute 0 in Figure 2.6 represents the time the equity is mentioned 
on the show at midday.  
Figure 2.5: How Stock Price React on CNBC Report  
Source: Adopted from Busse and Green (2002), cited in Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
(2014:352) 
 
The line above represents the average price variation of equities that get positive reports, and 
the line below shows returns on equities that receive negative reports. From the above graph, 
it can be observed that the line on top levels off, demonstrating that the news has been fully 
incorporated by the market within five minutes of the news whiles within 12 minutes, the line 
below also levels off.  
In the Swedish market, Hartman and Rodestedt (2010) find that adjustments to new information 
by the market as measured in volatility peaks within the first minute and within three minutes 
after the new information, more than half of the adjustments to normality is completed whiles 
full adjustment takes thirty-five minutes after the release of the information. 
Kurov, Sancetta, Strasser and Wolfe (2015) studied the behaviour of the prices of equity index 
and the Treasury futures around the dissemination of macroeconomic announcements of the 
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United States and discovered that out of the eighteen market-moving announcements, seven 
exhibited evidence of informed trading prior to the official time of release with prices drifting 
towards the correct direction about thirty minutes before the announcement time. 
Notable literature relating to the EMH though began earlier in 16th century with renowned 
Italian mathematician, Girolamo Cardano, in his book Liber de Ludo Aleae (The Book of 
Games of Chance) argued: “The most fundamental principle of all in gambling is simply equal 
conditions, e.g. of opponents, of bystanders, of money, of situation, of the dice box, and of the 
die itself. To the extent to which you depart from that equality, if it is in your opponents favour, 
you are a fool, and if in your own, you are unjust” (Cardano, c 1564). 
In 1828, Robert Brown the Scottish botanist, discovered that viewed under a microscope, 
pollen grains suspended in water had a swift oscillatory movement (Brown, 1828). French 
stockbroker, Jules Regnault, noted that the longer one holds a security, the more likely it is to 
win or lose on its price fluctuations which is proportional directly to the square root of time 
(Regnault, 1863). Jules Regnault, an amateur mathematician and a broker on the Paris Bourse, 
was one of the earliest to make a formal expression on market efficiency in a book written in 
1863. Regnault, by personal observation and by force of logic argues that the market price of 
an asset at any particular time reflects the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ and therefore speculators who 
trade on the imperfections of the market were being delusional. He asserts that one can only 
make a profit by trading on private information not available to other market participants. By 
using probability theory, he estimated the “gamblers ruin” problem - the number of times an 
uninformed trader has to trade before losing all his money. Regnault is also regarded as the 
first person to argue that market efficiency implies that security prices follow a random walk 
(Shamshir and Mustafa, 2014). Using data from both French and British bonds, Regnault tested 
this theory and therefore the first empirical researcher to verify a “random walk” in asset prices. 
Renowned English economist John Maynard Keynes opined that investors are rewarded for 
bearing risk rather than not for knowing better than the market, this assertion is a consequence 
of the EMH. 
Fama (1970) defines three kinds of market efficiency – weak-form, semi-strong-form and 
strong-form efficiency - each based on a differing conception of what kind of information set 
is construed to be pertinent in the statement: “a market in which prices ‘fully reflect’ all 
available information is called ‘efficient’”. 
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• Weak-form Efficient Market 
In weak-form efficient market, analysing information relating to past prices cannot be used to 
predict future prices. Therefore, in the long-run, one cannot earn excess returns by applying 
investment strategies that are based on historical data or the historical share prices. In a weak-
form efficient market, technical analysts will be unable to consistently deliver excess returns, 
even though some kinds of fundamental analysis could still be able to deliver excess returns. 
Share prices do not exhibit any serial dependencies therefore future price fluctuations are 
defined solely by information that is not contained in the time series of price. The implication 
is that the time series of prices follow a random walk. In a weak-form efficiency it is not 
necessary for prices to be at or near equilibrium, however, investors will still not be able to 
persistently profit from market 'inefficiencies' (Drake and Fabozzi, 2010).  
Many findings have shown a noticeable inclination for stock markets to ‘trend’ for weeks or 
longer (Saad, Prokhorov and Wunsch, 1998; Hamori, 2012; Pring, 2014). Furthermore, there 
is evidence of a positive correlation between the time period and the degree of trending 
(Granger and Morgenstern, 2001) although the EMH asserts that barring any changes in 
fundamental information, all price movements are random. 
In academic finance, there exist an extensive literature dealing with the momentum effect first 
identified by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,2001) who discovered that equities that have 
performed well over a period of 3 to 12 months, maintain such performance over the next 3 to 
12 months and vice versa. The momentum effect, based simply on historical stock returns, 
provides a strong evidence against the weak-form efficient market, and has been detected in 
the stock returns of many countries (Garg and Varshney, 2015, Birru, 2015, Choi and Kim, 
2014, Asness et al., 2013, Fama and French, 2012). 
Jefferis and Smith (2005) using weekly data starting from the third week of January 1990 to 
the last week of June 2001, applied a GARCH approach with parameters that vary with time, 
implemented a test of evolving efficiency (TEE) and reported changes in weak form efficiency 
through time on selected stock exchanges in Africa. The TEE showed that the JSE exhibited 
weak form efficiency over the period of the study whereas three stock exchanges namely the 
Casablanca Finance Group (CFG) 25 of Morocco, the EFG Price Index of Egypt and, the 
S&P/IFC Global Index for Nigeria exhibited weak form efficiency towards the end of the 
period of the study (1999 for Morocco and Egypt and from early 2001 for Nigeria.). However, 
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the Nairobi Stock Exchange of Kenya and Zimbabwe Stock Exchange showed no movement 
towards weak form efficiency whereas the SEMDEX of Mauritius displays a slow drift towards 
eliminating inefficiency. 
• Semi-strong-form Efficient Market 
In a semi-strong-form efficient market, prices of securities adjust rapidly to information that is 
publicly available in an unbiased fashion, therefore investors cannot persistently earn excess 
by trading on such information. The implications for a semi-strong form efficient market is that 
one cannot rely on fundamental analysis or technical analysis techniques to consistently 
produce excess returns (Drake and Fabozzi, 2010).  
• Strong-form Efficient Market 
In strong-form efficient market, prices of securities incorporate all information, both public 
and private, and therefore no investor can earn excess returns. It implies that even corporate 
insiders cannot profit from using private information. Strong-form efficient market builds and 
incorporates the weak-form efficient market and the semi-strong form efficient market. Given 
that there are legal barriers that may prevent private information from becoming public, for 
example insider trading laws, strong-form efficiency may be impossible, except in the situation 
where these laws are collectively ignored (Drake and Fabozzi, 2010).  
The semi-strong efficient market differs from the strong efficient market, in a strong form 
efficient market, market participants cannot even profit from inside information (Harder, 
2010). This implies that in a strong form efficient market the management of a company who 
are regard as insiders cannot benefit from inside information if they chose to trade the shares 
of their company even after they decide without making the information public, to carry out 
what they perceive to be a profitable takeover. A strong form efficient market will foresee 
future event and such information would have been incorporated in security prices in an 
objective and unbiased way before even those considered insiders make any trading decision 
(Clarke et al. 2001). 
 
2.7 Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and the Multi Factor Models 
The CAPM which is a single factor asset pricing model has been criticized as too restrictive. It 
is only reasonable to assume that a more precise representation of systematic risk, that allows 
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for different securities to show different sensitivities to its various factors, would be a more 
useful modification of the single-factor model.  
 Stephen Ross (Ross, 1976) proposed a general theory of asset pricing, the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) that posits that the expected return of a financial securities can be depicted as a 
linear function of several theoretical market indices or macro-economic factors with sensitivity 
to variations in each factor represented by a beta coefficient that is factor-specific. The APT 
assumes a linear relationship between the factors and asset returns even though it does not point 
out not point out what the factors are. 
Ross’s APT is based on three key assumptions: 
(1) asset returns can be explained by systematic factors 
(2) there are adequate securities to diversify away unsystematic risk; and  
(3) arbitrage opportunities cannot persist in properly functioning security markets. 
The nonexistence of arbitrage is arguably one of the most essential fundamental assumptions 
of classical finance.  Arbitrage is simply the simultaneous trading of assets at different prices 
in different markets with the arbitrageur making profits while bearing no additional risk by 
buying at a low price in one market and concurrently selling at a high price in another market 
(Focardi and Fabozzi, 2004, Huberman, 2005, Gromb and Vayanos, 2010).  
 
2.8 The Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
Fama and French (1996) derived another multi-factor model known as the Fama-French Three-
Factor model which at present is the principal approach to identifying factors for sources of 
systematic risk (Bodie et al., 2014). This model applies firm traits that appear on empirical 
grounds to be representation of exposure to market or systematic risk. The factors selected are 
variables have in the past predicted average returns accurately and may therefore be depicting 
risk premiums. The Fama and French three-factor model is given as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑀(𝐾𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = The expected returns of the portfolio 
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𝐾𝑀𝑡 = The return of the market portfolio 
𝑅𝑓𝑡 = Risk-free rate 
SMB = Small Minus Big, the difference between the return of a portfolio of large stocks and a 
portfolio of small stocks. 
HML = High Minus Low, the difference between the return of a portfolio high book-to-market-
value ratio stocks and the return of a low book-to-market ratio stocks portfolio. 
 
The market index in this model captures systematic risk emanating from macroeconomic 
factors. Although HML and SMB are in themselves not obvious candidates for pertinent risk 
factors, it is argued that they may be proxies for more fundamental yet-unknown variables. 
Fama and French for example, posit that firms in distress financially are more likely to have 
high book-to-market value ratios and small stocks may be more sensitive to variations in 
business conditions hence, these variables may portray sensitivity to macroeconomic risk 
factors.  
Black (1993) however argues that whenever researchers continuously scan the database of asset 
returns when searching for explanatory factors, they can eventually unearth past “patterns” that 
purely are due to chance, a practice commonly referred to as data-snooping. Black (1993) 
further points out that since discovery, the return premiums to factors like firm size have turned 
out to be inconsistent. Fama and French however have proved that the book-to-market and size 
ratios have in various time periods and markets over the world predicted average returns 
therefore diminishing possible effects of data-snooping (French, 2015). 
With regards to factors, there are at least 3166 factors that have been tested by financial market 
researchers that explain the cross-section of expected returns (Harvey, Liu and Zhu, 2015). In 
fact, Cochrane (2011), describes this as “a zoo of new factors”.  Figure 2.6 shows the growth 




                                                          
6 Appendix D presents a detailed list of all the factors 
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Figure 2.6: Factors and Publications 
 
Source: Harvey, Lui and Zhu (2015: 19)  
 Harvey, Lui and Zhu (2015) argue that many of the factors discovered are only significant by 
chance and therefore, it is a dangerous mistake in asset pricing tests to apply the typical 
statistical significance cutoffs such as a t-statistic exceeding 2.0.  
Furthermore, McLean and Pontiff (2016) studied the return predictability of 97 factors that 
academic studies have shown to forecast the cross-section of stock returns using out-of-sample 
and post-publication and found that factors lose 26% of their power after discovery. This inter 
alia, may be attributed to the effects of data mining. Factors further lose 32% of their 
predictability power after they appear in academic papers suggesting that investors only learn 
about this mispricing only after they have been published in academic papers. Financial 
markets can therefore not be construed to incorporate all relevant information since factor 
models purely reflect risk-return trade-offs and should not be affected by the publications done 
by academics. 
Ranguelova, Feeney and Lu (2015) discovered that there has been a significant decline in alpha 
as shown in Figure 2.7. Hedge funds included in the HFRI Composite index in 2001 achieved 
a rolling 3-year alpha of 25%, peaking at around 35% in 2002, before declining and finally 
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plateauing between 5 and 10% after 2008. Strategies that required lower entry barriers, for 
example long/short equities, suffered the steepest alpha generation decay as a result of more 
players entering the industry. In the long/short equities strategy group however, Figure 2.8 
shows managers focusing on small and mid-cap equities generated more alpha and experienced 
less alpha decay relative to their peers concentrating on large-caps since mid-2004. 
Figure 2.7: Alpha Generation Decay: HFRI Composite from January 2001 – January 
2015 
 Source: Adopted from Investcorp, Bloomberg, cited in Ranguelova, Feeney and Lu (2015: 1) 
It is well known that the small-cap equities offer a more attractive opportunity for generating 
alpha through investing in “under the radar” equities discovered by talented stock pickers. 
Managers who concentrate on small and mid-cap equities benefit from the “structural alpha” 
existing in this segment by exploiting lingering inefficiencies such as the quality of information 
for example, fewer analysts and less frequent publication of research reports on these stocks, 
and the limited volume and also, from a playing field that is less crowded relative to that of 
large cap equities (Ranguelova et al., 2015). Figure 2.9 shows that the number of analysts 
assigned to small cap equities as at March 2015 were far fewer than the number of analysts 
assigned to large cap equities. 
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Figure 2.8: Less Alpha Decay in Small-Cap Hedge Fund Strategies from January 2001 – 
January 2015 
 
Source: Adopted from Investcorp, Bloomberg, cited in Ranguelova, Feeney and Lu (2015: 1) 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Number of Analysts per Market Cap Size Decile (March 2015) 
 
Source: Adopted from Investcorp, cited in Ranguelova, Feeney and Lu (2015: 4) 
 
Ranguelova et al. (2015) compiled data from Capital IQ data service to tally the number of 
publications for the largest 10 and smallest 10 smallest companies of the Russell 2000 and the 
S&P 500 indices over a period of 30 days, three months, six months and one year. Defining 
publications as earnings estimates, research reports, research notes, fixed income reports, and 
articles on industry overview as they relate to the selected companies, financial models, 
initiation of coverage memos, notices of rating change and reporting results summaries. The 
study reports that there is a significant difference in publication frequency for constituents of 
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the two indices (Figure 2.10). There were on average, 36 publications for a large S&P 500 
stock compared to just 10 for a large Russell 2000 stock.  
 
Figure 2.10: Dispersion of Analyst Forecasts per Market Cap Size Decile (March 2015) 
 
Source: Adopted from Investcorp, cited in Ranguelova, Feeney and Lu (2015: 6) 
 
 
The dispersion of analysts’ forecasts for companies with market capitalizations of $7 billion or 
more diverge in a tight range of less than 10% increasing monotonically as the size of the 
market capitalization drops.  This implies smaller companies attract less analyst attention, 
leading to limited coverage by few analysts. Therefore, there are structural inefficiencies in the 
U.S. small-cap equity market that can be exploited to generate alpha (Ranguelova et al., 2015). 
 
2.9 Low Volatility Anomaly 
The low volatility anomaly can be defined as the phenomenon where low-risk stocks display 
markedly higher returns than the market portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis, while high-risk 
stocks underperform significantly on a risk-adjusted basis (Blitz, Pang and Van Vliet, 2013). 
This anomaly was discovered from two different sources - an academic source and an applied 
investment source (Marmer, 2015). From the academic perspective, the low volatility anomaly 
is credited to the empirical testing of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by pioneering 
academics who found that “high-beta securities had significantly negative intercepts and low-
beta securities had significantly positive intercepts, contrary to the predictions of the traditional 
form of the model.” (Jensen, Black and Scholes, 1972: 44). The low volatility anomaly, from 
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an applied investment perspective on the other hand can be attributed to Haugen and Heins 
(1972) who discovered that monthly returns of stocks with lower variances over the long run, 
outperform stock portfolios with higher variance. Even with evidence of continuing critical 
empirical tests of the CAPM and the early claims of Haugen and his colleagues, it took almost 
two decades before academic interest was reawakened on the concept of low volatility 
investing (Marmer, 2015).  
The traditional theories of asset pricing do not explain these patterns. Possibly, beta might just 
be a wrong measure of risk. The CAPM is only a one-equilibrium measure of risk and return 
based on unrealistic assumptions.  Over the past decades, however, academics have dedicated 
extensive efforts into creating rational models with the aim of finding the “right” measure of 
risk. A lot of these current models make the CAPM mathematics appear antiquated. Regardless 
of advanced computational capability, the new models face a difficult battle (Barker, Bradley 
and Wurgler, 2011).   
Romer (2015) cautions against ‘mathiness’ - the misuse of mathematical analyses to disguise 
an ideological agenda backed by unrealistic assumptions - and points out how economists 
usually stick to science but sometimes stray into academic politics. Economists fancy 
themselves as scientists, and believe that practitioners could reach dispassionate conclusions. 
However, “The problem is, you can’t look at the data objectively most of the time…You have 
prior beliefs that are methodological or ideological about the impact of things, and that 
inevitably color the assumptions you make.” (Peterson, 2016). 
Anthony Randazzo and Jonathan Haidt surveyed 131 economists and found that their response 
to moral questions predicted their response to empirical questions. For example, an economist 
who describes “fairness” as equality of outcome may be more likely to conclude that austerity 
hurts growth, or single-payer healthcare bends the cost curve (Randazzo and Haidt, 2015). 
Milton Friedman, debating Walter Heller on PBS, argued: “I doubt very much that there are 
any value-free economists. But that doesn’t mean that there cannot be value-free economics” 
and such a thing “is no more likely to exist than is the frictionless world of high school physics 
problems.” (Friedman, 1979, 7:55).  According to Russ Roberts, whereas in science, “the old 
saw is that progress comes one funeral at a time, with adherents of old theories dying off, 
economics does not work that way. There’s still Keynesians. There’s still monetarists. There’s 
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still Austrians. Still arguing about it. And the worst part to me is that everybody looks at the 
other side and goes ‘What a moron!’…That’s not how you debate science.” (Peterson, 2016).  
John Maynard Keynes in reviewing Professor Tinbergen’s book, Statistical Testing of Business 
Cycle Theories, argued that 
“No one could be more frank, more painstaking, more free 
from subjective bias or parti pris than Professor Tinbergen. 
There is no one, therefore, so far as human qualities go, 
whom it would be safer to trust with black magic. That there 
is anyone I would trust with it at the present stage, or that this 
brand of statistical alchemy is ripe to become a branch of 
science, I am not yet persuaded. But Newton, Boyle and 
Locke all played with Alchemy. So let him continue” 
Keynes (1939: 156). 
 Leamer (1983) in a paper, “Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics,” argues that in drawing 
inferences from data as expressed by econometrics, it becomes necessary to make capricious 
assumptions. 
 
Figure 2.11: Sample of Published Research on Low Volatility Strategies  
Adopted from Hillsdale Investment Management, cited in Marmer (2015: 18) 
Blitz and Van Vliet (2007), Baker and Haugen (2012) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) 
significantly contributed to the literature on the low volatility effect and documented their 
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results in global equity markets, as well as distinguishing and disentangling a volatility effect 
different from the classic value, size and momentum effects, and offering possible explanations 
for this effect. Figure 2.11 shows a growing number of studies on the low-volatility anomaly 
since it was first reported in 1972. Figure 2.12 shows the differences in risks, returns as well 
as risk adjusted returns between low risk and high risk securities in selected developed 
countries while Figure 2.13 shows the differences in risks, returns as well as risk adjusted 
returns between low risk and high risk securities in selected developing countries. 
 








Source:  Baker and Haugen (2012: 7) 
Baker et al. (2011) grouped the top 1000 stocks by market capitalization tracked by the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) according to trailing volatility and beta into five 
quintiles and found that stocks with the lowest volatility also had the highest returns concluding 
that over the long-term, low-risk portfolios outperforming high-risk portfolios is conceivably 
the most critical anomaly in finance and the extent of its magnitude defies the basic conception 
of a risk–return trade-off. Figure 2.14 shows the performance of the investments in the various 
quintiles. 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) propose an investment strategy of betting against beta (BaB) 
whereby an investor takes a long position on low beta equities and a short position on high beta 
equities. In their study, they found that a BaB strategy prduces a high risk-adjusted return. 
Corroborating the findings of  Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), Auer and Schuhmacher (2015) 
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selected the 30 constituent equities of the Dow Jones Industrial Average over 1926–2013 and 
investigated the existence and exploitability of the liquidity anomaly. The study confirms the 
existence of this anomaly of an inverse relationship between risk and return. 
Figure 2.13: Developed Markets Performance (Lowest Risk Decile - Highest Risk Decile 
1990– 2011 
 
Source: Baker and Haugen (2012: 5)  
 
Figure 2.14: The Value of $ 1 invested in 1968 
Source:  Baker et al (2011: 3) 
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They further conclude that this anomaly is exploitable by taking a long position on the 15 stocks 
with the lowest betas and shorting the remaining 15 with the highest beta and in the process, 
generating significant abnormal returns. The general asset-pricing factors of momentum, size 
and book-to-market does not explain the exploitability of this anomaly. 
In South Africa, the first evidence of the low volatility anomaly on the JSE was reported by 
Rensburq and Robertson (2003), who concluded that there is a negative correlation between a 
stock’s beta and its return. Strugnell et al. (2011) also confirmed the existence of the low 
volatility anomaly on the JSE applying a more refined estimate of beta.  Khuzwayo (2011) 
constructed low beta versus high beta portfolio of stocks made up of the Top 100 JSE stocks 
from 2001 to 2011 and matched their performance with the All share index (ALSI). His study 
concluded that low beta portfolios outperformed both high beta portfolios and the ALSI during 
periods of overall market underperformance in the market (Figure 2.15).  
Figure 2.15: Annual performance of low beta versus high beta baskets (December 2001-
May 2011) 
 
Source: Adopted in Khuzwayo (2011), cited in Oladele (2014: 11) 
Oladele and Bradfield (2016) analysed low volatility portfolios and used sectors rather than 
individual stocks as the foundation for portfolio construction. Their study concluded that low 
volatility portfolios outperformed the JSE All Share index based on their Sharpe ratios (Figure 
2.16 & Figure 2.17).  
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Figure 2.16: Out-of-sample cumulative returns of the FTSE/JSE sector-based low 
volatility portfolios January 2006–December 2013. 
 
Source: Oladele and Bradfield (2016: 67) 
 
Figure 2.17: Risk-return plot of the sector-based low volatility portfolios, January 2006–
December 2013. 
 
Source: Oladele and Bradfield (2016: 67)  
Muller and Ward (2013) re-examined style variables including size, momentum, liquidity 
return on equity by using an improvised data set and methodology and concluded that portfolios 
built using univariate ranked styles display considerable effects over 1985 to 2011. The study 
also finds persistent and significant excess returns in the following variables: earnings yield, 
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momentum, price to book, dividend yield, return on capital, cash-flow to price, liquidity, 
interest cover and return on equity and concluded that there is no evidence of the size effect, 
with the exception of fledgling companies. 
Several explanations have been given to the low risk anomaly. Among the explanations give 
are: 
• Agency problems 
• Type of manager compensation 
• Overconfidence bias 
 
• Agency Problems 
Baker and Haugen (2012) posit that the low volatility anomaly can be explained by: 
a.   Agency problems between investment managers in an organization 
b.  investment managers and their clients 
 
There are significant issues that exist among investment managers that can create excess 
demand for highly volatile stocks. Regular investment committee meetings which are central 
to the portfolio building process serve as a guide for constructing portfolios. Normally at such 
meetings, a team of analysts, each assigned to a particular industry or sector tries to make a 
case for a stock she believes must form part of the model portfolio. Analysts persistently failing 
to make their case may end up being terminated and are therefore susceptible to recommending 
equities for which a compelling case can be made. Such equities are typically noteworthy 
because they receive media attention and the flow of new information on these equities is 
comparatively intense therefore exhibiting higher than average volatility. As analysts aim to 
impress their colleagues, they would make a case for the inclusion of stocks with higher than 
average volatility in the model portfolio. The interesting characteristics of such equities offer 
the chance to easily explain their inclusion in the portfolio to their clients. Asset managers may 
recognise that the stocks being recommended are newsworthy, while being oblivious of their 
high volatility as most managers are not quantitative. These agency issues therefore create 
demand for highly volatile stocks by professional investors and in the process leading to the 
prices of such stocks to be overvalued with suppressed future expected returns. 
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• Type of Manager Compensation 
Figure 2.18 illustrates a manager remuneration schedule where the manager receives a basic 
salary and also a bonus when there is a satisfactory performance. Two probability distributions 
are superimposed on this figure. One for a portfolio that is volatile and the other a less volatile 
portfolio. It is evident that there is an increase in the expected value of compensation if the 
manager selects a more volatile portfolio (Baker and Haugen, 2012). 
Figure 2.18: Option-Like Manager Compensation 
 
Source: Baker and Haugen (2012: 11) 
 
• Overconfidence bias 
Overconfidence is another prevalent bias that underlies the choice of high-volatility stock 
(Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 1977; Alpert and Raiffa 1982). Stocks that have wide-
ranging opinions will likely have relatively more optimistic shareholders and trade at higher 
prices, which lead to supressed future returns (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina ,2002) 
2.10 Efficiently Inefficient Market 
EMH posit, that prices reflect all relevant information all the time, however, if that is the case 
then no market participant will try to beat the market, market participants will all resort to 
passive investing and eventually the market becomes inefficient. Pedersen (2015) proposes that 
financial markets are efficiently inefficient arguing that markets are inefficient but to an 
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efficient extent. In an efficiently inefficient market, competition among professional investors 
make financial markets almost efficient but remain inefficient so that they are compensated for 
their costs and risks. Asness and Liew (2014) believe that markets are reasonably efficient and 
disagree with markets reflecting all relevant information. An efficient market also efficiently 
reflects irrational investors’ desires. 
The assumption of market efficiency has promoted the move to index-linked investments as 
professional managers on average underperform the market. As index-linked investing 
disregards idiosyncrasies of individual companies except for the characteristics that are 
pertinent to the methodology of index-weighting such as market capitalization, the transactions 
of index-linked investments largely affect all securities within the given index. As a result, 
index-linked investments create an environment where trading decisions of individual 
securities are driven mainly by the overall market trends like investors’ sentiments instead of 
company-specific events such as earnings surprise or profit. Bolla, Kohler and Wittig (2016) 
concluded in a study that a market environment characterized by a large number of index-
related investments may exhibit amplified co-movement of securities in the given index and, 
consequently increasing the vulnerability in that financial market. Bolla et al. (2016) further 
discovered that growth in index-linked investing leads to an increase in risk commonalities 
(e.g. a higher co-movement among assets implies higher risk commonality) which is both 
statistically and economically significant. In regions in their early stages of index-related 
investing, large-cap companies are more affected by the growth in index-related investing 
whereas regions with a more mature index investing markets, experience a spill over of the 
effects of index-related investing (risk commonalities) to small-cap companies as well (Bolla 
et al., 2016).  
Engelberg and Parsons (2011) analysed how investors in nineteen local markets in the United 
States simultaneously react to the same set of information i.e., the release of earnings of firms 
of the S&P 500 Index and find that the existence or absence coverage of local media is strongly 
correlated to the size and probability of local trading. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) also find 
a strong relationship between trading patterns and the local pattern of media coverage. Earnings 
reported on Wednesday by the San Francisco Chronicle for example stimulates trade in the 
Bay Area with the entire set of events shifting to Atlanta when the same event is reported by 
the Journal Constitution on Thursday providing evidence of a pure media effect on investors.  
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2.11 Joint Hypothesis Problem 
The Joint Hypothesis problem asserts that testing for efficient market is impossible or at best 
difficult because any efforts to test for market efficiency must include an equilibrium asset 
pricing models and one can only measure 'abnormal' returns by applying these pricing models 
to predict expected returns. Therefore, any inconsistency in evidences on market returns may 
be because of bad asset pricing model, market inefficiency or both (Campbell et al., 1997). 
Alajbeg, Bubaš and Šonje (2012) opine that the efficient market hypothesis is not a “falsifiable” 
theory7, because the methodology applied in defining an informationally efficient market is 
axiomatic and provides a theoretical prediction to the behaviour of security prices under certain 
assumptions that do not aim at reflecting the actual market conditions. This methodology does 
not provide any criteria in the actual market on what is efficient and may therefore need 
extensive extension before the efficient market hypothesis can become a falsifiable empirical 
theory. In summary, the Joint Hypothesis problem implies that market efficiency is not testable. 
2.12 Summary 
The assumptions and theories of classical finance still remain relevant in both academia and in 
the industry as the models are continually taught at finance faculties in universities and being 
applied by practitioners in various sectors such as asset management, risk management and 
personal financial planning. The upsurge of investments in index funds is testament to the 
dominance of classical finance despite the barrage of criticisms of the underlying theories. In 
an article titled The Great Divide, Asness and Liew (2014) conclude that despite the criticisms 
of the EMH, it has contributed immensely towards the understanding of finance and economics 
in general than any other single idea over the past 50 years and prior to EMH, finance was not 
even a science and barely even an abstract art therefore, the splitting of the 2013 Nobel Prize 
in Economics between Eugene Fama an EMH pioneer and Robert Shiller an EMH critic (and  
Lars Hansen for his contribution to asset price analysis) is a vote of confidence by the Nobel 
committee in the EMH as well as an acknowledgement of its deficiencies. The following 
chapter discusses chaos theory and the Fractal Market Hypothesis which provide alternative 
description of financial market behaviour.
                                                          
7 Falsifiability implies the ability to subject a theory to criticism and empirical testing to prove it false 
(POPPER, K. R. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.) 
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Although classical finance theories are based among other assumptions on rationality of market 
participants, efficient markets, and normal distribution, from the history of financial crises, it 
becomes evident that financial market participants cannot be construed to be rational as 
suggested by classical finance and events that are assumed to be anomalies keep recurring more 
often than can be explained by classical finance theories. This chapter presents an alternative 
theory on the behaviour of financial markets which provides a different hypothesis on the 
behaviour of financial markets. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The rate at which financial crises repeat themselves over time in similar and recurring ‘greed-
panic’, ‘boom-bust’ patterns throughout history irrespective of technological advancements are 
contrary to those suggested by classical finance theories. For example, as pointed out by 
Mallaby (2010: 105): 
“…a plunge of the size that befell the S&P 500 futures contracts on 
October 19 [1987] had a probability of one in 10160—that is, a ‘1’ with 
160 zeroes after it. To put that probability into perspective, it meant 
that an event such as the crash would not be anticipated to occur even 
if the stock market were to remain open for twenty billion years, the 
upper end of the expected duration of the universe, or even if it were 
to be reopened for further sessions of twenty billion years following 
each of twenty successive big bangs.” 
 
Velasquéz (2009) proposes adapting Chaos Theory and Fractal science to explain financial 
phenomenon as this new theory would be able to explain the “messiness” of financial markets 
of today with the implication that the underlying assumptions of several classical finance 
theories such as the rationality of market participants, efficient markets and models of 
equilibrium have to be discarded. 
CHAPTER THREE  
CHAOS THEORY AND FRACTAL MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
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3.2 Shortcomings of Classical Finance 
Financial crises, such as the ones that occurred in 1987, 1998, 2000 and then recently in 2007, 
have been brushed off as anomalies by proponents of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
who maintain that markets remain informationally efficient. However, the frequency with which 
these crises occur cannot be explained by the underlying assumptions of an efficient market.  
Mandelbrot (2012) proves that the substantial one-day market fluctuations cannot be brushed 
aside as anomalies when estimating risk or forecasting returns since removing the ten largest 
one-day fluctuations from the S&P 500 over a period of 20 years, gives a very different kind of 
market reality and therefore these big moves do matter.  
 
Figure 3.1: The S&P without the Ten Biggest One-Day Moves 
 
Source: Mandelbrot and Taleb (2005: 11)  
Mandelbrot and Taleb (2005) argue that the measures of risk such as standard deviation, value-
at-risk, variance, correlation etc., as given by classical finance are not helpful in truly measuring 
risk as these measures are built on the statistical device of the bell curve which disregards big 
market fluctuations. They argue that these measures of risk “focus on the grass and miss out on 
the (gigantic) trees” therefore the infrequent and large deviations such as the failure of Enron in 
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2001 or the astonishing rise of Cisco in the 1990s which have significant impacts on long-term 
returns are disregard (Mandelbrot and Taleb, 2005:99). 
Although a study by Bendel, Smit and Hamman (1996) provides a special impetus on the 
behaviour of the stock market time series using a variety of indices, results were somehow 
mixed across indices. However, evidence of long-run persistence in the overall share returns 
were observed suggesting that future returns are influenced by past returns at least in the long 
term (Bendel, Smith & Hamman, 1996) which cultivates the need for further interrogation of 
the behaviour of share returns in modern economies.  
The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Goldman Sachs – Bill Bonner – writing in Money Week 
about the series of events that occurred in August 2007 stated that “Things were happening then 
that were only supposed to happen about once in every 100,000 years. Either that…or 
Goldman’s models were wrong.” (Bonner, 2007). However, the United States Treasury 
Secretary during the crisis - Henry Paulson -  states that the situation could have been worse 
(Paulson, 2010). Warren Buffet credits Henry Paulson together with Ben Bernanke, Timothy 
Geithner and Sheila Bair (Chairman of the FDIC) for the sterling management of the crisis - 
(Paulson, 2010). In his book The Improbability Principle, renowned British statistician, Hand 
(2014a) argues that the law of “probability lever” can trigger a slight variation in circumstances 
to have a colossal impact on probability and thereby transforming a minute probability into a 
massive one. He concludes that when scientific theory fails to match the observation, the reason 
could be that there is a problem of measurement with the data or that such theory is erroneous.  
Some economists often argue that American economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman 
validated the idea that making outrageously inaccurate assumptions is actually a sensible way 
to approach science, an argument famously referred to as Friedman’s “F-Twist” which has 
contributed significantly to warping the nature of economic theories (Buchanan, 2013). Milton 
Friedman is arguably the most influential economist of the twentieth century (The Economist, 
2006). Pfleiderer (2014) proposes subjecting a model to real world “filters” to ascertain the 
connection between the model’s assumptions and what is known in the real world describing 
models that have dubious associations with the real world as “chameleons”.  
Classical finance theory is based, inter alia, on the assumptions of investors being rational, of 
informationally efficient markets and market equilibrium. Equilibrium infers the nonexistence 
of emotional forces like greed and fear, which trigger the economy to evolve and to adjust to 
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new conditions. Peters (1991: 5) claims that equilibrium infers the nonexistence of emotional 
forces like greed and fear, which triggers the economy to evolve and to adjust to new 
conditions. Regulating such human tendencies, he admits are desirable to minimise their effects 
but doing away with them however “would take away the life out of the system, including the 
far from equilibrium conditions that are necessary for development” 
Corroborating the assertions of Peters (1991), American physicist and former editor of the 
international journal of science Nature and the New Scientist magazine, Mark Buchanan 
reasons that the assumption of equilibrium in economics and finance is “…a crazy state of 
affairs, something more or less equivalent to physics in the Middle Ages…” and contends that 
all kinds of financial crises from flash crashes to global financial meltdowns are similar to 
storms in the socioeconomic systems (Buchanan, 2013).  
As financial crises are becoming pervasive, the assumption of efficient markets is increasingly 
being criticised. Some academics have turned to Chaos Theory to provide an explanation to 
the behaviour of financial markets. Chaos theory is the study of systems that appear to follow 
a random behaviour, even though they are actually part of a deterministic process, and the 
random behaviour is given by their typical sensitivity to initial conditions that leads the system 
to unpredictable dynamics. One of the founders of chaos theory, Edward Lorenz, summarises 
this theory elegantly: “Chaos: when the present determines the future, but the approximate 
present does not approximately determine the future” (Hand 2014: 45). Financial markets are 
non-linear dynamic systems characterised by positive feedback and fractals, and therefore 
“what happened yesterday influences what happens today” (Peters, 1996:9).  Peters (1996) 
therefore proposed the Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) for modelling financial markets. 
With the underlying classical assumptions of financial markets behaviour being heavily 
criticised, Buchanan (2013) suggests adopting a disequilibrium view of financial markets, 
claiming that the disequilibrium view submits that the crashes of 6 May 2010 or of October 
1987 or of 2007–2008 were not any more abnormal than the March 2011 earthquake in Japan 
or the April 1906 quake in San Francisco. Market economies are self-referential and self-
propelling systems intensely propelled by expectations and perceptions, and these systems 
regularly foster explosive amplifying feedbacks. Buchanan (2013) asserts that it is not easy to 
foretell the instant when a bubble will collapse, and equilibrium economics has resolved, 
therefore, that bubbles do not exist. A classic example is the refusal of Eugene Fama to admit 
Page | 49  
 
to the existence of bubbles, for example in an interview in November 2013 on National Public 
Radio’s Planet Money. Fama states that the word ‘bubble’ drives him crazy given that there is 
nothing to prove that anyone can predict when prices will go down, claiming that markets work 
and so bubbles cannot be predicted (Fama and Shiller, 2013).  
The first comprehensive research on daily stock returns was done by Fama (1965) who 
discovered that stock returns were negatively skewed, therefore more observations were in the 
left-hand tail than in the right-hand. Furthermore, the tails appeared fatter and the peak round 
the mean was higher than what the normal distribution predicted. According to Corhay and 
Rad (1994), empirical findings reveal the existence of non-linear dependencies that the random 
walk model fails to explain. Sterge (1989), in an additional study of financial futures prices of 
treasury bonds, treasury notes and Eurodollar contracts, finds the same leptokurtic 
distributions. Sterge (1989) notes that “very large (three or more standard deviations from the 
norm) price changes can be expected to occur two to three times as often as predicted by 
normality.” i.e., they have fat tails. 
British hydrologist H.E. Hurst published a paper in 1951 with the title “Long-Term Storage 
Capacity of Reservoirs”, which dealt with modelling of reservoirs, while he was trying to find 
a way to model the river Nile levels so that architects could build a reservoir of appropriate 
size (Peters, 1996). This work by Hurst paved the way for a statistical methodology that 
distinguishes random from non-random systems and for identifying the persistence of trends – 
a methodology referred to as rescaled range analysis (R/S analysis) (Mansukhani, 2012).  
While researching the fractal nature of financial markets, Mandelbrot chanced on Hurst’s work 
and recognised its potential and therefore introduced it to fractal geometry (Mansukhani, 2012). 
The Hurst exponent measures long-term memory of time series. The exponent relates to the 
autocorrelations of a given time series, and the rate at which such autocorrelations diminish as 
the lag between pairs of values increases. According to Peters (1996), a higher value of H 
depicts less noise and more persistence and a more distinct trend than lower values with higher 
values showing less risk albeit exhibiting abrupt changes. 
Financial data are also virtually always not normally distributed even though most econometric 
techniques assume that they are. High frequency data regularly encompass additional ‘patterns’ 
which are the consequence of the way the market operates, or the way prices are documented 
(Brooks, 2008). Peters (1991) describes capital markets as an evolving system similar to any 
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natural system such as the earth that needs to be in disequilibrium in order to survive. He states 
for example that equilibrium in any system implies the death of the system pointing out that 
“The moon is in equilibrium. The moon is a dead planet.” (Peters, 1991: 4)  
Former chief economist of the World Bank and former United States treasury secretary 
Lawrence Summers in a study with David Cutler and James Poterba concluded that large 
moves in the stock markets occur in days without any recognisable major news announcements 
or information therefore casting doubts on the assertion that movements in stock prices are 
fully explicable by information about discount rates and future cash flows (Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers, 1988). The work of Cutler et al was instigated by a presidential address by Richard 
Roll (1988) to the American Finance Association where he drew the conclusion that only about 
one-third of market indices variations are as a result of economic influences (Cornell, 2013).  
Fair (2002) extended the work of Cutler et al (1988) by spotting big variations in records of the 
futures contracts of the S&P 500 over less than five-minute periods, and matching them to 
pieces in newswire reports. Searching for related news in the Associated Press Newswire, Dow 
Jones News Service, Wall Street Journal and New York Times, his findings showed that most 
significant market movements do not appear to be associated with any plausible information 
emanating from news. Overall, among the 1,159 events, he was only able to locate plausible 
news reports for just 69 concluding that it is difficult to point out why some variations are as a 
result of new information reaching the market and why some are not. 
Buchanan (2013) maintains that just as in any natural dynamic system, positive feedbacks – 
the process by which minor variations in a particular system can become increasingly large – 
better explains the dynamics of financial markets. He cites the flash crash of May 2010 as an 
example of how between the opening of the market and noon, the Dow Jones Industrials had 
plummeted by 2.5 percent as a result of a trade by a single investor – Waddell and Reed 
Financial Inc. – selling $ 4.1 billion E-mini stock index futures through a computer program 
which sold the futures little at a time spread over the day to prevent prices from being driven 
down as selling has the effect of driving down prices. Regardless of how cautious the computer 
program was designed to trade, the action of this single investor triggered an explosive series 
of events that eventually led to the flash crash. The consequence was that in three and half 
minutes, the stock of Proctor & Gamble lost a third of its value, the stock of Accenture 
plummeted to less than a penny per share and the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 9.2 percent 
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of its value in a few minutes making it the largest drop ever in such a short time. This incident 
was reported by Bowley (2010) in the New York Times as “Lone $4.1 Billion Led To “Flash 
Crash” In May”. 
Eugene Fama, addressing the 65th CFA Institute Annual Conference held in Chicago however 
defended the Efficient Market Hypothesis asserting (Harrison, 2012):  
“…I don’t think it was a financial disaster that caused an 
economic disaster. I think you can’t reject the hypothesis that 
it was an economic disaster that caused the financial 
disaster… It’s hard to think that if there wasn’t a pretty 
significant recession that the financial system would come 
crashing down.” 
However, economist and Nobel laureate Paul Krugman claims that the “efficient market 
theory” is the reason why many economists fail to acknowledge the housing bubble even 
though text book economics always put forward the “EMT as a baseline, not a revealed truth.” 
(Krugman, 2013).   
While classical finance assumptions view incidents such as market crashes as isolated cases 
and abnormal, studies by Nanex – a company that records data on all types of financial 
activities – suggest that these kinds of events are pervasive in the financial market of the United 
States. According to Buchanan (2013), Nanex documented 139 perplexing moves in individual 
stocks in the first three months of 2011 with stocks falling one percent or more within a second 
and recovering thereafter. There were 1818 crashes in 2010 and 2715 in 2009. The flash crash 
of May 2010 attracted attention simply because of its magnitude. 
 Farrell (2013) reports that although there has not been any major flash clash since 2010, flash 
crashes have nearly become a daily occurrence with stocks rapidly plunging and making an 
immediate rebound. Stocks of companies such as Apple (AAPL), Berkshire Hathaway 
(BRKA), Aon Plc. (AON) and Hanesbrands (HBI) all experienced quick drop in prices and a 
quick rebound with Hanesbrands’ stock losing 3% in in less than a half second and immediately 
rebounding on February 5, 2013. Even though such mini crashes are not made public by the 
stock exchanges, most active traders claim at least a dozen such crashes on a daily basis 
(Farrell, 2013). 
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Thurner, Farmer and Geanakoplos (2012) posit that fat tails are caused by the purchasing of 
assets with leverage and margin calls, maintaining in their study that when funds do not trade 
with leverage, asset price fluctuations are uncorrelated and normally distributed across time. 
Increasing leverage leads to amplified price fluctuations, fat tailed distributions and the display 
of clustered volatility. This volatility according to Thurner et al. (2012) are as a result of 
nonlinear feedback which intensifies large downward movement of prices which at the extreme 
cases cause crashes even though the effect can be seen at every time scale which produces a 
power law of asset price disturbances. 
 
3.3 CHAOS THEORY 
Chaos theory studies systems that appear to follow a random behaviour, but form part of a 
deterministic process. The random nature is because of sensitivity to preliminary situations that 
move the system to a state of random dynamics. This random dynamic is however restricted by 
a higher deterministic framework and therefore there always is some form of order that underlies 
such unpredictable dynamics. “In Chaos there is order, and in order there lies chaos” (Sardar 
and Abrams, 2005: 18). 
The adoption of Chaos Theory as a major paradigm in science saw immense advancement for 
scientific research by opening up the possibility to investigate the complexities and roughness 
in natural systems which prior to were not possible given the rigid assumptions, methodological 
reductionism and mathematical formalism of preconceived ideas. This theory however was 
rejected in the field of finance and economics as that would have rendered all statistical tools 
for analysis obsolete. This rejection however has led to the use of inadequate language and 
methods in addressing current complexities in financial markets (MacKenzie, 2006). 
Mathematicians were historically the first to show interest in chaos theory and works involving 
dynamic deterministic systems generating random behaviours have been carried out since the 
1800s. Biologists have been using chaotic deterministic systems to study the evolution of 
populations from the 1970s (May, 1976). 
 
3.4 Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) 
A fractal is a figure that comprises parts that are similar to the main figure itself, therefore 
appearing approximately the same regardless of the scale observed. Scaling a fractal up or down 
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by the same amount still results in self-similar patterns. Figure 3.2 below is a fractal generated 
by adjoining the middle points of a triangle to create four different triangles with the one in the 
centre cut out later. The process is carried on infinitely until the final figure is observed.  
 
Figure 3.2: The Sierpinski Triangle  
 
Source: Mandelbrot and Hudson (2014) 
Benoit Mandelbrot, who is regarded as the father of fractal geometry, first discovered the 
distinguishing characteristics of fractals in financial time series, but many economists rejected 
his ideas so he lost interest in fractals in finance, and turned to physics. In the field of physics, 
he developed the fractal geometry of nature (Velasquéz, 2009). Mandelbrot spotted that the 
variance of prices misbehaved, culminating in abnormally big changes. This behaviour was 
manifested in “fat-tail” and high-peak distributions, which commonly followed a power law 
with the implication that graphs will not descend toward zero as strikingly as a Gaussian curve. 
However, the most distinctive property was that these leptokurtic (fat-tail and high-peak) 
distributions seemed unchanged irrespective of time scale (weekly, monthly or yearly). 
Mandelbrot therefore concluded that “the very heart of finance is a fractal” (Mandelbrot and 
Hudson, 2014:147). 
However, an MIT professor and efficient market theorist - Paul Cootner – pointed out that 
“Mandelbrot, like Prime Minister Churchill before him, promises us not utopia but blood, sweat, 
toil and tears. If he is right, almost all of our statistical tools are obsolete— least squares, spectral 
analysis, workable maximum-likelihood solutions, all our established sample theory, closed 
distribution functions. Almost without exception, past econometric work is meaningless.” 
(Cootner, 1964: 337).  
Peters (1994), followed up on his earlier criticism of the EMH (Peters, 1991) and proposed the 
FMH, a hypothesis that offers a new method for modelling the deterministic characteristics and 
conflicting randomness of financial markets. The FMH appears to be a robust theoretical input 
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that provides an explanation of the discontinuity, turbulence and non-periodicity that typify 
financial markets. 
The FMH has as its cornerstone, a focus on the heterogeneity of investors with regard to their 
investment horizons. Financial markets consist of the investors with varying investment 
horizons spanning a few seconds up to several years. Investors with diverse investment 
horizons react differently to information. A particular set of information can be interpreted by 
a short-term investor as a sell signal but interpreted by a long-term investor as a buy 
opportunity. Differing investment horizons ensures that financial markets function in a stable 
manner. The presence of investors with various investment horizons is vital for a stability and 
smooth operation of financial markets (Rachev, Weron and Weron, 1999, Weron and Weron, 
2000). FMH posits that during stable periods of financial markets, all the different horizons are 
equitably represented therefore there is a smooth clearing of demand and supply on the market. 
Conversely, during highly volatile periods such as in a crisis, even some long-term horizon 
investors switch to short-term horizon which becomes the dominant horizon therefore the 
demand and supply of the differing groups of investors are not cleared efficiently.  
 
Kristoufek (2012) concluded in a study on the three most liquid indices in the United States - 
DJIA, NASDAQ and S&P 500 – that the EMH does not sufficiently explain the behaviour of 
financial markets during the Global Financial Crisis, arguing however that the FMH provides 
an adequate explanation of the behaviour of financial markets during this period. Kristoufek 
(2013) further posit that short investment horizons characterised the most turbulent periods of 
the Global Financial Crisis, this mismatch between short and long term investment horizons led 
to liquidity problems which is in line with the assertions of the FMH. Dar, Bhanja and Tiwari 
(2015) also test the assertion of a dominant investment horizon during financial crises. Using 
the wavelet power spectra based on continuous wavelet framework in line with Kristoufek 
(2013), Dar et al (2015) conclude that equity markets around the world exhibited the dominance 
of higher frequencies during the period of the crises, thereby, validating the assertions of Fractal 
Market Hypothesis. 
Van der Merwe (2015) defines a liquid market as one in which large volumes of trade can be 
executed immediately with minimal effect on prices. Fisher Black (1971), co-author of the 
Black-Scholes option pricing model, defined a liquid market as one where: 
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• There is always a bid-ask price for investors who want to immediately trade small 
amounts of stocks.  
• There is a small difference between bid and ask prices.  
• Investors trading large amounts of stocks, without any special information, can do so 
over a long period at prices that are on average, not different from current market prices.  
• Investors can trade large blocks of stock immediately, perhaps at a premiums or 
discounts dependent on the size of the block with larger blocks attracting larger 
premiums or discounts.  
Financial markets provide a stable and liquid environment, that facilitate trading activities. 
Financial markets create this stability through “investors with different horizons, different 
information sets, and consequently, different concepts of ‘fair price’” (Peters 1994: 43).  
Investors with differing time horizons will evaluate information differently. For example, since 
day traders are only concerned with the daily prices of securities, they will focus mainly on 
recent trends while ignoring information concerning prices of such securities in the long-term. 
Investors with long-term horizons however, will set long-term investment objectives and will 
therefore be more interested in the long-term prospects. As a result of this differences in 
investment horizons, investors will have diverse opinions on what a fair price is. Consequently, 
information that flows into financial markets impact each investment horizon differently. For 
example, new information that may lead to a decline in prices in the short-term triggering a sell 
signal among short-term investors may attract long-term investors who will take the opposite 
side of the trade and thereby providing stability in the market. They buy these stocks because 
they regard such information as noise and therefore willing to bear the short term distress 
(Peters, 1994). 
Generally, investors share the same degree of risk once with subsequent adjustments for the 
range of investment horizons. In fact, such “shared risk explains why the frequency distribution 
of returns look the same at different investment horizons” (Peters 1994: 46), and is responsible 
for the fractal nature of financial markets. The market will become unstable if it loses its 
“fractal” nature. Market failures may occur when there are major uncertainties in long-term 
expectations. Wars, political crisis and natural disasters for example, can alter the fundamentals 
of financial markets. In such periods, long-term investors affected by such events, will adopt a 
short-term approach or totally avoid investing in the market. Shortening positions leads to a dry 
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up of liquidity and subsequently a critical period where markets become highly volatile. Peters 
(1994) posits that so far as market participants with differing investment horizons are active in 
the market, a panic in one group can be easily contained by other horizons who will view such 
event as an opportunity to buy or sell. Conversely, if the market wholly assumes the same 
horizon, or a crucial segment of the market stay away from market activities, then the market 
will become unstable. In this situation, the non-existence of liquidity eventually culminates in a 
panic. 
 
Table 3.1: Comparing the EMH and FMH 




Emphasis Fair asset prices and efficient markets Liquidity 
Market cycles 
and memory 
Past events have no effect on future 
prices as markets behave in a random 
manner 
The path of the market is 
determined by past events thereby 
exhibiting deterministic order 
making short-term predictions 
possible. 
Market Market has a single equilibrium and 
always in equilibrium with deviations 
that are highly infrequent and 
negligible deviations. 
There are different equilibria for 
each investment horizon therefore 
the market cannot reach just a single 
equilibrium 
Distribution Normal distribution Fat tails and high peaks 
 
On the JSE, Jefferis and Smith (2005), adopting a GARCH methodology with time varying 
parameters, and employing a test of evolving efficiency (TEE) over the period 1990 to 2001, 
concluded that the JSE is weak form efficient. Smith (2008), however, rejects the random walk 
hypothesis on the JSE, using tests of four joint variance ratios. Adelegan (2003, 2009) also 
finds the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) to be informationally inefficient, by testing the 
reaction of market participants to changes in dividend policies of listed firms. 
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3.5 Summary 
Whereas the EMH assumes a single investment horizon, the FMH assumes several investment 
horizons with investors in the various horizons assuming the “counter-positions” thereby 
providing liquidity in the market all the time therefore ensuring stability of the market. The 
FMH therefore provides an alternative hypothesis on the behaviour of financial markets and 
provides an explanation to why financial markets fail leading to financial crises whereas the 
EMH simply brushes these crises aside simply as anomalies. 
The following chapter discusses financial crises. The chapter looks into why financial crises 
keep recurring, provides a description of the different categories of financial crises and reviews 
some noteworthy financial crises that have occurred over time. 
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Contrary to classical finance theories, financial markets have over the years exhibited 
inefficiencies with market participants repeatedly making sub-optimal decisions with 
debilitating consequences. This chapter discusses the causes of financial crises and some major 
crises portraying centuries of irrational choices that have all culminated in financial crises with 
remarkable similarities regardless of the period or country in which such crises occurred. 
Among other crises, this chapter discusses the tulip mania as happened Holland in the 
seventeenth century, the eighteenth century South Seas bubble, the boom and bust of the stock 
market the 1920s resulting in the Great Depression, the dotcom boom and crash of 1996 to 
2000, more recently, the 2002 -2007 sub-prime mortgage housing crisis that led to the Great 
Recession. 
4.1 Why Financial Crises Keep Recurring 
Accurate valuation of assets is very crucial in financial markets. According to classical 
economics, prices are determined by negotiation between rational buyers and rational sellers 
regarding the worth of such assets and are therefore rightly priced to reflect their fundamental 
values. History has however proven time and again that at regular intervals, prices can 
significantly deviate from their fundamental values culminating in bubbles and eventual 
crashes with catastrophic circumstances. These circumstances are precipitated by a particular 
event, expectation, or some novel developments that kick starts rapid appreciation of asset 
price. The rise in asset price attracts more investors seeking to profit from such asset and 
therefore feeding into the rapid price acceleration. The momentum generated further attracts 
even more investors. During such periods, the new investors disregard or are totally oblivious 
of the sustainability of such rapid price acceleration, and only buy with the intention to sell at 
an even higher price.  
There is also a deeply rooted belief among market participants that “financial crises are things 
that happen to other people in other countries at other times; crises do not happen to us, here 
and now. We are doing things better, we are smarter, we have learned from past mistakes.” 
During such periods, the rules of fundamental valuations are no longer applied.  (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009: 1). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) describe this as the ‘this-time-is-different 
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syndrome’ where market participants are convinced that circumstances that precipitated prior 
financial crises are clearly known and understood and have no semblance to their own situation 
and therefore are insulated from the recurrence of such crises. Throughout the history of 
financial markets however, all major crises have striking similarities: a failure to acknowledge 
the precariousness and capriciousness of confidence in what former United States Federal 
Reserve Chairman Allan Greenspan refers to as ‘irrational exuberance’. In a speech at the 
Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture organized by the American Enterprise Institute 
during the 1990s Dot-com bubble, Greenspan (1996) intimated: “…how do we know when 
irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to 
unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?”. 2013 
Economics Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller believes that the overall market is driven by 
psychology (Shiller, 2016), on the contrary, Eugene Fama a co-winner of the 2013 Economics 
Nobel Laureate contends that such contractions are not as a result of market inefficiencies but 
rather the, markets displaying efficiency by foretelling impending economic crisis as financial 
crises always precede economic downturns or recessions and the crash tends to be more severe, 
the bigger the recession. The market is therefore simply predicting bad times which is exactly 
what one will expect from an efficient market – predicting as accurately as possible what is 
going to happen to the economy (Fama, 2016).  
Donald Rapp on the other hand argues that the process through which booms transform into 
bubbles and subsequent busts are as a result of, usually, a legitimate basis for the expectation 
of substantial future growth. For example, in the 1920s, the extensive electrification and the 
growth in the use of automobiles and development of highways, or the advent of, and 
proliferation of personal computers as well as the internet in the 1990s. This attracts huge 
investments of new money, in the process producing a boom which develops into a bubble as 
the initial basis for such investments is increasingly supplanted by momentum trading where 
speculators get involved and mainly invest because they expect persistent appreciation in the 
price of the asset regardless of its fundamentals. More speculators get sucked into this vacuum 
as asset prices steadily appreciate and ultimately, when such rate of appreciation reaches 
unsustainable proportions, the bubble busts (Rapp, 2014). Jeffrey Gundlach, CEO and CIO of   
DoubleLine – an asset management firm in the United States -  further argues that recessions 
do not drive financial markets, it is rather, the other way around (Krisiloff, 2016). 
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In what they describe as “the illusion of a perpetual money machine”, Sornette and Woodard 
(2010) argue that the ‘this-time-is-different syndrome’ coupled with financial innovations can 
lead to acceleration of wealth. However, just as in physics, the perpetual motion machine 
violates the fundamental laws and is impossible, similarly, it is impracticable for an economy 
expanding at a real rate of 2–3% per annum to keep generating a profit of 10–15% per annum. 
The overall growth in wealth has to be equal to the rate of growth of the economy. 
In describing why financial markets are dogged with boom-bust phenomena, George Soros 
applies his General Theory of Reflexivity. He argues that reflexivity creates a feedback loop 
between valuations and the fundamentals being valued. This feedback can be positive or 
negative. A negative feedback draws market prices and the underlying reality of fundamentals 
closer together. Negative feedback is self-correcting. This can go on indefinitely and if the 
fundamentals remain the same, it may ultimately lead to an equilibrium where the fundamentals 
are accurately reflected in market prices. A positive feedback on the other hand is self-
reinforcing. It cannot however, go on forever unlike a negative feedback because eventually, 
market prices will deviate so much from reality that market participants would recognize them 
as unrealistic. When this tipping point is finally reached, a self-reinforcing process in the 
opposite direction ensues. This is how boom-bust phenomena are created in financial markets 
(Soros, 2010). 
 
4.2 Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) 
Hyman Minsky (1992) proposed the FIH which argues that financial crises are pervasive in 
capitalism mainly because in times of economic prosperity borrowers and lender tend to be 
increasingly optimistic and reckless. This excessive optimism and recklessness create financial 
bubbles which eventually bust. Capitalism therefore is disposed to moving from periods of 
stability to instability. Minsky posits that during periods of prosperity when cash flow of 
corporations increases beyond what is necessary to defray debt, a speculative frenzy builds up, 
and consequently debts rise beyond what can be paid off from incoming revenues, eventually 
leading to financial crisis. Banks and other lenders tighten the availability of credit, due to such 
speculative borrowing bubbles, even to companies that can pay back such loans and 
subsequently, the economy contracts. According to Minsky (1974), one of the fundamental 
characteristics of the economy, is that its financial markets swing between fragility and 
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robustness which are part of the mechanism that creates business cycles. Financial markets 
slowly moving from stability to fragility then followed by crisis, is sometimes describes as 
"Minsky moment" and refers to Minsky's academic work in this field. According to economist 
and Wall Street money manager Henry Kaufman, Minsky provided some great insights in the 
1960s and 1970s when the relationship between the economy and financial markets were not 
well understood and showed that financial markets can move to excess frequently (Uchietelle, 
1996). FIH, which is a model of the credit system incorporates many ideas already promulgated 
by Alfred Marshall, John Stuart Mill, Irvin Fisher and Knut Wicksell (Kindleberger and 
O'Keefe, 2001).  
Given these inevitable financial market swings, and the accompanying booms and busts in a 
free market economy, Minsky proposed among other tools, government interventions through 
regulation and central bank actions. Minsky opposed the deregulation that characterized the 
1980s in the United States and stressed the primacy of the Federal Reserve as the lender of last 
resort and while arguing against the excessive growth of private debt in financial markets 
(Uchietelle, 1996). 
 
4.3 Categories of Financial Crises 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), financial crises can be classified quantitatively or 
by event. 
4.3.1 Quantitative Definition of Financial Crises 
Inflation crises, currency crashes, currency debasements and the bursting of asset price bubbles 
are crises that can be quantitatively defined. 
• Inflation Crises 
Many studies apply a twelve-month threshold of 40% or greater, as a sign of an event of high 
inflation. A hyperinflation also refers to periods of monthly inflation rate of 40% or greater. 
However, for periods before World War II, even a 40% per year threshold is considered too 
high and a 20% threshold more appropriate since inflation rates were very low during such 
period particularly before the introduction of fiat currency. The median inflation rates were 
0.5% per annum for 1500 – 1799 and 0.71% for 1800-1913. These pre WWII inflation rates 
were relatively low compared to 5% for 1914-2006 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
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• Currency Crashes 
Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency crash as a depreciation of at least 25% of the 
nominal exchange rate which is also at least 10% increase in the nominal rate of depreciation. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) believe this is the most frugal definition as it is not dependent on 
other factors like reserve losses and interest rate hikes but believe that similar to inflation, the 
threshold to periods prior to WWII may be too high and suggest a threshold of 15%.   
Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz, Dumas and Weber (1995) posit that political instability, budget 
deficits and current account deficits, rapid growth of money and increase in price precede 
devaluations. 
• Currency Debasement 
The forerunner to modern foreign exchange crises and inflation was currency debasement 
during the period when the principal means of transaction was metallic coins (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009). It describes the act of decreasing the value of a currency. Debasement is 
principally used in reference to commodity monies like silver or gold coins. There is a 
debasement of a coin when the quantity of silver, gold, nickel, copper is reduced. 
• Bursting of Asset Price Bubbles 
When the prices of assets or other securities rise aggressively and persistently that they far 
surpass valuations supported by fundamentals (forming asset bubbles), there is a likely 
subsequent and sudden collapse (when the bubble bursts). 
4.3.2 Financial Crises by Event 
Financial crises that are described by event are those that cannot be readily described in a strict 
quantitative sense. They are: bank crises, external debt crises and domestic debt crises 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
• Bank Crises 
Banking crises consist of either waves of costly bank failures or panics and were historically 
rare compared to the present. Panics and waves of failures do not always occur together, they 
are not random events, they do not usually accompany business cycles or errors of monetary 
policy and cannot be viewed as the unavoidable result of human nature or the liquidity altering 
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make up of bank balance sheets. It is rather the risk-inviting microeconomic rules established 
by government that have always been the fundamental added necessary condition to creating a 
propensity for banking crises (Calomiris, 2009). Banking crises are classified by event as 
opposed to quantitatively due to the nonexistence of a long-range data of time series that will 
permit dating banking crises quantitatively (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
• External Debt Crises 
According to the International Monetary Fund, gross external debt is the amount of disbursed 
and outstanding liabilities of a country to nonresidents. Depending on the contract, the principal 
may be paid with or without interest, or interest paid with or without the principal (IMF, 2003). 
External debt crises involve downright default on a government’s external debt obligations 
issued under the jurisdiction of another country. 
• Domestic Debt Crises 
Domestic public debt is issued under the legal jurisdiction of the issuing country. This debt in 
most countries, historically, has been almost always issued in the local currency and mainly 
held by residents. Relative to external debt, there exists very little information on sovereign 
defaults on domestic public debt. Prior to the 1980s and even recently, cross-country data on 
domestic debt remains exotic (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Domestic debt crises usually do not 
involve powerful external lenders. This may be the reason why lots of incidents of domestic 
debt crises go unnoticed and also the little representation in academic literature (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009). 
 
4.4 SOME NOTEWORTHY FINANCIAL CRISES 
This section discusses the different kinds of financial crises that have occurred through history 
starting with the tulip mania in the Netherlands in 1636–1637 when trading tulips was a 
national mania leading otherwise rational investors into mortgaging a great deal of valuable 
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4.4.1 Tulip Mania 
There are very few financial crises more popular in the history of financial crises than the tulip 
mania that captivated the people of Holland in the early 1500s. Tulip was introduced in Europe 
by the ambassador of Ferdinand I, Ogier de Busbecq, Holy Roman Emperor to the Sultan of 
Turkey. He sent the first tulip seeds and bulbs from the Ottoman Empire to Vienna in 1554 
(Knight, 2014). Tulip bulbs soon were in circulation in many parts of Holland (Brunt and 
Walsh, 2005) with its popularity gaining momentum around 1593 after Carolus Clusius, a 
Flemish botanist established the hortus academicus where he took up a position at the 
University of Leiden. There he discovered that the bulbs could withstand the harsh conditions 
of the Low Countries (Dash, 2011, Goldgar, 2008).  
The bulbs were placed into three categories: the single coloured, the multi-coloured, and the 
“bizarres” which were the most popular and rarest tulip. What made the tulips unique was as a 
result of a virus called breaking virus that inhibited the ability of the flower to have uniformity 
of petal color. The virus was so named because it breaks the lock of the plant on a single petal 
color without killing the plant but causing striking effects in the form of mosaic-like flames of 
colour on the petals (Knight, 2014). 
It could take approximately 7 to 12 years of cultivation from a seed to a flowering bulb and 
produced only one or two offsprings in a year and the parent bulb lasted a few years before it 
perished. Cultivating the regular tulips was a very challenging task and even more challenging 
to cultivate the rare varieties as the virus weakened the flower, usually preventing it from 
creating clones thus any bizarre variety needed new plants to be cultivated from seeds. The 
period of time needed for the growth of the plant made the most appealing varieties continue 
to remain rare (Knight, 2014).  
The virus had beautiful effects on the flowers and made them highly coveted and given the 
scarcity, they were expensive. Growers gave their new varieties glorifying titles. Some earlier 
forms had the prefix of admiral and often combined with the names of the growers: for 
example, Admiral van der Eijck was probably the most coveted among around fifty of such 
varieties. General was also a prefix that was used for about thirty other types of tulips and later 
varieties had even more flamboyant names (Dash, 2011). 
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           Figure 4.1: Tulip Price Index 
 
            Source: Thompson (2007: 101) 
As the flowers became increasingly popular, professional cultivators paid very high prices for 
the bulbs especially the ones with the virus. By 1634, speculators began to enter the market, 
partly as a result of demand from France (Garber, 1989). The contract price for the rare bulbs 
soared progressively throughout 1636, and by November that year, even the common, 
"unbroken" bulbs experienced tremendous price increases as well, such that any tulip could 
sell for some hundreds of guilders. During this same year, a formal futures market was created 
where contracts to trade bulbs during the end of the season were available where parties were 
not required to put up an initial margin and there was no mark-to-market margin as well. All 
the contracts were with individual counter-parties and not the Exchange. These contracts were 
known as "wind trade", since no bulbs actually changed hands. The whole business was not 
carried on in the Exchange itself but rather conducted on the margins of Dutch economic life 
(Goldgar, 2008). 
In Amsterdam, the Calvinists viewed with consternation and trepidation the extent of 
speculative fever creeping up in the country. The virtues of moderation, hard work and 
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discretion had been discarded for the alluring and easy profits that came from trading in paper. 
A single bulb could trade for as much as the equivalent of 10 times the annual salary of an 
experienced craftsman and an entire estate could be traded for one “bizarre” bulb (Knight, 
2014). 
The tulip had become the fourth major export of Holland by 1636 as the prices kept increasing 
due to speculations in the futures market by traders who had never seen the bulbs. Many traders 
made fortunes while others had their fortunes wiped out overnight (Schama, 1988). During the 
winter of 1636-37, the tulip mania reached its peak. Some bulbs were reported to have changed 
hands about ten times within a day although no deliveries were made to complete any of these. 
In Haarlem, buyers for the first time, failed to pitch up at a scheduled tulip auction. This might 
have been as a result of Haarlem experiencing a spate of the bubonic plague. This plague might 
have in part created a society of fatalistic risk-takers allowing the speculation to increase 
rapidly in the first place, this same plague might have also led to the bursting of the bubble 
(Garber, 2001). 
If the rapid increase in tulip prices was momentous, the decline in the prices was all the more 
so. In just a week, a bulb that had sky-rocketed 26 folds by January 1637 had its value drop by 
about 95%. Citizens requested that the government do something about the situation but this 
proved futile. The Dutch judges viewed all the tulip contracts in circulation to be nothing than 
gambling debts therefore there was no recognition of such contracts in the legal system 
therefore buyers were not considered liable for agreed-upon prices to sellers as such contracts 
were not enforceable (Knight, 2014).  
4.4.2 The South Sea Bubble 
Britain found itself highly indebted in prosecuting the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). 
During an internal audit, it was discovered that the various bonds owed amounted to £9 million 
with no specific means of defraying the debt. The prospects of the government bonds being 
honoured were so poor that they were priced at around 50% discount in the public market 
(Knight, 2014). A scheme was created in 1711, as a form of private organization that will take 
over the debt and manage it. The capitalization was supposed be simple as the company would 
be created with a trading monopoly backed by the government and allowed to trade in South 
Page | 67  
 
America with the Spanish colonies a zone commonly known as the South Seas. This new entity 
was therefore named The South Sea Company (Knight, 2014). 
The South Sea Company was officially known as The Governor and Company of the merchants 
of Great Britain, trading to the South Seas and other parts of America, and for the 
encouragement of fishing (Dale, 2004) was formed as a public-private partnership aimed at 
consolidating and reducing the cost of Britain’s national debt.  
The South Sea itself was the main appeal of the South Sea Company.  Lucrative trade routes 
granted by Spain and sailed by Britain. The company made it appear as if the all that was 
required was to load some ships with clothes and wool, sail to South America, exchange with 
the natives for some precious metals and gems and return them to Britain. It was however 
impossible to make such lucrative gains when one looked at the true details of the treaty with 
Spain. The agreement allowed Britain to provide on a yearly basis, 4,800 slaves to the Spanish 
colonies for 30 years. The constraints were extremely strict for other merchandise. The treaty 
stipulated that Britain would be allowed just a single ship of at most 500 tons for any given 
year and 25% of the profits including 5% of the balance must be paid to the King of Spain if 
the trade from such ship proved to be profitable. Such monopoly could not possibly be lucrative 
given such strict treaty. The prospects were further worsened by the war that broke out between 
Spain and Britain. The few assets in South America owned by South Sea Company were 
confiscated, leading to a loss of £300,000. At this point, the company was merely an office in 
Britain that held government bonds (Knight, 2014).  
Similar to the Louisiana territory of France, there existed an intense sense of enigma on the 
ability of Britain to gain prospective riches in South America. Generally, they believed that the 
supposedly primitive people of South America would happily trade mountains of jewels and 
gold and for comparatively valueless fleece and wool clothing of Britain. This turned out to be 
a false expectation. In fact, it was after seven years since the creation of South Sea Company 
before a trading ship finally sailed to trade. This trade had nothing to do with precious metals 
but rather, slaves (Knight, 2014). 
Stories of the John Law’s successes in France generated similar eagerness in Britain concerning 
some new frontiers of enterprise and finance. Rumors of soaring value of Law’s bank stocks 
inspired hopes in Britain. 1720 began with increasing interests in publicly traded company 
stocks similar to the enthusiasm in the United States for technology company stocks some 275 
Page | 68  
 
years later (Knight, 2014). The company’s stock increased tremendously in value, reaching a 
peak in 1720 before finally collapsing at the end of the summer of 1720 dropping by a factor 
of 8 in September. Many people in Britain lost all their money (Rapp, 2014). 
Adam Smith commented on the South Sea Bubble that “They had an immense capital dividend 
among an immense number of proprietors. It was naturally to be expected, therefore, that folly, 
negligence, and profusion should prevail in the whole management of their affairs. The knavery 
and extravagance of their stock-jobbing operations are sufficiently known [as are] the 
negligence, profusion and malversation of the servants of the company” (Smith, 1776: 703-4). 
It is reported that Isaac Newton, in the spring of 1720 stated: “I can calculate the motions of 
the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people.” On April 20, he sold his stocks in the 
South Sea Company for £7000 making a 100% profit. Later, he was swept by the mania and 
bought larger number of stocks near the market peak loosing £20,000 eventually. (Carswell, 
1961: 131,199). 
Some Dutch speculators however, profited from the bubble. For example, in April 1720, David 
Leeuw sold his holdings of South Sea stocks and purchased the stocks of Bank of England and 
East India Company and by the end of the same month. Dutch banker Crellius commented that 
Exchange Alley (a venue for the trading of shares and commodities) resembled “nothing so 
much as if all the Lunatics had escaped out of the Madhouse at once” (Wilson,1941:103,124). 
The major aspect of The South Sea Company’s business plan, which was to make profits from 
a trade route monopoly a was an illusion. After the crash, parliamentary enquiry was held to 
investigate its causes. Some politicians were humiliated, and people who were known to have 
made unlawful profits from the company had their assets impounded in proportion to their 
gains. The company was then restructured and operated for over a century after the crash with 
its headquarters in Threadneedle Street in London, in this street today the Bank of England can 
be found. During the period of this event, the company was also a private company that dealt 
in national debt and therefore consolidated its position after the crash as banker to the British 
government (Thornbury, 1878). 
4.4.3 The Mississippi Bubble 
John Law (1705) circulated his economics treatise titled Money and Trade Considered, arguing 
against the use of currency backed by precious metal and in favour of fiat currency since the 
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use of fiat currency stimulates commerce. Smith (2004) discussed that the two fundamental 
concepts in this treatise were: (1) circulation of credit acts similarly as conventional currency, 
and (2) money supply stimulates commercial activity.  
Some economists consider John Law to be the world’s first Keynesian i.e., a person who 
believes that to address economic slowdown, there is a need for increased government spending 
(Knight, 2014). It is believed that the word millionaire emerged during the mania of Law and 
his Mississippi Scheme (Knight, 2014). 
The Mississippi Bubble debacle began in 1715, when the French government was on the verge 
of insolvency as a result of debts accumulated during the Spanish Succession War. The 
government of France, headed by a group of regents as then King Louis XV was only five 
years of age, frantically tried to find a solution. The Duke of Orléans and leader of the group 
sought council of John Law who happened to be his friend. John Law, an early theorist of 
monetary economics viewed this as an opportunity to put into practice his monetary theory. 
Law received permission from the government of France in 1716 to create a national bank - 
Banque Générale - which received deposits of silver and gold and in return, issued “paper” 
bank notes which were not legal tender but acceptable as such since they were redeemable in 
the official currency of France. The reserves of Banque Générale was built up through issuance 
of stock and from the profits earned from managing the finance of the government of France 
(Colombo, 2012). 
John Law established the Mississippi Company and obtained a monopoly to trade with 
Louisiana from the government of France which also included a plan to reduce the debt 
payments made by the government. The economy was in a very bad state and the government 
bonds were trading at a huge discount. John Law reached an agreement with the government 
of France that allowed him to trade shares in his company to the public for the government 
bonds at par value, and in turn the government would pay lower interests on the bonds he 
acquired. This agreement appeared beneficial to all parties however, in reality, the bondholders 
were trading discounted papers which at least, had tangible values for papers at par value but 
backed only by speculations and dreams (Rapp, 2014). 
Initial response by the public was lukewarm, so Law added extra attractive terms, such as the 
exclusive rights to raise tobacco, trade in slaves and several merchandises coming from the 
Senegal (then a French colony) paid for with shares that have been newly issued. Law 
Page | 70  
 
aggressively hyped the prospects of the company with intense advertisements resembling a 
modern campaign of public relations and carried on a vast array of financial schemes that saw 
the stock rising steadily as interest from the public heightened (Rapp, 2014). The stock bubble 
created a buying frenzy of luxury items in reflecting a change in consumption patterns as a 
result of the dramatic increase in stock prices (Smith, 2004). Around the same period as the 
South Seas bubble, the Mississippi Company experienced a similar cycle where a runaway 
bubble was followed by a crash (Rapp, 2014).  
4.4.4 The Panic of 1837 
This panic occurred in the United States and triggered a major recession that dragged on into 
the 1840s. Wages, price and profits declined while unemployment increased. During this 
period, there was lots of pessimism among people. This panic had both foreign and domestic 
origins. Practices of speculative lending in the western states, coupled with a drastic fall in 
price of cotton, a bursting of land bubble, restrictive lending policies in Britain and 
international specie flows were all responsible for the crisis (Roberts, 2012). Banks in New 
York restricted specie payments on May 10, 1837 and would no longer permit the redemption 
of commercial paper in specie at par value. Regardless of the brief 1838 recovery, the recession 
continued unabated for about seven years. Businesses failed, prices declined, banks collapsed 
and lots of workers were laid off with unemployment reported to be 25%. The period of 1837 
to 1844 was characterised by years of deflation in prices and wages (Rousseau, 2002). 
4.4.5 The Rich Man’s Panic of 1907 
The Panic of 1907 which occurred in the United States is also referred to as Knickerbocker 
Crisis or the 1907 Bankers' Panic (Donaldson, 1988), was a crisis that occurred over a period 
of three weeks, and witnessed an almost 50% decline of the New York Stock Exchange from 
its previous year’s peak. This precipitated a panic creating numerous runs on trust companies 
and banks. The panic later spread throughout the country when many local and state businesses 
and banks became bankrupt. Depositors losing their confidence and dry up of market liquidity 
by some banks in New York City were the major causes of the run and aggravated by side bets 
at bucket shops that were unregulated (Braunstein, 2009). The panic was set off by a failed bid 
to corner the market on the stocks of United Copper Company in October 1907. The banks that 
lent monies for this scheme experienced runs when the bid failed which later spread to 
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associated trusts and banks, and led to the collapse of New York City's third largest trust – the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company.  
Had it not been for financier JP Morgan who intervened and pledged a sizeable sum of his 
money and as well as convincing other New York banks to do likewise to prop up the banking 
system, the panic might have even deepened further (Norton et al., 2011). The United States 
had no central bank during this period to implement policies that would provide market 
liquidity. The crisis had largely subsided by November only to be supplanted with a further 
crisis which was as a result of a big brokerage firm heavily borrowing and using the stock of 
Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company (TC&I) as collateral. The following year, the 
father-in-law of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Senator Nelson W. Aldrich, set up and chaired a 
commission that investigated the crisis and proposed future solutions which led to the Federal 
Reserve System being established (Wells, 2004). 
4.4.6 The Great Depression 
The great depression of the 1930s in the United States is probably the most famous financial 
crisis in the world and had more enduring effects, lasted longer and ran deeper, than any other 
financial catastrophe in the history of the United States. The economic thinking forged during 
this period still dominates global financial structures to this day (Knight, 2014). 
The depression began in the United States, after heavy decline in stock prices that started 
around September 1929, and made global news when the stock market collapsed on October 
29, 1929 popularly referred to as Black Tuesday. Worldwide GDP fell by about 15% between 
1929 and 1932. The magnitude of the depression becomes even clearer when compared to the 
Great Recession when worldwide GDP from 2008 to 2009 declined by less than 1% (Demeri, 
2015). Some economies began recovering by mid-1930s although the negative impact of the 
depression remained until the start of World War II in many countries (Lowenstein, 2015). 
The Dow Jones Industrial Average remained mostly unchanged for the first twenty years of the 
twentieth century although it experienced five distinct cycles of boom-and-bust. Had one 
invested on the first day of trading in 1900 in the Dow Industrials, her investments would have 
remained virtually the same in September 1921 (Knight, 2014).  
According to Knight (2014), the subsequent appreciation in stock prices ensued in three phases: 
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The first phase, lasted from 24 August 1921, to 21 October 1926, and saw appreciation in stock 
values by about 60%, an annual compound rate of approximately 10%. This period saw a 
healthy and steady appreciation in stock prices which were mostly uninterrupted by the jolts 
witnessed in the prior two decades. 
The second phase witnessed price appreciations which in retrospect, could be described as a 
bubble. Between the period of October 1926 and June 1928, stock values gained an additional 
50% and a 20% annual gain. In this phase, stock price appreciation rates doubled. 
Between June 1928 and August 1929 was the final phase, where the Dow Industrial appreciated 
by approximately 90% in a span of a little over one year. Thus, annual gains were almost triple 
that of the prior period as well as nine times what was witnessed from 1921 to 1926. Around 
this period, stocks became very popular, and people in positions of leadership for example 
Herbert Hoover, then United States Commerce Secretary, worried over the “orgy of mad 
speculation” that he was witnessing (Knight, 2014: 159). Moorhouse (1928: 676-677) in an 
article titled What’s Wrong with Wall Street? Published in the North American Review, wrote: 
“Millionaires have been made many times over with the 
unprecedented rise of certain individual stocks. Of a list of twenty 
well-known stocks which have increased from 600 to 6,000 percent 
during the last ten years, twelve famous names appear above the 
1,000 percent mark, with one outstanding motor stock heading the 
list with a 6,493 percent increase. No wonder our nation has gone 
stock market mad.” 
However, Roger Babson, a respected economist, cautioned on September 5, 1929, almost at the 
exact peak of the market that (Knight (2014: 161-162) 
“More people are borrowing and speculating today than ever in our 
history. Sooner or later a crash is coming and it may be terrific. Wise 
are those investors who now get out of debt and reef their sails This 
does not mean selling all you have, but it does mean paying up your 
loans and avoiding margin speculation. ... Sooner or later the stock 
market boom will collapse like the Florida boom. Some day the time 
is coming when the market will begin to slide off, sellers will exceed 
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buyers, and paper profits will begin to disappear. Then there will 
immediately be a stampede to save what paper profits then exist.” 
Another highly respected economist and Yale professor, Irvin Fischer on the other hand is 
reported to have said that “stock prices are not high and Wall Street will not experience 
anything in the nature of a crash” (Shaw, 2015:95). On September 3, 1929, the Dow Jones 
Industrials reached a peak at 386.10 and began a gentle daily slide virtually, although no day 
was large enough to be interpreted as a panic. However, 50% of the value of the Dow 
Industrials was wiped between the peak of September 3 and November 11 with the greater 
parts of the decline taking place on October 23 when the market closed at 305.90; October 28 
close of: 260.60 and October 29 close of 230.10. Ultimately, the market declined by 90% 
percent in two years’ time when on July 8, 1932, the final nadir of 40.60 was reached (Knight, 
2014). 
4.4.7 The Latin American Debt Crisis 
During the 1970s and 80s, the global economy plunged into recession and oil prices increase 
astronomically, leading to a tipping point for many Latin American countries and some other 
developing countries as a result of an acute liquidity crunch. During 1973-74, 
petroleum exporting countries, flooded with lots of cash when oil prices increased, invested 
these monies with international banks and the banks in turn 'recycled' a significant portion of 
this capital as loans to governments in Latin American. The sudden increase in oil prices led 
many countries to borrow to cover the high prices. Believing these high prices would persist 
and permit them to pay off their additional debts, the oil producing countries also began 
borrowing heavily from these banks for further developments (Vincent and Melissa, 1994).  
Increasing interest rates in Europe and the United States in 1979 led to increases in debt 
payments making debt payments difficult for the indebted countries (Schaeffer, 
2003). Furthermore, exchange rate deterioration with the US dollar meant Latin American 
governments owed enormous amounts in their respective national currencies, which had lost 
purchasing power (Timmons, 2013) coupled with a decline in world trade during 1981, the 
prices of primary resources, Latin America's biggest export, also fell (Timmons, 2013).  
Although the huge foreign debt build-up occurred over several years, the crisis actually started 
when international financial markets realised that the Latin American countries would be 
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unable to honour their debts. This became evident in August 1982 when Jesus Silva-Herzog, 
the Finance Minister of Mexico, announced that Mexico was not in a position to honour its 
debt (Pastor, 1987) and unilaterally declared a 90-day moratorium and further requesting a 
renegotiation of periods of payment as well as new loans in order to honour its existing 
obligations (Bruner and Simms, 1987, Bernal, 1991).  
As a result of Mexico defaulting on its debt obligations, majority of commercial banks 
significantly reduced or stopped offering new loans to many Latin American countries. Given 
that a significant percentage of the loans to Latin America were short-term, a crisis arose when 
a quest to refinance was declined therefore billions of dollars in loans that prior to could be 
refinanced by the banks, were now due immediately. In order to avoid a financial panic, the 
banks restructured the debts and offered new loans with very strict terms in addition to 
requirements that the countries accept interventions from the IMF (Bruner and Simms, 1987, 
Bernal, 1991). Eventually, the United States and the IMF brokered a debt relief, admitting that 
the indebted countries cannot honour in full the considerable sums they owed (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2016).  
4.4.8 The Asian Financial Crisis 
In July 1997, the greater part of East Asia experienced a crisis which raised fears of a global 
economic meltdown as a result of financial contagion. This crisis began in Thailand when the 
Thai baht collapsed after the government of Thailand was forced to switch the baht to a free-
floating currency due to insufficient foreign currency to support a currency peg to the U.S. 
dollar. During this period, Thailand had acquired a massive foreign debt that made the country 
practically bankrupt even prior to the collapse of its currency (EuroMoney, 1997). Majority of 
southeast Asian countries experienced currency depreciation, massive decline in stock markets 
and a significant increase in private debt (Yamazawa, 1998, Hunter et al., 2012).  
The countries that were suffer the most from the crisis were Indonesia, South Korea and 
Thailand whereas the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Laos also were affected but on a lesser 
scale.  
In some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the foreign debt-to-GDP 
ratios increased from 100% to 167% from 1993 to 1996.  During the worst period of the crisis, 
this ratio increased beyond 180%. However, in South Korea, the ratios increased from 13% to 
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21% and rose as high as 40%. Only in South Korea and Thailand did debt service-to-exports 
ratios increase (Asian Development Bank, 2003).  
In Indonesia, President Suharto was forced to step down after 30 years in power, due to 
prevalent rioting that followed the sharp increase in prices caused by the devaluation of 
the rupiah. Growth in the Philippines almost dropped to zero in 1998. It was only Taiwan and 
Singapore that proved fairly insulated from the crisis, although both suffered severe hits in 
passing, the later was as a result of its size and geographic position between Indonesia and 
Malaysia. By 1999, analysts reported signs of economic recovery (Pempel, 1999).  
4.4.9 Russian Crisis of 1998 
On 17 August 1998, the Russian government and the Central Bank defaulted on its debt and 
devalued the ruble. The crisis was caused by a chronic fiscal deficit, a high and fixed exchange 
rate between the ruble and other foreign currencies aimed at avoiding public turbulence and a 
decline in productivity (Melloni, 2007). The economic consequences of the first 
war in Chechnya, which was estimated at about $5.5 billion excluding the cost of rebuilding 
the ruined Chechen economy, also played a role in the crisis. The Russian economy had shown 
signs of improvement in the first half of 1997, but soon after, the difficulties began to intensify 
gradually (van de Wiel, 2013). 
Russian foreign exchange reserves were severely affected by two external shocks, the fall in 
the demand and consequently, the price of crude oil and non-ferrous metals, and the Asian 
financial crisis (Hsu, 2013).  
On 13 August 1998, the Russian currency, stock and bond markets experienced massive 
declines as a result of fears of a devaluation of the ruble and a domestic debt default. These 
fears were as a result of ongoing interest rate increases, capital outflows and a decline in 
investor confidence in emerging markets. Annual yields on bonds denominate in Russian 
Rubbles rose to more than 200%. Further, stock prices declined more than 75% since the 
beginning of the year to August. 
The government also announced a set of emergency measures on August 17 aimed at 
preventing an escalation of the crisis. These measures included devaluing the ruble, defaulting 
on short-term Treasury Bills, and domestic long-term bonds, and a 90-day moratorium on 
payments to foreign creditors by commercial banks (van de Wiel, 2013). 
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The Russian Central Bank on September 2, 1998, decided to eliminate the currency corridor 
and made the ruble a free-floating currency. Consequently, the ruble depreciated sharply losing 
two thirds of its value in 3 weeks. The strong depreciation led to a rapid increase in prices with 
inflation in 1998 rising to 27.6% and 85.7% in 1999. Social unrest increased as a result of 
increases in food price (van de Wiel, 2013). 
The Russian Deputy Minister of Finance, Mikhail Kasyanov on November 20, 1998, declared 
that Russia would only be able to repay less than $10 billion of its $17 billion foreign debt. In 
1998, the economy contracted by 5.3% and per capita GDP was at its lowest level since the 
establishment of the Federation of Russia in 1991. Restructuring of sovereign debts occurred 
in 1999 and 2000 with an agreement with the IMF for $ 4.5 billion loan, concluded in July 
1999, to aid the country regain access to international capital markets. Subsequently, as a result 
of the Ruble’s sharp depreciation, which continued in 1999, and an increase in oil prices, the 
economy recovered quickly and grew by 6.4%, 10% and 5.3% in 1999, 2000 and 2001 
respectively. Inflation also fell from 85.7% in 1999 to 20.8% in 2000 and then 21.5% in 2001. 
The 13% unemployment rate in 1998 also decreased to 9% in 2001 (van de Wiel, 2013).  
4.4.10 The Dot Com Bubble 
From 1997 to 2000, there was a buildup of a historic speculative bubble popularly referred to 
as the dot-com bubble. During this period, many new internet-based companies also known as 
dot-coms were founded. Companies could experience sharp stock price increases by simply 
attaching an “e-” prefix to their names or a “.com”, which one author called “prefix investing.” 
(Masnick, 2003).  
The Chairman of the Reserve Bank, Allan Green Span had noticed excessive speculation on 
the stock market with some trepidation and on December 5, 1996, made his famous “Irrational 
Exuberance” speech as he witnessed asset prices rapidly escalate (Greenspan, 1996). Central 
bankers were in a dilemma in determining whether the rapid escalation in asset prices were as 
a result of a bubble build up or prices were merely reflecting improving fundamentals. After 
all, the EMH was the dominant theory and Greenspan for example was an ardent believer in 
market efficiency (Bilginsoy, 2014).  During the late 1990s, the Federal Reserve Bank resolved 
that a pre-emptive attempt to quell the bubble was out of its reach and instead, defined its role 
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as applying monetary policy to shield the overall economy from any spillover effect that may 
arise in the event of a financial shock (Greenspan, 2008). 
Figure 4.2: The Nasdaq Composite’s Astonishing Appreciation 
 
Source: Knight (2014: 354) 
 The bubble reached a peak on March 10, 2000 with the NASDAQ Composite rising 220% in 
a period of 37 months. This rapid appreciation is even considered moderate as the NASDAQ 
is considered to be broad an index to capture the dot-com effect since it includes all technology 
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companies some of which are classified as part of the “old” economy (Bilginsoy, 2014). Ofek 
and Richardson (2002, 2003) point out 400 “pure” internet stocks that appreciated by about 
500% over the same period. The bubble collapsed soon after. Some companies, such as 
pets.com and Webvan, failed completely whiles others – such as Cisco, saw their stock prices 
declining massively (Goldman, 2010). 
4.4.11 The Great Recession 
The United States faced a deep and lengthy recession after the dot-com crisis and the 
consequent bear market. Allan Greenspan, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, through a 
succession of aggressive interest rate cuts, replaced one bubble – dot-com bubble - with another 
-real estate bubble. By considerably lowering the interest rates and standards of lending, the 
government of the United States escalated a colossal credit bubble which encouraged consumer 
spending and fueled rapid real estate price appreciation as well as the global economy, which 
eventually crashed and led to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression (Knight, 
2014). 
According to Knight (2014), the seeds of the Great Recession were planted 80 years prior, 
during the Great Depression. Roosevelt’s administration acknowledged the importance of the 
housing industry to the whole economy. This is because of the fact a vibrant housing industry 
has a positive impact on other quarters of the economy namely:  timber, consumer appliances, 
professional trades as well as the other services and materials needed for building and 
furnishing a home. 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), generally called “Fannie Mae” was 
established in 1938 in line with Roosevelt’s New Deal with a mandate to buy up mortgages 
from the banks, convert these mortgages into securities which are then sold to investors in the 
secondary public markets (Hagerty, 2012).  The banks then could still have a decent cash 
reserve available for lending as opposed to it being locked up in a slow albeit continual stream 
of cash flow spanning a 3- year period. Fannie Mae was a government-sponsored entity (GSE), 
but it was also an independent corporation and became a publicly traded corporation in 1968. 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), another GSE was established in 
1970 to buy mortgages from the secondary market, convert them into securities, and sell them 
as mortgage backed securities (MBS) (Acharya et al., 2011). 
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The United States federal government has a history of offering incentives for purchasing and 
owning homes.  As an affirmation of policy, the government in 1992, stipulated that a portion 
of mortgage purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be committed to purchasing affordable 
housing with the goal of helping low-income Americans who otherwise would not have 
qualified, to obtain mortgages. The government further directed a portion of mortgage 
purchases by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) should be committed 
to affordable housing. By 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had committed 58% of mortgage 
purchases to affordable housing, up from 30% in 1992. The two institutions eventually had $5 
trillion in low-income as well as minority loan commitments (Knight, 2014, Pezzuto, 2016). 
Figure 4.3: US Mortgage Lending from 1997 - 2007 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Harvard University (2008: 4) 
Apart from mortgage interest qualifying for deduction for tax purposes, there was an additional 
benefit of tax-free capital gains included in the tax code for homeowners initially introduced 
in July 1978 which allowed up to $100,000 tax-free capital gain for people who are 55 years 
or older. The tax exemption increased to $250,000 and $500,000 for an unmarried person and 
for a married couple respectively in 1997 (Burman, 2010, Knight, 2014).  
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This ignited interest in investing in real estate. Falling interest rates also fuel the increase in 
mortgage loans which encouraged people to invest in real estate. Interest rates was above 18% 
in 1982 for customers with some high creditworthy records. However, over the following three 
decades, interest rates declined persistently. After the dot-com crisis, the Federal Reserve 
adopted an assertive stance on reducing interest rates, and reduced its interest rate to 1%. As 
interest rates dropped mortgage payments became affordable (Knight, 2014). 
Despite the economic slump in 2001—2002 the oil-producing countries, and the world in 
general still had lots of cash, and were seeking places to invest this wealth. Persistent decline 
in interest rates meant the $70 trillion invested in fixed-income vehicles were generating paltry 
rates of return. These monies were meant for safe, non-speculative reasons, and the managers 
were constantly seeking investments offering relatively higher yields as well as safety. The 
creative finance industry designed Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) which were made up subprime mortgages which in turn were given the 
blessings of the ratings agencies as high-grade securities. These monies seeking higher yields 
were poured into the creative investments although some underlying mortgages were classified 
as SIVA (Stated Income, Verified Assets) where the borrowers could declare any amount of 
income they pleased and only had to prove they had a job and cash in their bank accounts; 
NIVA (No Income, Verified Assets) where only a proof of bank account was retired to secure 
a mortgage; NINA (No Income, No Asset) where no proof of assets or income was required to 
secure a mortgage (Knight, 2014).  
With the Dot-com crises and the September 11 attacks now years away, and the United States 
economy performing very well, the Reserve Bank started making upward adjustments to 
interest rates which was at a historical low of 1%. This was done in small steps but 
consecutively for 17 times, increasing the Fed rate from 1% in 2004, to 5.25% in 2006 (Knight, 
2014). Increasing interest rates implied increasing payments for mortgages all over the country, 
and majority of these had adjustable mortgage rates. The situation was even grimmer worse for 
those with subprime loans, as the low “teaser” rates, were replaced with even higher interest 
rate payments upon expiration (Knight, 2014). 
Eventually, the safety of these investment vehicles was exposed when the default rates of the 
underlying mortgages began to increase triggering panic and eventually a crisis. The year 2008 
was the severest stage of the mortgage meltdown and financial crisis, with trillions of dollars 
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wiped out in the United States. Several banks and other financial institutions heavily exposed 
to these securities collapsed or had to seek bailout form their governments. Notable among 
these banks and financial institutions were Lehman Brothers which was acquired by Nomura 
Holdings, Bear Stearns also acquired by JP Morgan Chase, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, which 
were bailed out by the United States government. 
 
4.5 Summary 
The history of financial crises reveal that financial market participants can behave irrationally 
and make suboptimal and detrimental choices. Further, market participants keep repeating the 
same irrational behaviours over time proving that history in fact repeats itself as the FMH posits 
therefore previous events that happened in financial markets in the past will occur again in 
future. It is also evident that financial crises also have the potential of spilling over into other 
markets. The following chapter describes the behavioural biases that cause market participants 
to repeatedly behave in ways that are deemed irrational and consequently have detrimental 
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Chapter 3 discussed the Chaos Theory in finance and the FMH, which subsequent to the Global 
Financial Crisis, have been gaining popularity again. The FMH explains the characteristics of 
financial time series but does not offer an explanation as to why financial markets behave the 
way they do. This chapter discusses behavioural finance, which studies the effects of 
psychology on the behaviour of finance practitioners and the effects on financial markets 
subsequently and why financial markets are not efficient. Behavioural finance describes the 
underlying psychology that cause market participants to behave in certain ways that directly 
influence the behaviour of financial markets. 
Several studies challenged the classical finance theories, culminating in a new school of 
thought in finance. The new finance doctrine focuses on market inefficiencies, mainly by 
applying behavioral models. Eugene Fama however contends that behavioural finance is 
simply a branch of classical finance, because all it does is criticize the efficient markets model 
claiming therefore, he is possibly the most important behavioral finance figure, because there 
is no behavioural finance without him and the efficient markets model (Fama and Thaler, 
2016). Fama argues that there is no testable and full-blown behavioural asset pricing model 
(Fama and Thaler, 2016). There is however an emergence of behavioural asset pricing models 
(Shefrin and Statman, 1994, Duran and Caginalp, 2008, Lux, 2008, Shefrin, 2008) 
 
This chapter begins with an introduction to behavioural finance, describing its origins and 
delves into the various behavioural biases that investors are prone to thereby making them 
behave contrary to what classical financial theories assume. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A parent will pay a certain amount of money to minimize her the risk of her child contracting 
a debilitating disease from 10% to 5% and even be willing to pay an additional twice or thrice 
as much to push the said risk from 5% to 0%. This decline from 5% to 0% is so much more 
valuable to the parent than the decline from 10% to 5%, this is because it offers more than just 
a 5% reduction in risk; it brings certainty. To the parent therefore, 0% and 100% weigh far 
more heavily in the mind than what mathematical models argue they should. Although this 
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premium paid is considered irrational under the rational model of classical finance, it is 
consistent with the psychology of worry where parents are willing to pay a premium for 
certainty (Kahneman, 2011). Lottery players are motivated to pay a dollar for lottery tickets 
that on average pay only 50 cents due to the appeal of the benefits of hope and the appeal of 
the benefits of hope also motivate employees to receive stock options instead of salaries, 
irrespective of the fact that stock options, on average, are worth less than salaries foregone 
(Statman, 2014). Statman (2010: 8) posits that: 
“We want more from our investments than a reasonable balance 
between risk and return. We want to nurture hope for riches and banish 
fear of poverty. We want to win, be number one, and beat the market. 
We want to feel pride when our investments bring gains and avoid 
regret when they inflict losses. We want the status conveyed by hedge 
funds, the virtue conveyed by socially responsible funds, the 
patriotism conveyed by investing in our own country, and the loyalty 
conveyed by investing in the companies that employ us. We want 
financial markets to be fair, but we search for an edge that would let 
us win. We want to leave a legacy for our children when we are gone. 
And we want to leave nothing for the tax man.” 
 
Although Harry Markowitz won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1990 for his contribution to 
of the mean-variance portfolio to MPT, when Markowitz had to make his own investment 
decisions for his retirement, he did not apply his Nobel Prize–winning approach! Instead, he 
applied a simple rule of thumb known as 
1
𝑁
 where the investor allocates her capital equally 
among N number of asset classes. In an interview, Markowitz admitted that he wanted to steer 
clear of regrets: “I thought, ‘You know, if the stock market goes way up and I’m not in, I’ll feel 
stupid. And if it goes way down and I’m in it, I’ll feel stupid.’ So I went 50-50.” (Markowitz, 
2011). 
 
According to Skinner (1953), it is difficult to analyse human behaviour as a result of its 
tremendously complex nature and based on mainly cause-result relation. People take actions 
due to the multifarious effect of both external and internal stimulants/drive and demonstrate 
certain actions/reaction. 
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Figure 5.1: Development of Behaviour 
 
Source: Kıyılar and Acar (2009) 
 
Over time, the tension between the ideal concept of human rationality and the reality of our 
daily lives has become a progressively critical issue. To what extent do we know about how in 
the real world, people make decisions and choices and how divergent are the disparities 
between the real world and the theoretical assumptions? Do those differences even matter? It 
was only in the 1960s that systematic efforts were made to provide answers to the questions.  
The field of behavioural finance begun to take shape when psychology professors Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky happened to compare their life experiences and notes which 
subsequently led to collaborations that brought about a competing version to the rational model 
of classical finance on how under conditions of uncertainty, individuals make decisions 
(Bernstein, 2007). Figure 5.1 depicts the development of behaviour and how both external and 
internal factors influences the behaviour of an individual. 
 
5.2 What Is Behavioural Finance?  
Behavioural finance can be simply defined as applying principles of psychology to finance. 
Behavioural finance is based on the assumption of ‘normal people’ instead of ‘rational people’ 
in classical finance and propounds behavioural portfolio theory and behavioural asset pricing 
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suggest that expected returns are only determined by risk (Statman, 2014). Statman (2014) 
further posits that in the argument of efficient markets, behavioural finance differentiates hard-
to-beat markets from rational markets a delineation that is often blurred in classical finance, 
and examines why so a large number of investors believe that they can beat the market 
expanding the field of finance beyond market efficiency, portfolios and asset pricing and poised 
continuous expansion while abiding by the scientific rigours introduced by classical finance. 
 
Although behavioural finance have gained a huge amount of popularity and recognition as it 
points out the flaws in classical finance,  Thaler (2015) however argues that classical finance 
theories should not be discarded as they still remain relevant as a starting point for models that 
are more realistic and in some special situations where the problem at hand is simple or the 
actors in the economy possess the highly specialized relevant skills, the model can offer a good 
approximation of what pertains I the real world. This may however not be the case even when 
the economic actors possess these highly specialized and relevant skills as pointed out in the 
Allais Paradox where French economist and 1988 Nobel Prize in Economics winner Maurice 
Allais proved that even highly trained economists were susceptible to choice problems and 
behaviours inconsistent with that suggested by the Expected Utility Theory (Allais, 1953). 
However, Thaler (2015) argues that for the most part of economic theories, the assumption of 
rationality is not a critical one irrespective of the level of expertise of the market participants.  
 
Statman (2014) points out that whereas the building blocks of classical finance are: 
• People are rational 
• Market efficiency 
• The design of portfolios should be guided by mean-variance rules of portfolio 
theory and 
• Standard asset price theories describe expected returns with the differences in 
returns attributable to the differences in risk. 
 
Behavioural finance on the other hand is based on alternative foundations replacing each of the 
foundations of classical finance. The four alternative foundations are: 
• People are normal 
• Markets are inefficient although hard to beat 
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• Portfolios are designed according to the rules of behavioural portfolio 
management 
• Behavioural asset pricing theory describes expected returns and with 
differences in expected returns explained by more than the differences in risk. 
Normal investors want three kinds of benefits from their investments namely utilitarian, 
expressive and emotional benefits. Utilitarian benefit answers the question, ‘What does the 
investment offer me and my pocketbook?’ For investments, the utilitarian benefits are in 
increasing wealth with low risk and high returns. Expressive benefit answers the question 
‘What does the investment portray about me to others and to myself?’ and depicts values, tastes, 
and status. For example, environmental mutual funds, express environmental responsibility, 
whereas a hedge fund, just like a stately Bentley expresses high status. Emotional benefit also 
answers the question ‘How does the investment make me feel?’ An environmental mutual fund 
makes one feel virtuous, whereas an investment in a hedge fund makes one feel proud (Statman, 
1999,2010).  
 
5.3 A History of Behavioural Finance 
The argument on the irrationality of investors has existed for a very long time and possibly, the 
most popular historical example of investors’ irrationality can be traced to the sixteenth century 
when a man named Conrad Guestner introduced tulip bulbs to Holland. The tulips were 
beautiful and difficult to obtain and thrilled consumers and in the process, become a status 
symbol for the elite. In the early periods, most buyers bought the flowers simply because of its 
aesthetic value, with speculators eventually joining the trade to make profits. Trading activities 
in tulips rocketed, and tulip bulbs were eventually filed on the local market exchanges. As 
speculative trading increased, people sold everything they owned in order to acquire tulips, 
with the hope that the value would continue to soar (Pompian, 2006). As speculators begun to 
liquidate their holdings, the prices of tulips weakened and eventually plunged by 90% within 
a month with investors defaulting on their tulip contracts and incurring huge losses (Pompian, 
2006).  
 
According to Pompian (2006), it was during the mid-eighteenth-century with the beginning of 
the classical period in economics, nonetheless, that people began to analyse the human aspect 
of economic decision making, subsequently laying the foundations for behavioural finance. It 
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was during this same time that the concept of utility emerged as a measure of the satisfaction 
associated to the consumption of a good or a service.  
 
Besides the well-known Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (1776b), His book, The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759) focused more on the psychology of the individual rather than 
on the creation of wealth in markets. Adam Smith (1759) explained the emotional and mental 
foundations of human interaction, which included economic interaction. While the classical 
economists believed that the behaviour of people could be modelled in mathematical terms and 
completely rational. Others, such as Adam Smith, argued that each human was born with an 
innate moral compass, which influences externalities such as logic or law. Adam Smith posited 
that an “invisible hand” guided both economic and social conduct however, the viewpoint of 
economic decision making by individuals being “perfectly rational” was never part of Smith’s 
argument (Pompian, 2006). When dealing with financial issues, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments focused on factors such as shame, pride, insecurity, and egotism: 
 
“It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us. But 
vanity is always founded upon the belief of our being the object of 
attention and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches, because 
he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, 
and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all those 
agreeable emotions with which the advantages of his situation so 
readily inspire him... The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his 
poverty. He feels that it either places him out of the sight of mankind, 
or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any 
fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. He is 
mortified upon both accounts. For though to be overlooked, and to be 
disapproved of, are things entirely different, yet as obscurity covers us 
from the daylight of honour and approbation, to feel that we are taken 
no notice of, necessarily damps the most agreeable hope, and 
disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature.” (Smith, 1759: 28). 
 
The classical economic assumption of rationality however prevailed over the role of 
psychology in economic decision making and became the mainstream until the expanding 
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field of experimental economics analysed theories of individual choice, and begun questioning 
the theoretical foundations of perfect rationality.  
 
5.4 Risk and Uncertainty 
Although classical finance theories make no distinction between risk and uncertainty, 
renowned German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer advocates that a clear distinction should be 
made between the two (Gigerenzer, 2014). The US Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson, on 
March 2008 Henry Paulson, confirmed: “Our financial institutions, banks and investment 
banks, are strong. Our capital markets are resilient. They’re efficient. They’re flexible.” 
(Makridakis, Hogarth and Gaba, 2009:796). The financial crisis shortly escalated thereafter. 
Gigerenzer (2014) posits that the risk models that motivated Henry Paulson’s belief failed to 
anticipate the magnitude of the bubble, akin to the turkey enjoying being fed freely 
continuously by the farmer and not anticipating the thought of Thanksgiving (Gerd Gigerenzer 
refers to this as Turkey Illusion and cconfusing a world of risk with a world of certainty as the 
Zero-Risk Illusion).  
 
By promoting an incorrect sense of certainty, known risk models can promote rather than avert 
crises. Gigerenzer (2014) entreats people to learn to live with uncertainty suggesting that the 
first step towards this is to gain an understanding of the difference between know risk and 
unknown risks. Figure 5.2 illustrates the two types of illusions of certainty. The first describes 
confusing a world of risk with that of certainty, this is known as the zero-risk illusion. The 
second kind of illusion is confusing a world of uncertainty with that of known risk, this is 
known as the turkey illusion or the calculable-risk illusion. In each of the cases, the illusion is 
shown with an arrow that move from right to left (Gigerenzer, 2014). 
University of Chicago economist Frank Knight (1921) distinguished between risk and 
uncertainty defining risk as outcomes that can be insured against and uncertainty, sometimes 
also referred to as Knightian uncertainty as risk that cannot be measured or calculated and 
argued that uncertainty must be radically viewed in a distinct sense from risk. Although some 
scholars disagree with Frank Knight arguing that there is always the possibility to create 
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Figure 5.2: Risk, Uncertainty and the Illusions of Certainty 
 
Source: Gigerenzer (2014: 37) 
 
However, according to Savage (1954) the father of modern Bayesian decision theory, and to 
whom this rebuttal is often attributed, this is only applicable to “small worlds” where 
everything is known and would be “utterly ridiculous” to adapt his theory to large worlds, and 
even to simple questions as planning a family picnic. (Savage, 1954;16).  
 
In November 2008, the Queen of England, Queen Elizabeth II posed the question “how come 
nobody could foresee it” referring to the financial crisis of 2007-09, during her visit to the 
London School of Economics. In response, a letter was drafted by Professor Tim Besley of 
London School of Economics and a member of the Bank of England Monetary Policy 
Committee and Professor Peter Hennessey of University of London concluded (Besley and 
Hennessey, 2009: 3): 
“…in summary, Your Majesty, the failure to foresee the timing, 
extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off, while it had 
many causes, was principally a failure of the collective 
imagination of many bright people, both in this country and 
internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole.” 
 
The former governor of the Bank of England, Mervin King (2016) argues in his book, The 
End of Alchemy, that the financial crisis of 2007-09 reflects not only a failure of institutions 
or individuals but also a failure of the fundamental ideas of current economic policymaking. 
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Principal among these ideas is the nature of uncertainty and risk. One fundamental assumption 
in economics and finance is the idea that individuals rationally attach probabilities to possible 
future outcomes and estimate the likely effects on their wellbeing (utility as they seek to 
maximize that utility. King (2016) contends that in a world of what economists refer to as 
“radical uncertainty”, it may not always be possible to estimate the expected utility of an 
action as there is no way of ascertaining the probabilities of all possible future events. 
 
In the words of Donald Rumsfeld (2002), then United States Secretary of Defence, “there are 
known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; 
that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know.” 
 
5.5 Investor Biases and Heuristics 
Behavioural biases can be described abstractly, in the same way as systematic errors in 
judgement (Pompian, 2006), whereas a heuristic is any kind of ‘rule of thumb’ or a simple rule 
of behaviour through which a problem is solved (Cartwright, 2014). Gigerenzer (2014) uses 
the term behavioural biases and heuristics interchangeably describing them as are rules of 
thumb that provide shortcuts to methodical research or calculations.  In their book Judgment 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) presented 
ground-breaking studies in decision making under uncertainty claiming that when evaluating 
probabilities, people depend on limited number of heuristics which lessen the complex tasks 
of calculating probabilities and forecasting values to easier judgmental operations. Gilovich, 
Griffin, & Kahneman (2002) in their book Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment, offered some of the most prominent study on biases and heuristics after Judgment 
Under Uncertainty. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky did not claim it is irrational for people to apply the relevant heuristics. 
They argue on the contrary that the heuristics are quite valuable as a general rule. The drawback 
is that in certain cases, the use of heuristics leads to systematic and severe errors which were 
not random and could be described and even predicted.  
 
According to Kahneman (2011), our thinking can be described by two systems, explained by 
a catalogue of opposing characteristics. System 1 is described as unconscious work by 
Page | 91  
 
heuristics and prone to errors. However, System 2 is the conscious works by rule of logic and 
statistics, and not prone to errors. Biases may be categorised as cognitive biases or emotional 
biases. Cognitive biases refer to predispositions to thinking and acting in certain ways and can 
also be regarded as a heuristic or rule of thumb, which may lead to systematic divergence from 
a standard of good judgement or rationality although there are still some prevailing some 
controversies as to whether some of these heuristics are in fact irrational or they result in 
beneficial behaviour or attitudes (Baker and Ricciardi, 2014). An emotional bias on the other 
hand results in making decisions based on one’s feelings instead of facts.  
 
Akerlof and Shiller (2015) in their book Phishing for Phools, argue that although the free-
market system does a lot of good, it also encourages firms to “phish”8 for “phools”9 stating 
that if we care for the welfare of people, then the invisible hand is usually the problem and not 
the solution. This invisible hand may punish companies for not taking advantage of the biases 
like the tendency to show unrealistic optimism or ignoring the fine print. According to Akerlof 
and Shiller (2015), without due suspicion of complex financial securities being traded, 
phishing for phools played a significant role in the Great Recession.  
 
The following section describes a list of popular behavioural biases. 
 
5.5.1 Overconfidence Bias 
The overconfidence bias can be summarized as unjustified faith in one’s own intuition, 
judgements, reasoning and cognitive abilities. It is derived from a vast body experiments and 
surveys in cognitive psychology where subjects overestimate their own abilities to make 
predictions. People are not properly calibrated to estimate probabilities therefore events that 
they think are certain to occur are usually far less than 100 percent certainty of occurrence.  
People saying that they are 90% confident that a particular event will transpire, or claiming that 
a statement is true, are usually only 70% correct (Fuller, 1998). Research prove that 
overconfidence bias is the cause of market bubbles, litigations, wars and strikes (Moore and 
Healy, 2008).  The overconfidence bias can be placed into two categories – miscalibration and 
better-than-average effect. According to Hilton (2001), miscalibration can lead to 
                                                          
8 Exploiting ignorance and biases of people 
9 Any person who is successfully phished 
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overestimating or underestimating events. A common way to assess faulty calibration of 
forecasts is by asking people to make a range prediction, with a 90% conviction that the actual 
value will be within the specified range.  
 
An investment manager for example, asked to make a forecast about the exchange rate of the 
British Pound/Euro in six months may say that she is 90% confident that the exchange rate will 
fall within 0.64 and 0.74 pounds. If the manager exhibits proper calibration, the nine out of ten 
times, the value of the currency should be within the range predicted (“hits”) and thus expect 
only one out of ten “misses” as a result of predictions falling out of the range. Stephan (1998) 
observes a strong evidence of miscalibration when he applied this procedure in a multinational 
bank, with thirty-six foreign exchange traders, with a high rate of misses on foreign exchange 
rate predictions (71.1%) as well as stock price questions (83.3%) and even in general 
knowledge questions (78.6%). 
 
When asked about their driving skills, most people consider themselves to be better than the 
average driver. People tend to show extreme and unrealistic optimism about themselves 
(Merkle and Weber, 2011, Harris and Hahn, 2011). Such overconfidence is classified as the 
better-than-average kind of overconfidence. Moore and Healy (2008) describe miscalibration 
as an extreme belief in one’s precision, and the better-than-average effect as overrating one’s 
performance relative to the performance of others. 
 
Shiller (1981) in a study on the S&P and the Dow Jones Industrial Average, found that stock 
prices appeared to be five to thirteen times higher than justified by new information on future 
dividends providing evidence on miscalibration by investors over the period of the study. 
Figure 5.3 shows the real S& P index (the solid line p) and the ex-post “rational price (dotted 
line p) from 1871 to 1979 and the real adjusted Down Jones Industrial Average (the solid line 
p) and the ex-post rational price from 1928 to 1979 respectively all detrended by a long-term 
term exponential factor. However, Fama (2016) argues that although he agrees with Shiller 
(1981), stock prices are made up of two components namely expected cash flows (dividends) 
and discount rates (expected returns) therefore the variation in prices beyond what is justifiable 
from the expected cash flows is as a result of the variations in the discount rates as investors 
may adjust their expected returns in line with new information. There is miscalibration even 
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among experts and this is usually as a result of a far too tight prediction interval that experts 
use as a result of overconfidence (Deaves, Lüders and Schröder, 2005; Ben-David, Graham 
and Harvey, 2010). 
Figure 5.3:  S&P Index and the                                   Dow Jones Industrial Average 
 
Source: Shiller (1981: 422) 
 
 
People tend to showcase overconfidence when difficult questions are posed and under 
confidence when less difficult ones are posed (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977) this 
phenomenon is known as the hard-easy effect. Although the overconfidence bias is exhibited 
by both genders, men tend to be more overconfident than women (Lundeberg, Fox and 
Punćcohaŕ 1994).  
 
5.5.2 Anchoring and Adjustment Bias  
Any time a pre-owned car salesperson is negotiating prices with customers, he/she begins with 
a higher price and then works downwards. The salesperson thus anchors the customer in the 
higher price so that the customer then accepts that a lower price suggests good value. 
Anchoring and adjustment are heuristics that involves adjusting from a starting point (Furnham 
and Boo, 2011, Tamir and Mitchell, 2013).  
 
De Bondt (1993) proposes that anchoring influences people to skew their interval forecasts. To 
understand this heuristic, one needs to think about a ship which has its anchor dropped therefore 
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keeping the boat from veering too far off. This is not a problem if the ship is anchored but 
becomes challenging if one wants to go somewhere. The anchoring heuristic affects 
calculations that involve a series of operations and numbers and occurs when an operation 
starts with a number and an adjustment is made relative to that number. Anchoring may be at 
taking place if the adjustment is too small as this psychological bias forestalls making sufficient 
adjust from the anchor. The starting point for anchoring may be a recent data like economic 
growth, inflation or the price of an asset. The anchoring and adjustment bias occurs anytime 
investors are preoccupied without a reason on a given set of information to which inadequate 
subsequent modifications are made irrespective of the availability of new information when a 
rational investor is expected to adjust the starting set of information (Numann, Roberts, Cauvin, 
2011, Bokhari and Geltner, 2011). 
 
 
5.5.3 Cognitive Dissonance Bias 
Cognitive dissonance developed by Leon Festinger is based on how people endeavour to attain 
internal consistency. A person who encounters inconsistency or dissonance is likely to develop 
psychological discomfort, and is driven to strive to minimise this dissonance as well as actively 
trying to avoid information and situations that are likely to increase it. Cognitive dissonance is 
a mental discomfort or stress experienced by a person holding two or more contradictory ideas, 
beliefs or values concurrently, implements an action that is contrary to one or more ideas, 
beliefs or values, or encountered new information that contradicts existing ideas, beliefs or 
values (Festinger, 1962a, Festinger, 1962b). 
 
Academics have distinguished between two different facets of cognitive dissonance that relate 
to decision making namely, selective perception and selective decision making. The seminal 
experiment on cognitive dissonance was conducted by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). In their 
experiment, all the participants were expected to do what all would concur was a boring 
undertaking and then to tell another participant (who was in fact a confederate of the conductor 
of the experiment) that it was exciting. Half of the participants were paid $1 to co-operate and 
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Figure 5.4: Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
 
Source: Rolla (1998: 2) 
 
Following this, all participants were asked to assess how much they enjoyed the boring task. 
This latter evaluation served as the dependent measure/experimental criterion. According to 
behaviourist/reinforcement theory, participants who were given $20 should enjoy the task more 
since they would associate the money received with the task. On the other hand, cognitive 
dissonance theory would predict that participants who received $1 would feel the most 
dissonance because they had to complete a boring task and then tell a lie to an experimenter, 
all for just $1.  
Figure 5.5: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
Experiment 
 
Source: R. H. Rolla (1998: 3) 
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This would create a dissonance between the conviction that they were not evil or stupid, and 
the action which is that they completed a boring tasked and then lied for only $1. Therefore, 
the cognitive dissonance theory would envisage that the participants in the $1 group would be 
more prompted to seek a resolve to their dissonance by reconceptualising/rationalizing their 
actions. They would establish the belief that the boring task was, actually, fun. It proved to be 
correct as predicted by Festinger that the participants in the $1 group would enjoy the task 
more. Figure 5.5 illustrates the experiment. 
 
5.5.4 Availability Bias 
The availability bias is a rule of thumb, or judgemental heuristic whereby a person assesses the 
probability of an occurrence by the extent to which an event is easily remembered (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1973). People who exhibit this bias identify easily recalled events as being 
more likely to occur than events that are difficult to imagine or to understand. 
 
Unusual and dramatic events such as shark attacks, homicides or lightning are reported more 
often in the new than very common and less shocking causes of death such as common diseases 
(Briñol, Petty and Tormala, 2006). Availability can be as a result of imagination, experience 
or memory (Lee, O’Brien and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010, Bebbington, 2010, Moradi, Mostafae 
and Meshk 2013). According to Goetzmann, Kim and Shiller (2016), although historical data 
points to the fact that the base rate for an extreme, stock market crash in a single day is relatively 
low, surveys of institutional and individual investors, that have been conducted regularly over 
26 years in the United States, indicate that they judge the probability to be far higher. 
Goetzmann et al. (2016) conclude that this phenomenon is as a result of availability bias as 
negative market and current market declines made salient by financial press are related to 
probabilities of higher subjective crashes. Nonmarket-related, rare disasters are also associated 
with higher subjective crash probabilities. 
 
5.5.5 Representativeness Bias 
Representativeness bias refers to the penchant to placing less emphasis on long-term averages 
and thereby over-weighting recent events, this phenomenon is referred to as the law of small 
numbers (Ritter, 2003).  
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Two fundamental clarifications of representativeness bias affect individual investors namely 
base-rate neglect and sample-size neglect. With base-rate neglect, investors endeavour to 
ascertain the possibility of success for example, of an investment in a particular company by 
placing the business in a familiar classification model that is easy to understand. This investor 
may classify the company as a value stock and determine the risks and rewards associated with 
that classification. This approach, however, neglects other factors that are unrelated and could 
significantly influence the success of this investment. Investors usually adopt this approach 
because it appears to be a substitute to the meticulous research that is actually needed when 
valuing an investment. Lacking sensitivity to previous information or disregarding base rate, 
or a lack of knowledge of regression are some of the factors that result in representativeness 
bias among investors (Pompian, 2011, Ying Luo, 2013). 
 
On the other hand, sample-size neglect, exists when in judging the probability of a given 
outcome of an investment, investors fail to correctly take into account the sample size of the 
particular set of information on which their judgement is based by incorrectly assuming that 
the small sample size represents the populations this phenomenon is also referred to as the “law 
of small numbers.”  
 
5.5.6 The Affect Heuristic 
The affect heuristic is a mental shortcut people use in making quick and efficient decisions and 
solving problems. This mental shortcut is influenced by current emotion such as pleasure, fear, 
surprise, etc. The affect heuristic is therefore a type of heuristic in which in psychological 
terms, “affect” (emotional response) plays a critical role. This heuristic is a subconscious 
activity that shortens the process of decision-making and lets people function without the need 
to go through an extensive amount of information. Furthermore, the affect heuristic has a 
shorter duration than a mood and occurs involuntarily and rapidly in response to a stimulus. 
The words "lung cancer" typically invokes an effect of dread, whereas the words "mother's 
love" typically invokes a sense of affection and comfort. Affect usually comes into play when 
judging the benefits and risks of something, based on the negative or positive feelings that 
associated with a stimulus. If the sentiments towards an event are positive, people are more 
likely to construe the benefits as high and risks low however, if the sentiments towards an event 
are negative, people are more likely to construe the benefits as low and risks as high (Finucane, 
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Alhakami, Slovic and Johnson, 2000). For example, people perceive stocks that they identify 
to be “good” as having low risk and offering higher returns whiles “bad” stocks are perceived 
to come with high risk and low returns (Ganzach, 2000). The affect theory predicts that there is 
a negative correlation between risk and return for unfamiliar stocks and a positive correlation 
between risk and return for familiar stocks. Riskier stocks were perceived to produce higher 
returns as predicted by traditional finance models. If a stock is perceived to be safe, investors 
pay a premium for this perceived safety thereby making it more expensive and depressing 
expected returns in the process (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011, Ganzach, 2000). Affect bias 
ascribes negative and positive images to feelings and occurrences that point out signals for 
decision making (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and Macgregor, 2007). Shefrin (2016) posits that, 
investment professionals on average construe expected return and risk to be negatively 
correlated, which is contrary to the relationship portrayed in textbook finance. Shefrin (2016) 
argues that representativeness and affect heuristics are responsible for this phenomenon. Solt 
and Statman (1989) argue that investors who perceive the shares of good companies as 
representative of good investments rely on the representativeness bias that a good stock is a 
stock of a good company. Such associations are referred to as “somatic markers” feelings in 
the body associated with emotions and strongly influence decision making. Representativeness 
and affect are in many ways similar, and usually reinforce each other and in this context both 
biases focus on the “goodness of companies” (Shefrin, 2016).  
Baker and Wurgler (2006) identified the extent to which sentiments impact the relationship 
between characteristics such as size and B/M and realized returns and reported that the size 
effect is conditional on sentiment therefore in a period of low sentiment, stocks of small 
companies earn relatively high subsequent returns, however, in a period of high sentiment, the 
size effect ceases to exist. The conditional sentiment study offers a vehicle to understand how 
behavioural bias and perceived risk combine to affect realized returns (Shefrin, 2016). In line 
with classical finance assumptions, investors’ perception that small-cap equities are riskier than 
large-cap equities on average causes the realized returns of small-cap equities to be greater than 
that of large-cap equities (Shefrin, 2016). Again, perceptions about the risk-size interaction 
deepen after periods of negative sentiment which lead to larger size effects during such periods 
(Shefrin, 2016). 
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According to Ganzach (2000), financial analysts to a large extent, evaluate stocks in terms of 
global attitudes toward such stocks and not in according to their risk/return relationships as 
suggested by traditional finance theories. Analysts’ recommendations also have substantial 
impact on stock prices (Amir et al., 1999). According to Ganzach (2000) this explains some of 
the “anomalies” observed in studies on market returns particularly Fama and French (1993) 
and also Fama and French (1996) conclusion that investors are not only compensated for 
holding high-risk stocks, but also for holding small company stocks, with low sales growth, 
low P/E ratio, high book-to-market value, and low past returns. All these parameters are 
however, correlates of low preference, which, according to Ganzach (2000) lead to lower 
perceived expected returns as well as higher perceived risk resulting in depression in price 
which is unwarranted. Excessive returns are subsequently realized when this unwarranted 
depression disappears. 
5.5.7 The Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory explains how people make decisions on probabilistic choices involving risk, 
when the outcome probabilities are known. The theory states that people make choices based 
on the conceivable amount of losses and gains instead of the ultimate outcome, and also, people 
estimate such losses and gains by applying some particular heuristics.  
 
The theory emerged in 1979 and was expounded in 1992 by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky as a more precise depiction of decision making that bordered on psychology, in 
comparison with the expected utility theory (Shafir and LeBoeuf, 2002). In their seminal work 
in behavioural finance, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) used the term prospect originally to refer to lotteries or gambles. 
 
The prospect theory is to behavioural finance what the expected utility theory is to classical 
finance. In this theory, the assessment of outcomes of a choice is reference-dependent, where 
reference refers to the existing state of wealth whereas the expected utility theory states that 
the evaluation of an outcome is reference-independent.  The prospect theory argues that people 
base their decision making on the consequences of the outcome of on their current wealth. The 
pain one experiences as a result of a loss exceeds a gain of similar magnitude. Figure 5.6 
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represents a hypothetical value function which was used by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to 
show how the value assigned to a gain is far below the value assigned to a loss.  
 
Figure 5.6: A Hypothetical Value Function  
 
Source:  Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 279) 
 
The theory therefore shows that in reality, people simultaneously are risk loving and risk averse 
as observed when investors buy insurance policies, bonds and mutual funds thereby 
diversifying and avoiding risks while at the same time, proceeding on to buy single stocks and 
lotteries, indicating an urge to take on risk. Again, individual investors as well as professional 
investors sometimes sell winning stocks too early and hold on to declining stocks for far too 
long due to the fear of a loss proving that losses trigger more severe pain than the pleasure that 
a gain of similar value brings. 
 
5.5.8 Framing 
The framing effect refers to situations where different portrayals of the same event bring out 
different responses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The framing bias leads to the 
predisposition to react in a different manner to a circumstance depending on how such a 
situation is presented (Bailey et al., 2011, Chuah and Devlin, 2011). Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981: 453) posit that, “The frame that a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the 
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formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the 
decision maker.” 
 
5.5.9 Herding  
There is a common conception that investors have a penchant to flock together, acting like a 
herd in their trading decisions. This kind of behaviour is usually associated with ‘irrational’ 
volatility in the market and threatens the stability of financial markets. The inclination to 
imitate other investors that cause to a group of investors to act in the same way is referred to 
as herding (Lemieux, 2004, Cipriani and Guarino, 2009). Novice investors are prone to herding 
and that behaviour influences the price of stocks; this behaviour however does not occur among 
professional investors (Cont and Bouchaud, 2000).  Teh and De Bondt (1997) and Gutierrez 
and Kelley (2009) also argue that herding can significantly influence the variance of stock 
returns. On the other contrary, Lakonishok et al. (1991) and Agarwal et al. (2012) argue that 
even professional investors are also susceptible to herding with the objective of “window-
dressing” their portfolio. In South Africa, Sarpong and Sibanda (2014) also found that even 
professional mutual fund managers exhibit herd behaviour. 
 
According to former Reserve Bank chairman Ben Bernanke, but for the financial crisis, it is 
not clear whether house prices would have tumbled so far or swiftly since in 2006, house prices 
had flattened out without declining much initially. When the crisis surfaced, in August 2007, 
prices of housing were about only 4 percent lower than they were at the start of 2006. Had it 
not been the panic, the bubble in the housing market might have gradually deflated, as has been 
anticipated by Federal Reserve’s forecasters had anticipated (Bernanke, 2015). Figure 5.7 
shows how the price of housing in 20 major cities in the United States declined only modestly 
from the beginning of 2006 till August 2007 when the financial crisis began. The decline 
accelerated throughout the period of the crisis but in May 2009, prices stabilized as the crisis 
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Figure 5.7: Home Prices Fell Sharply After the Financial Crisis 
 
Source: Adopted from S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index, Seasonally 
Adjusted, Cited in Bernanke (2015: 353) 
 
Rational Herding 
There has been an emerging literature on 'rational herding' in financial economics. models in 
rational herding are developed mainly on one or more of three phenomena namely, payoff 
externalities models, Principal-agent models and cascade models (Devenow and Welch, 1996). 
The Payoff externalities models posit that payoffs to an agent taking a particular action rises in 
the number of other agents taking the same action for example, the rule of driving on the left 
side of the road. The principal-agent models posit that to gain or preserve reputation in times 
of imperfectly informed financial markets, managers may choose either to 'ride the herd' 
thereby proving quality, or 'hide in the herd' thereby avoiding evaluation. Cascades models also 
posit that later agents, infer information from the behaviour of prior agents and optimally 
choose to disregard their own information and act in similar manner (Devenow and Welch, 
1996). 
Payoff Externalities: Market Liquidity  
In the 19th century, there were roughly 250 stock exchanges in the United States, today, one-
tenth of this number remains. This decline may be due to payoff externalities (Devenow and 
Welch, 1996). With economies of scale or informed traders imposing an externality on 
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uninformed traders (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991), informed and 
uninformed traders will both gain from transacting in more liquid markets or markets with 
more depth consequently forcing most traders to transacting in only one market (Devenow and 
Welch, 1996).  
Payoff Externalities: Information Acquisition 
Payoff externalities can also influence the decisions of agents on stocks for which they seek 
information. In some circumstances, agents find it worthy to pursue further information only 
when other agents do, thus herding on the acquisition of information or the lack thereof 
(Devenow and Welch, 1996; Han and Yang, 2013). Brennan (1990) and Hirshleifer et al. 
(1994) argues that private information reflect in the price of stocks a period after it acquisition, 
however, this only occurs after a minimum number of investors have also acquired such 
information. As a Consequence of this, the expected profits from acquiring information is 
dependent on the assessment of the expected gains of other investors leading to two equilibria. 
In one equilibrium, no investor purchases such information since the likelihood of information 
reflecting in the stock price is negligible and vice versa. 
Principal-agent/Reputation Models: Investment Decisions 
Principal-agent concerns can also lead to rational herding as the evaluation of managers is 
usually based on relative performance as opposed to absolute performance (Devenow and 
Welch, 1996). Pan et al., (2016) provided results from a number of tests to argue that CEO 
investment cycle, where investment increases over the period of a CEO’s tenure while 
disinvestment decreases causing “cyclical” firm growth in employment and assets. This is 
caused by agency problems and leads to rising investment quantity and declining investment 
quality as the CEO, over time wins more control of his board. Morck et al. (1989) also reported 
that top management dismissals are related to a firm performing poorly relative to its industry, 
as opposed to industry failures. Baker and Haugen, (2012) argue that portfolio managers may 
include certain stocks in their portfolio simply because they are easy to explain the inclusion 
of such stocks to their investment committees. Lütje and Menkhoff, (2003) also report that fund 
manager, particularly senior managers use rational herd behaviour as a means of adapting to 
incentives. 
These herding models usually reveal that managers prefer to mimic the actions of each other, 
totally disregarding private information, in order to avoid being exposed to be of low-skill in 
line with Keynes' remark in the General Theory that "it is better for reputation to fail 
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conventionally than to succeed unconventionally". Because of this, even the managers who are 
better than the average prefer to follow the crowd. This works in favour of worse managers as 
the decision to herd turn out to be a better decision (Devenow and Welch, 1996).  
 
Informational externalities: Cascades 
The most common explanation of rational herding may be cascades, as described in Welch 
(1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). When actions are publicly visible but not private 
information and there is a limit to the information of a private agent and actions possible, the 
basic cascade models may become applicable. The argument is that agents obtain relevant 
information by observing the previous decisions of other agents, to an extent where it becomes 
optimal and rational to completely disregard their private information. An investor for example, 
in possession of the most adverse private information can be motivated to make a purchase 
regardless if he witnessed three investors making a purchase previously, here, the information 
from three buys could outweigh the negative private information. Over time, there is very little 
additional new information to the cascade, investors simply mimic others based on the 
assumption that such large number of investors cannot be wrong. This however, may lead to 
erroneous decision on a large scale. Information cascades are usually very brittle, as investors’ 
actions may be based only on public observation and hearsay therefore, any new public 
information or a more accurate information can alter the behaviour, and the direction of the 
cascade (Devenow and Welch, 1996; Deng, 2016). 
 
5.5.10 Endowment Bias  
The endowment effect which is also referred to as divestiture aversion and connected in the 
field of social psychology with the mere ownership effect (Beggan, 1992). The endowment 
bias postulates that people assign more worth to things simply because they own them 
(Morewedge and Giblin, 2015). This is usually depicted in two ways, in a valuation paradigm 
and in an exchange paradigm. In terms of valuation, people tend to pay more to hold on to 
something they own than to acquire one they do not own even in circumstances where a cause 
for attachment is non-existent, or even if the particular item was only acquired minutes ago. In 
the exchange paradigm, people when given an asset are hesitant to trade it for another of similar 
value. For example, participants were reluctant to exchange their Swiss chocolate for a mug of 
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coffee when first given the Swiss chocolate. However, participants who were first given the 
mug of coffee were also hesitant to trade it in for a Swiss chocolate (Knetsch, 1989).  
 
The endowment effect is comparable to the Willingness to Accept or Pay (WTAP) behavioural 
model, a formula used to determine how much a consumer is ready to lose or put up with for 
different outcomes. Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler (Kahneman et al., 1990) 
provided one of the most popular examples of the endowment effect in finance literature where 
participants were offered a mug and then given the chance to trade it for an equally valuable 
alternative (pens). They discovered that the amount that participants demanded as payment for 
the mug after their ownership had been established i.e. “willingness to accept”, was 
approximately two times higher than the amount they were prepared to pay to in order to 
acquire the mug i.e. “willingness to pay”.  
 
Many wealth managers have dealt with clients who are unwilling to sell securities bequeathed 
to them by previous generations and usually in these situations, investors mention a feeling of 
disloyalty that is associated with the act of selling inherited securities, tax issues, and the 
general uncertainty in establishing “the right thing to do,” (Pompian, 2006). 
 
5.5.11 Hindsight Bias  
Hindsight bias, also known as creeping determinism or the “knew-it-all-along” effect, is the 
tendency, after the occurrence of event, to view the particular event as being predictable, 
despite the nonexistence of any objective basis for predictability (Roese and Vohs, 2012). It is 
a multidimensional event that may affect the different stages of situations, designs, context, 
and processes (Pohl, 2007). Hindsight bias can trigger distortions in memory, where 
recollecting and reconstructing content may result in theoretically false outcomes. Examples 
of these are evident in the literatures of historians explaining the outcomes of battles, in the 
judicial systems when trying to attribute culpability and the predictability of accidents and 
physicians when recalling clinical trials (Fischhoff, 2003). 
 The hindsight bias was not a novel concept when it appeared in some psychological studies in 
the 1970s. It had been indirectly defined several times by philosophers, historians, and 
physicians (Fischhoff, 2003). Baruch Fischhoff attended a conference in 1973 - when he was 
a psychology graduate student at that time - where Paul Meehl pointed out an observation that 
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clinicians sometimes overestimate their capability to have foreseen the result of a particular 
case, claiming they knew it all along. Baruch Fischhoff then discovered an opportunity to 
explain these observations in psychological research (Fischhoff, 2007).  
In the early 1970s, research on heuristics and biases was an important area of investigation in 
psychology, spearheaded by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Among the heuristics 
studied, two heuristics discovered by Tversky and Kahneman – availability heuristic and the 
representative heuristic - were of significant importance in developing the hindsight bias 
(Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975). 
 
In an explanation of these heuristics, Beyth and Fischhoff developed the first experiment that 
directly tested the hindsight bias. They asked the participants of the experiment to judge the 
probability of several outcomes of the upcoming visit of US president Richard Nixon to Beijing 
and Moscow. After president Nixon’s return, the participants were again asked to reconstruct 
or recall the probabilities they had earlier assigned to each of the possible outcomes and their 
assessments of the probability of each outcome was overestimated or far greater for the events 
that had actually occurred (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975). This study is regularly referred to in 
the definition of the hindsight bias, and perhaps the title of the study, “I knew it would happen”, 
may have led to the hindsight bias being referred to as the “knew it all along” bias. 
 
5.5.12 Reputation Mining 
Akerlof and Shiller (2015) introduced the concept of reputation mining which can be described 
as the ability to take advantage of a good reputation built on a past track record of providing 
excellent services, to offer substandard services which will still be misconstrued as excellent. 
Unsuspecting investors therefore pay for these services at the same price as they would pay for 
a truly excellent service. Akerlof and Shiller (2015) argue that investments banks and ratings 
agencies had mined their reputations to sell highly complex and risky assets as investment 
grade to investors who did not understand the complexity of these assets but trusted the AAA 
rating sanctioned by the ratings agencies. 
 
Michael Lewis (2011), gives an account of reputation mining among ratings agencies Moody’s 
and S&P in the run-up to the financial crisis. In his book The Big Short, Lewis (2011) claims 
the gigantic Wall Street firms such as Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Lehman 
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Brothers et al had goals similar to any manufacturing entity - to pay the barest possible 
minimum for its raw materials (in this case home loans) and charge the maximum possible 
price for the finished product - mortgage bonds. The price charged for the finished product was 
fuelled by the ratings given to it by S&P and Moody’s using their own models and the 
intricacies of these so-called models were said to be officially a secret claiming they were 
simply impossible to game. 
 
5.5.13 Regret Aversion Bias  
Investors showing regret aversion avoid making any decisive decision since they fear that 
whatever action they take will turn out less than optimal upon hindsight. This bias aims to 
prevent the pain of regret that comes with making a poor decision. Even Nobel laureate in 
economics Harry Markowitz succumbed to this bias when making his retirement decision 
stating: 
“I visualized my grief if the stock market went way up and I wasn’t in 
it—or if it went way down and I was completely in it. My intention 
was to minimize my future regret, so I split my retirement plan 
contributions 50/50 between bonds and equities.” (Pompian, 
2006:227) 
 
Figure 5.8: Impact of Being Out of the Market 
 
Source: Roy, Carson and Rizkallah (2016: 35) 
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The regret aversion is a cognitive bias that leads investors to hang onto losing positions for too 
long with the aim of avoiding the admittance of errors and realizing losses. Regret aversion 
also cause investors to be unnecessarily apprehensive of entering markets that have generated 
losses recently. As study by JP Morgan Asset Management however shows that investors loose 
out when they stay out of markets that have recently experienced great losses (Roy, Carson and 
Rizkallah ,2015) . 
 
 
5.6 The Argument for Heuristics 
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) however argue that in reality, every heuristic studied can 
be applied both consciously and unconsciously therefore, heuristics cannot be construed to 
stand in opposition to consciousness. Furthermore, heuristics cannot be pointed out as the 
general cause of errors since heuristics can lead to more precise inferences when compared to 
logical or statistical rules. 
 
Wübben and Wangenheim (2008) conducted a study intended to establish the superiority of 
stochastic customer base analysis models - Pareto/NBD model and the BG/NBD model - over 
the simple heuristics that companies typically apply. They investigated how many accurate 
predictions the models made compared to the simple heuristics for an airline, an online CD 
retailer and an apparel retailer. The outcome showed that the heuristic performed at least as 
well as the stochastic models. 
 
Gigerenzer (2014) therefore argue that heuristics and errors are not associated. The two-
system view suggested by Kahneman (2011) overlooks the difference between uncertainty 
and risk suggesting that whereas statistical methods are vital when faced with known risks, 
heuristics on the other hand come in handy when faced with uncertainty. Todd and Gigerenzer 
(2012) therefore propose that instead of spending time knocking heuristics, there is the need 
to research their ecological rationality; i.e., to investigate in which circumstances heuristics 
work and in which circumstances they don’t.   
The Greek term “heuristic” originally meant “serving to find out or discover” and in fields 
that deal with uncertainty such as artificial intelligence and animal behaviour, heuristics have 
continuously had a positive connotation (Gigerenzer, 2014:241). The Stanford mathematician 
Polya (1954) make a distinction between analytical thinking and heuristic, stating that 
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heuristic thinking is essential in finding a mathematical proof, while analytic thinking is 
required for checking the processes of a proof.  
 
Emotions are complements to reason more often than they impede it, the interactions between 
reason and emotions are mostly beneficial. Emotions ward us away from being lost in thought 
when instant action is crucial, and emotions also reinforce lessons we must learn (Statman, 
2014) 
 
Figure 5.9: Fear Prevents Us from Thinking too Long Before Acting in Dangerous 
Situations 
Source:  Gigerenzer (2014: 66) 
 
Stetson, Fiesta and Eagleman (2007) designed a test of present orientation (the tendency to 
overly concentrate on the present without taking the future into consideration) by asking 
participants to read some digital numbers that flashed quickly on a small display. They found 
that when the participants were relaxed, they could not read the numbers, since they flashed 
too quickly. However, in a freefall during bungee jump, they could read the numbers. The 
freefall elicits strong emotion and concentrates all mental resources solely on the present 
therefore providing an extra mental power that allows people the ability to read numbers that 
previously were undecipherable. Fear and excitement therefore heighten present awareness, 
while sharpening instincts and help us survive. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 respectively show how 
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frequently thirty-two executives from a technology-services provider and fifty top executives 
from an international car manufacturer make gut decisions based on self-reports.  
 
Figure 5.10: Gut Decisions in an International Technology-Services Provider 
 
Source:  Gigerenzer (2014: 99) 
 
According to Gigerenzer (2014), majority of the technology-services provider executives 
admitted that 50 percent of the time, they rely on gut decisions although few of them would 
admit publicly to doing so. Furthermore, the relatively higher occurrence of gut decisions 
among the executives of the car manufacturing company may be due to the fact that these 














Figure 5.11: Gut Decisions in an International Car Manufacturer 
 
Source: Gigerenzer (2014: 100) 
 
Gigerenzer (2014) points out four misconceptions about intuition namely: 
• The Opposite of Rationality is Intuition:  
This is not so, as intuition can be described as unconscious intelligence that is based on personal 
experience and can be a smart rule of thumb therefore one requires both intuition and reasoning 
to be rational. 
• Intuition is Female:  
This has been a long-held view since the Enlightenment. Men are less likely to admit intuition 
or listen to their gut. 
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• Deliberate Thinking is Superior to Intuition:  
Intuition is not inferior to deliberate thinking and vice-versa. Good rules of thumb and 
intuitions are crucial in an uncertain world whereas logic or statistics is critical for dealing with 
known risks. 
• Intuition is Grounded in a Complex Weighing of all Evidence Unconsciously:  
This argument has been suggested to explain the reason why decisions based on intuition are 
often excellent because if an intelligent process is good then it must be based on the 
bookkeeping process of weighing everything. However, the bookkeeping method is only good 
in a world of known risk and not in a world of uncertainty. Evidence exist to prove that 
intuitions are based on smart, simple rules that only take into consideration some of the 
available information. 
 
Gigerenzer (2014) postulates that Kahneman and followers view laws of logic and probability 
theory as general norm of rationality and “content-blind” and that heuristics can only be faster 
but never be more accurate. Although this is true in a world of know risks, in a world of 
uncertainties, simple heuristics can often do better. The real research question therefore should 
be aimed towards understanding why and when. The answers known today according to 
Gigerenzer (2014) are based on the general study of ecological rationality10 (Todd, Gigerenzer, 
and the ABC Research Group 2012) and bias-variance dilemma11 (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 
2009). 
 
5.7 All Models Are Wrong 
The aphorism all models are wrong is attributed to George Box (1976: 792) who famously 
opined that “Since all models are wrong the scientist cannot obtain a "correct" one by excessive 
elaboration... Just as the ability to devise simple but evocative models is the signature of the 
great scientist so overelaboration and overparameterization is often the mark of mediocrity.” It 
has been recommended that this aphorism be made part of Applied Statistician's Creed (Nester, 
1996).  
 
                                                          
10 Exploiting patterns of information within the environment to come out with accurate inferences in a frugal 
and fast way. 
11 A statistical theory that explains why and when simple rules of thumb can provide more accurate results than 
more complex methods. 
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Nobel Prize in economics winners Robert Merton and Myron Scholes who won the prize for 
developing a new method for determining the value of derivatives, were working partners in 
the now defunct hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), where they actively 
applied their asset pricing models. Scholes went ahead to form another hedge fund, Platinum 
Groove Asset Management (PGAM) in 1999 which went bust in November 2008. Trinsum 
Group, which also had Scholes’ former partner Merton as its chief science officer also was 
bankrupt in January 2009. This proves that even models developed by Nobel laureates can fail 
(Chang, 2012). In an article titled Taleb’s Stranded Swan? structured finance expert Janet 
Tavakoli (2009) points out how Empirica Kurtosis, a hedge fund started by Nassim Taleb, 
author of The Black Swan posted anaemic returns in 2001 even when Taleb had admitted that 
the September 11 terrorist attacks were black swan events and the hedge fund was set up 
purposely to take advantage of such events to produce stellar performance. Empirica Kurtosis 
was closed in 2005 (Smith, 2016). 
 
Taking this assertion that all models are wrong into consideration, Hand (2014b) proposes that 
generally, when developing statistical models, one must be mindful that the objective is to gain 
an understanding, predict, or make a choice on something concerning the real world rather than 
an abstract mathematical world. Models are not the reality.  It is therefore important to admit 
that although models and theories, be it of classical finance or behavioural finance, are very 
useful in understanding financial markets, have their flaws since they are just abstractions or 
simplifications of the real world. Models are never true, however, there is truth in models 
(Mäki, 2011). We can only understand the world by first simplifying it (Chang, 2014). 
 
Instead of a single specific model, economics entails a collection of models and the field 
advances by improving the library of models by enhancing the mapping between these models 
and the real world. Therefore, the diversity of models is the necessary counterpart to the 
tractability of the real world. Different societal settings necessitate different models therefore 
economists ae unlikely to develop universal general-purpose models and must desist from 
misconstruing ‘a model’ as ‘the model’ and select models as circumstances change with the 
ability to fluidly shift among different models (Rodrick, 2015). 
 
Ritholtz (2016) argues that as investors we: 
• have a limited knowledge about the world around us 
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• presume we have knowledge about the factors that influence complex systems like 
financial markets and economies 
• misjudge the probabilities of significant random events occurring 
• fall prey to false ideas, numerous myths and incorrect “facts” 
• do not understand the extent of complexity that exists 
• believe we are distant from crowd psychology yet understand it, and 
• disregard the possibility of investment styles going in and out of favour   
 
However, investors do not need to have a perfect understanding of the real world in order to be 
successful. They only need to understand enough in order to achieve whatever goal they set for 
themselves. To be good enough for any particular task – driving, batting, investing, etc. - 
demands only a narrow comprehension of a small subset of factors in order to achieve success 
therefore one does not need to know everything about a particular thing in order to be 
reasonably successful at the given task (Ritholtz, 2016).  
 
5.8 Summary: Let A Hundred Flowers Bloom12 
The global financial crisis rekindled the arguments against underlying assumptions of several 
classical finance theories. A notable alternative to classical finance is behavioural finance 
which instead of assuming rationality of investors, posits that investors are prone to heuristics 
which lead them to making suboptimal economic decisions. However, some distinguished 
behavioural finance academics such as Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter Todd, argue that not all 
heuristics are inherently detrimental to optimal decision making. Rather, in some cases, 
heuristics help investors make optimal choices and even more quickly.   
 
Theories in classical finance and economics have led to the introduction of worthwhile 
innovations in the investment world. The EMH for example, has led to the development of 
index funds which come with lower fees that in the end benefits investors. The theory of 
auctions, which draws on abstract game theory (which has an underlying assumption of 
rationality), provided the principles applied by the Federal Communications Commission in 
                                                          
12 The argument to let a hundred flowers bloom was proposed by CHANG, H.-J. 2014. Economics: the user's 
guide, Bloomsbury Publishing USA. 
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the United States to efficiently apportion the telecommunications spectrum to broadcasters and 
phone companies and in the process, raising over $60 billion in revenue for the federal 
government (Golden Goose Award, 2014). However, the application of game theory principles 
may not always lead to an optimal outcome and a ‘nudge13’ of the participants may become 
necessary to achieve optimal outcomes. For example, a study by York University (2008) points 
out that the pharmaceutical industry in the United States spends almost two times as much on 
advertising compared to research and development. The pharmaceutical industry paid out 
approximately 24.4% of sales dollar (of US $235.4 billion) on promotion in 2004, compared 
to 13.4% for research and development.  
 
There may be situations where individual incentives can diverge from collective goals and 
sometimes even lead to collective doom, a phenomenon referred to as Darwin’s Wedge which 
applies to a class of circumstances where, individually rational choices aggregate badly (Frank, 
2012).  Behavioural finance has created awareness of heuristics that can be detrimental to 
making optimal economic decisions.  There is a need therefore to recognizing that there exist 
different approaches to economics and finance and this diversity needs to be preserved, or even 
promoted (Chang, 2014). Since different approaches point out different aspects and give 
different perspectives, knowing alternative theories, allows for a fuller and more balanced 
comprehension of the complexities of financial markets.  
 
In the longer run, just as a biological group that has a more diversified gene pool is more 
adaptable to shocks, a discipline that encompasses an assortment of theoretical approaches can 
better cope with an evolving world far better than one that is characterized by “intellectual 
mono-cropping” (Chang, 2014). It will therefore be beneficial to the field of finance to let a 
“hundred flowers bloom” as different approaches to finance can benefit a lot from learning 
from each other, making our understanding of the finance world richer. 
                                                          
13 A term used to describe propping up individuals to make optimal choices as proposed by THALER, R. H. en 
Sunstein, CR (2008) Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
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This chapter presents a general overview of the asset management industry. With increasing 
calls for certain segments of the asset management industry to be classified as Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), a move to protect the global financial systems by 
averting the failure of such SIFIs, or, in the event of a failure, curbing the subsequent adverse 
effects. The industry has attracted the attention of regulators who seek to avert potential crisis 
that the industry may pose. The asset management industry therefore plays a significant role in 
the stability or otherwise of financial markets. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
At present, the asset management industry is highly competitive and investment managers 
compete for clients in an industry that is now highly advanced and matured. There exists a 
varied universe of firms providing asset management services ranging from independent asset 
managers to diversified brokerage firms, commercial banks and insurance companies, all 
providing asset management services as well as other complementary and discrete business 
activities. Asset managers provide a crucial link between those seeking capital and providers 
of capital. The asset management industry forms an essential constituent of the global financial 
services sector and is responsible for the professional management of assets of more than $68 
trillion (Shub, Bartletta, Beardsley, Donnadieu, Fages, Hapelt, Macé, Maguire, Tang, 2014). 
The industry has advanced alongside a progressively sophisticated and globalized capital 
market with investable capital estimated to have grown from $64 trillion in 2004 to over $101.1 
trillion as at June 2013 (Concannon, 2015). The highly diversified asset management industry 
can be attributed in part to the variety of clients served by the industry that range from 
individuals planning for their retirements or big multinational entities that are in charge of 
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Figure 6.1: The Global Fund Management Industry 
 
Source:  TheCityUK (2014: 14) 
Africa is seen as the final frontier for the asset management industry although the quality of 
institutions and economic growth mean that the various markets in Africa are at different levels 
of development.  
 
Figure 6.2: Grouping of Countries 
 
Source:  Adopted from PwC Market Research Centre Analysis, cited in PwC (2015: 6) 
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PwC (2015) assessed the twelve countries according to relevant indicators in to depict their 
real investment potential. PwC categorised twelve African countries into three groups namely; 
nascent markets, promising markets and advancing markets.  
  
Figure 6.3: Traditional Asset Management in the Three Groups of Countries 
 
 
Source: Adopted from PwC Market Research Centre analysis based on National Authorities 
data, cited in PwC (2015: 7) 
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These countries were categorized to the groups according to their ranking on selected metrics. 
Some of the metrics used were, the quality of institutions, proportion of AuM in mutual funds 
relative to GDP, macro indicators such as GDP growth, stock market index and foreign direct 
investment. Figure 6.2 shows the three categories and the countries that fall in each category 
and Figure 6.3 shows the AuM for each country and projected AuM for the year 2020. 
 
In South Africa, the total household savings which comprise collective investment portfolios 
(mutual funds), insurance companies and retirement funds amounted to R 8.1 trillion ($700 
billion) as at December 2014 according to the Association for Savings and Investment South 
Africa (ASISA) (ASISA, 2015). 
 
6.2 An Overview of Portfolio Management 
A portfolio is a combination of assets and portfolio management involves an integrated set of 
activities carried out in a consistent manner with the objective of creating and maintaining a 
portfolio that is appropriate in meeting the stated goals of clients (Maginn, Tuttle, McLeavey 
and Pinto, 2007). The core service provided by asset managers is professional investment 
portfolio management. Asset managers usually act on behalf of investors, using capital 
provided by the investors to execute investment strategies as well as assuming a fiduciary role.  
 
Generally, investment strategies are categorized as active or passive even though over time, 
the techniques and models of portfolio management have persistently changed in line with 
innovations in financial markets and the demand of investors. Active portfolio managers apply 
diverse techniques in attempting to outperform their respective benchmarks which are usually 
represented by market indices such as the S&P 500 or the FTSE/JSE All Share index. The most 
predominant form of portfolio management however is active management. As at November 
2013, approximately 73% of mutual funds in the United States – the world’s largest 
marketplace for asset management – were actively managed (Zoll, 2014). Passive portfolio 
management involves replicating the returns of a selected market index by holding in the same 
proportion, the holdings of the market index.  
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6.3 Active versus Passive Portfolio Management 
Active mutual funds’ performance has been of immense interest to financial economists for a 
very long time (Jensen, 1968; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Kent, Grinblatt, Titman, 
and Wermers, 1997; Wermers, 2000; Pástor and Stambaugh, 2002; Cohen, Coval and Pástor, 
2005; Fama and French 2010; Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2014; Jensen, Fisher 
and Tkac, 2015; Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2015).  
Petajisto (2013) grouped equity mutual funds according to how active their managers are and 
finds that the most active fund managers are able to outperform their respective benchmarks 
even after fees. These findings are contrary to the numerous studies on active fund management 
that found that active managers tend to consistently underperform the market (Jensen, 1968, 
McDonald, 1974, Sharpe, 1975, Gruber, 1996, Wermers, 2000, Mibiola, 2013). 
Apart from a fund manager’s skill in spotting investment opportunities, the ability to 
outperform a benchmark inter alia, is also dependent on the returns to scale which also interact 
with skill: for example, a small fund which is less skilled can outperform a large fund which is 
more skilled (Pástor et al., 2015). 
There are two hypotheses on the nature of returns to scale in active management both motivated 
by liquidity constraints (Pástor et al., 2015). First is a decreasing returns to scale at fund-level 
i.e. the ability of an active fund to outperform its benchmark decreases as the size of the fund 
increases (Perold and Solomon, 1991, and Berk and Green, 2004). There is also decreasing 
returns to scale at the industry level i.e. as the ability of any particular fund to outperform a 
given benchmark dwindles as the size of the industry of active mutual funds increases (Pástor 
and Stambaugh, 2012).  
Asset prices are affected by large trades by large funds’ this will have an impact on the 
performance of such funds an also, as the number of funds seeking to outperform a given 
benchmark increases, there is an incremental amount of monies seeking the chance to 
outperform which leads to prices increases thereby making such a venture elusive. There is 
increasing amount of evidence that mutual fund trading activities can influence prices on the 
stock market. Stock market returns are influenced by the aggregate flows into equity mutual 
funds (Edelen and Warner, 2001). Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2007) further posit that another 
major source of diseconomies of scale for mutual funds can be attributed to trading cost. 
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Hypothesis on returns to scale at the fund level have been tested in a number of studies with 
inconclusive findings (Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, 2004; Pollet and Mungo, 2008; Yan, 
2008; Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, Ramos, 2013, a,b;. Reuter and Zitzewitz, 2013).  
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) presented a new measure of active portfolio management –Active 
Share – which depicts the share of portfolio holdings that diverge from the holdings of the 
benchmark index. The study reports that Active Share forecasts fund performance this implies 
that funds that have the highest Active Share substantially outperform their benchmarks before 
and after expenses, and exhibit strong performance persistence as well. Petajisto (2013) further 
reports that even after fees, funds with the highest Active Share outperformed their 
benchmarks.  
 
Figure 6.4: The Different Kinds of Active Share  
 
Source: Adopted from Cremers and Petajisto (2009), cited in Petajisto (2013) 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the two aspects of active management and how each can be associated 
with different styles of active management. Diversified stock pickers display low tracking error 
and high Active Share, the opposite is true for funds that concentrate on factor bets. 
Concentrated funds apply both stock selection and factor bets, and therefore score high on each 
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measure. Closet indexers however score low on each measure. Closet indexers claim to be 
active managers but are far less involved in any kind of active management. 
In the study, Petajisto (2013) distinguishes different kinds of active management explaining 
that active managers can only add value by differing from the benchmark index either through 
factor timing (also referred to as tactical asset allocation) which entails time-varying bets on 
broad factor portfolios such as being overweight in a particular sector of the economy or equity 
selection which entails active bets on single equities such as choosing just one equity from a 
given industry.  
 
Figure 6.5: The Evolution of Active Share in the US (1980 to 2009) 
 
Source: Petajisto (2013: 81) 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the portion of assets in United States mutual funds in the five categories 
of Active Share from 1980–2009. The group of funds at the bottom, that have Active Share 
less than 20%, are pure index funds which have grown from almost zero in 1980 to around 
20% of mutual funds AUM in 2009. The next two category of funds that have Active Share 
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ranging from 20% and 60%, and are closet indexers and have become even more popular than 
pure index funds and accounted for about one-third of mutual funds AUM in 2009.  
Petajisto (2013) reports that stock selection as depicted by a high Active Share is compensated 
for in the equity market with the most aggressive stock pickers adding value even after fees for 
their investors. On the other hand, factor bets, represented by high tracking error on average, 
did not add value for their investors. Table 6.1 presents the equal-weighted returns for the five 
types of funds, and the averages across all groups. The figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. 
Table 6.1: Performance of Active Share 
 
Source: Petajisto (2013: 84) 
 
However, Frazzini, Friedman and Pomorski (2015) of AQR Capital Management LLC, 
investigated the Active Share, a measure using the same data set as Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) and Petajisto (2013) and concluded that the empirical support for the Active Share is 
weak and is completely influenced by the strong correlation between the benchmark type and 
Active Share. (Frazzini et al., 2015) further argue that Active Share rather correlates with the 
returns of the benchmarks, but cannot predict actual fund returns and conclude that there is no 
theoretical or empirical justification that Active Share may improve investors’ returns. 
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Rebutting the arguments of Frazzini et al. (2015), Cremers (2015) argues that the AQR paper 
“falls into a wonderfully creative but altogether different genre, which we label the Wonderland 
Genre” and should therefore not be interpreted by applying typical academic standards and 
further arguing that AQR paper is employing a “Sentence First, Verdict Later.” Style and their 
results cannot be taken at face value, because the information is not shared thereby reversing 
their main conclusion. In conclusion, Cremers (2015) points out that AQR funds tend to have 
low Active Shares and little outperformance and hence appearing fairly expensive considering 
the amount of differentiation offered by the firm. 
 
Figure 6.6: Performance of Active Managers over the Long-Run 
 
Source:  Allianz (2014: 5) 
According to Allianz Global Investors, the global active equity managers have been able to 
generate significant value for their clients over the past thirty years, according to Mercer’s 
GIMD database although recently, there have been a significant slowdown of the pace of 
outperformance hence calling for the need for more active management (Allianz, 2014). Figure 
6.6 shows how over the long-term, the median active fund outperforms the MSCI index and 
also had a relatively minimal slump during the recent Global Financial Crisis. 
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Chlanger, Philips and LaBarge (2012) advise investors not use only active share as their sole 
metric in selecting a portfolio but rather include it in their toolkit in selecting portfolios. 
Schlanger et al. (2012) conclude that higher active share do not predict outperformance, do not 
significantly outperform portfolios of lower active shares and had larger dispersion of excess 
returns. Higher the active-share resulted in higher the fund costs. They also found that funds 
that had the highest active share were concentrated in small-cap and mid-cap equities. 
 
Figure 6.7: The Relationship between Fund Age and Performance (March 1993 to 
December 2011) 
 
Source: Pástor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2015: 35) 
 
Cohen, Leite, Darby and Browder (2014) argue that although active share may assist investors 
in comparing active managers, it lacks consistency as a measure across different market 
capitalization, size, benchmarks and mandates.  Higher active share comes with a greater level 
of return dispersion as well as a higher downside risks and strikingly, for large-cap managers, 
the relationship between excess return and a higher level of active share appears to be largely 
due to exposures to smaller-cap portfolios (Cohen et al., 2014). 
Pástor, Stambaugh and Taylor, (2015) empirically analysed the characteristics of returns to 
scale in active mutual fund management and reported compelling evidence at the industry level 
of decreasing returns stating that there is a negative correlation between the active mutual fund 
industry size and the ability of funds to outperform passive benchmarks. Pástor et al. (2015) 
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further report that over time, the industry of active fund management has become more skilled 
with the upward trend in skill coinciding with industry growth and precluding the skill 
improvement from enhancing fund performance. Their study also reveals a deterioration of 
performance over the lifetime of a typical fund with the correlation being stronger for funds 
with relatively higher volatility, turnover and small-cap funds citing decreasing returns to scale 
at the industry-level as an explanation for this phenomenon. Figure 6.7 illustrate the 
relationship between performance and fund age. The average fund’s performance declines over 
its lifetime. This result is almost monotonous for funds with that have existed for the past 12 
years over the period of the study. According to Pastor et al (2015), the point estimators for the 
age fixed effects diminish in an approximately linear style from 0.37% every month at age one 
to 0% at age 12, from this point, they become almost flat therefore, as funds age, their 
performance diminish. 
Philips, Kinniry and Todd (2014) propose combining both active and passive funds in a 
portfolio as this strategy minimises underperformance, downside risk and dispersion of returns 
but manage to produce a positive excess returns over the period albeit lower than would have 
been the case with portfolio made up of only actively managed funds. Figure 6.8 comprises all 
diversified top quintile U.S. equity funds from 2004 to 2008. Figure 6.9 is made up of the same 
funds as Figure 6.6, however, it combines each fund in a 50/50 ratio, with a passive index that 
matches the fund’s style of investment. Index returns are reduced by 10 basis points per year 
to reflect implementation expenses and excess returns are measured according to the stated 
benchmark of the fund. 
 
The data reflect excess returns from 2009 to 2013 for the 1,205 funds that were in the top 
quintile from 2004 to 2008.  
The debate between active and passive management still continues and in recent times it 
appears the argument for passive management is gaining traction.  In the past few years, 
investors have gravitated towards less expensive and passively managed ETFs and index funds 
particularly in the United States and poor performance of actively managed funds against their 
benchmarks has been cited as the reason for this trend (Lamy and Strauts, 2015). Figure 6.10 
illustrates the net flow for index and non-index funds in 2014. 
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Figure 6.8: Distribution of excess returns for the five years ended 2013 for top quintile 
funds as of 2008 
Source: Philips, Kinniry and Todd (2014: 3)  
 
 
Figure 6.9: Same distribution but including 50% apportionment to the style benchmark 
of each fund 
Source: Philips, Kinniry and Todd (2014: 3)  
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As of December 2014, 382 index funds had net assets of $2.1 trillion while demand for index 
funds continued to increase, with $148 billion in net new cash flow. In 2014, among households 
that owned mutual funds in the United States, 31% had at least one equity index fund 
(Investment Company Institute, 2015).  
 
Figure 6.10: Net Flows for Index and Nonindex Funds by Region (2014) 
Source: Lamy and Strauts (2015: 9) 
 
6.4 Major Product Segments 
The major product segments in the asset management industry are mutual funds, exchange 
traded funds separately managed accounts, hedge funds, venture capital, private equity and 
institutional investors. Institutional investors are mainly made up of pension funds, insurance 
companies and sovereign wealth funds. 
 
6.4.1 Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds form part of a large family of financial intermediaries that pool funds from 
investors to invest in securities. The assets under management of mutual funds worldwide was 
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$33.4 trillion as at December 2014 with the United States representing the largest market for 
mutual funds with a 53% share as at year-end 2014 followed by Europe with 29% (Investment 
Company Institute, 2015). The mutual fund industry in the United States is dominated by 
domestic equity funds which make up 42% of industry assets followed by bond funds with 
21% of assets. Figure 6.11 illustrates worldwide mutual funds’ assets as well as a breakdown 
of the market share of different categories of fund in the United States.  
Figure 6.11: 2014 Year End Market Share of Mutual Funds and ETFs   
Source: Investment Company Institute (2015: 10) 
According to ASISA (2015), total assets under management in South Africa as at 30 June 2015 
was R1.781 trillion, increasing from R 78.8 billion in June 1998. There were 1225 registered 
funds as at June 2015. Mutual funds in South Africa had R 77 billion net flow as at June 2015. 
The majority of mutual funds (also called Collective Investment Schemes(CIS)) distribution in 
South Africa is currently through banks and insurance companies, although the emergence of 
the Retail Distribution Review(RDR) is likely to bring significant changes (PwC, 2015). The 
market for Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) is expected to considerably shrink, while the 
Do-It-Yourself (DIY) approach is expected to gain momentum as a result of to increased levels 
consumer sophistication and internet connectivity (PwC, 2015). The total assets of the 1,171 
mutual funds based in South Africa in 2014 worth R 1.7tn ($147.2bn) have grown at 15.2% 
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Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) since 2006. During the Global Financial Crisis, the 
growth slowed but bounced back in 2009 (PwC, 2015). There are 49 registered mutual fund 
managers in South Africa and many are also registered fund managers in other African 
countries.  
Figure 6.12: Overview of South African Mutual Fund Industry 
 
                Source: ASISA (2015) 
The institutional managers market is quite concentrated with the top ten asset managers 
managing more than half of AuM while the top three are responsible for a quarter of AuM 
(PwC, 2015). The retail market is however, quite fragmented. The top ten asset managers 
manage a fifth of AuM. The Financial Services Board (FSB) regulates all South African funds 
under the terms of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002. The FSB permits 
three different types of CIS: property (CISP), CIS in securities (CISS) and participation bonds 
(CISPB). The majority of the schemes are however CISS and include feeder funds, money 
market funds and funds of funds (PwC, 2015). Figure 6.13 shows the asset allocation of CIS 
in South Africa. 
Foreign Collective Investment Schemes (FCIS) are off-shore mutual funds that are also under 
the regulation of the FSB and approved for distribution in South Africa. The total AuM of these 
mutual funds amounted to R286 bn (USD 24.7bn) in 2014 with 313 funds. The majority of 
these funds (53.9%) were based in Luxembourg, with Ireland and Jersey also being popular 
domiciles (PwC, 2015). 
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Figure 6.13: Asset Allocation of CIS (2014) 
 
Source: Adopted from ASISA, cited in PwC (2015: 22) 
The managers of the offshore funds have to be approved by the registrar, and the country where 
these funds re based must have regulatory environments that are at least of similar standing as 
that of South Africa. Local investors who want to invest in such funds must comply with 
regulations of the Reserve Bank and use their foreign capital allowance since FCIS funds are 
denominated in foreign currencies, usually the British Pounds, United States Dollars, Euro and 
Japanese Yen (PwC, 2015). 
 
6.4.2 Exchange Traded Funds (ETFS) 
ETFs are designed as open-ended investment vehicles in the same way as mutual fund although 
investors do not buy ETF shares directly but through stock exchanges. The origins of ETFs can 
be traced to a computer-based innovation that came around in the 1980s known as “program 
trading” that allowed investors to trade in shares of major indices with a single trade order (Hill 
et al., 2015). 
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Table 6.2: The Global Exchange Traded Products 
Source: Adopted from BlackRock (2014), cited in Concannon (2015: 61) 
 
Many attribute the creation of the first ETF to State Street Global Advisors in 1993 (State Street 
Global Advisors, 2013) -  the Standard & Poors Depository receipts (SPDR) S& P 500 - 
designed to track the performance of the S&P 500 with assets of $6.5 million growing to $182 
billion as at November 2015 (State Street Global Advisors, 2015) making it one of the most 
extensively traded securities in the world (Concannon, 2015). However, the Toronto Index 
Participation Shares, launched in 1990 on the Toronto Stock Exchange, is the first ETF and it 
provided exposure to 35 of the biggest companies in Canada which some preliminary success, 
but ETF never gained traction and was shut down eventually (Hill, Nadig and Hougan, 2015)   
 
As of October 2013, the global ETF industry had $2.3 trillion assets and more than 5,000 funds 
growing from 215 ETF managers on 58 stock exchanges. Although majority of ETFs are 
passively managed, asset managers have in recent years introduced actively managed ETFs.  
• The Rise of Indexing 
In the 1970s, institutional investors began incorporating modern portfolio theory into their 
investment products, the concept that investors are be better off “holding the market” rather 
than picking specific stocks also began gaining popularity in part due to Burton Malkiel (1973) 
in his book A Random Walk Down Wall Street and institutions like endowment and pension 
funds began investing in private portfolios that tracked the S&P 500 (Hill et al., 2015). Well 
Fargo Investment Advisors structured the first index fund in 1971 for Samsonite Corporation 
pension fund (Ancell, 2012) and John Bogle (2014) of Vanguard Group started the first index 
mutual fund in 1975.  
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• Exchange-Traded Notes (ETNs) 
Although the term ETF is also used to refer to ETNs, ETNs are not “funds” in the true sense 
of the word rather, they are unsecured debt obligations of the issuing institution structured as a 
promise to pay a series of returns that are based on the returns of a given index excluding 
management fees. Among all exchange traded products, holders of ETNs are exposed to the 
largest counter party risk because they are unsubordinated and unsecured debt notes and do not 
carry voting rights as ETNs are not debt securities (Hill et al., 2015).  
As at 31 September 2016, there were 71 JSE listed ETFs and ETNs in South Africa. By end of 
2014, AUM was R 82.56 billion growing from R 16.4 billion in 2008 (ETF SA, 2016). 
 
6.4.3 Hedge Funds 
Similar to mutual funds, the pooling of investments is the core idea behind hedge funds. 
Investors acquire shares in these funds and the funds proceed to invest the pooled assets on the 
behalf of the investors. The investors’ stake in the portfolio is represented by the NAV of each 
share. Hedge funds in this sense, operate in the same way as mutual funds. There are however, 
significant differences between hedge funds and mutual funds.  
Hedge funds are subjected to less stringent transparency requirements than mutual funds. 
Furthermore, Hedge funds do not advertise to the general public unlike mutual funds and 
usually have a maximum of 100 investors who are usually high net worth investors. Mutual 
funds usually make public their investment approach for example, small-cap value orientation, 
or small-cap momentum orientation, large-cap value orientation, etc., and face the pressure to 
eschew style drift (the departure from stated investment orientation) whereas hedge fund 
managers are not obliged to make public their investment strategies. There are also differences 
in liquidity and compensation structures of hedge funds and mutual funds, whereas hedge funds 
often implement lock-up periods, i.e., periods within which withdrawal of investments is not 
allowed and many hedge funds also implement notice of redemption that requires investors to 
give notices in advance could be weeks or months depending on the fund of the desire to 
withdraw funds.  
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Mutual funds do not usually implement such stringent redemption policies therefore making 
them more liquid than hedge funds. In terms of remuneration, mutual funds also differ from 
hedge funds in their fee structure. Mutual funds usually set management fees as fixed 
percentage of assets under management generally between 0.5% and 1.5 annually for a typical 
equity fund whiles hedge funds usually impose a management fee that ranges from 1% to 2% 
of assets under management and an incentive fee set as a percentage (usually 20%) of any 
investment profits above a given benchmark (Bodie et al., 2014). 
 
The phrase “hedge fund” was coined by sociologist Alfred W. Jones (Ineichen, 2002, Ubide, 
2006) and also credited with the establishment of the first hedge fund in 1949, this however 
has been disputed (Anson, 2006). Alfred Jones described his fund as "hedged", a term that was 
generally used on Wall Street to portray risk management of investment as a result of changes 
in capital markets (Lhabitant, 2011). 
Due to heavy losses, several hedge funds collapsed in the period of the recession of 1969–70 
as well as the 1973–1974 stock market crash. The industry however gained renewed interest in 
the late 1980s (Ineichen, 2002). In the 1990s, the number of hedge funds grew substantially, 
this growth was fuelled by the wealth created during bull market of the 1990s (Ubide, 2006). 
The renewed interest was as a result of the promise of high returns and the compensation 
structure adopted by hedge funds that aligned the interest of managers and investors (Nicholas, 
2004). 
Hedge funds gained worldwide popularity during the first decade of the 21st century and by 
2008, the hedge fund industry held $1.93 trillion in AUM (Herbst-Bayliss, 2011). The financial 
crisis of 2008 however led many hedge fund managers to constrain withdrawals by leading to 
a decline in their popularity and AUM (Pessin, 2010). Assets under management of hedge 
funds have grown from $1.45 trillion in 2008 to $2.79 trillion in 2015 (Barclay Hedge, 2016). 
By February 2011, institutional investors accounted for 61% of worldwide investments in 
hedge funds (Williamson, 2011). According to Preqin’s 2016 Global Hedge Fund Report, over 
5,000 global institutional investors invested in hedge funds.  The hedge fund industry attracted 
$71.5 billion new capital inflow with 829 funds launched in 2015 and 625 funds closed in 2015 
as well. (Preqin, 2015). 
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Figure 6.14: Global Hedge Fund Industry: Assets Under Management (AUM) 
 
Source:  Barclay Hedge (2016), “Hedge Fund Industry” 
www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/Hedge_Fund.html 
 
More than 4,800 global institutional investors invested with hedge funds in 2014 representing 
almost 65 percent of the invested capital of the industry. Overall, total assets under 
management in 2014 increased by $355 billion (Preqin, 2015). Figure 6.14 illustrates a 
breakdown of capital invested by institutional investors in hedge funds in 2014. 
Regardless of the actions by some public pension funds in the second half of 2014, there was 
a pervasive over-allocation of funds from the pension funds industry. Public pension plans 
accounted for about 20 percent of all institutional capital that were invested with hedge funds. 
When investments from private pensions are factored in, the number almost doubles. Public 
pension funds dedicated about 7.8 percent on average of their portfolio to hedge funds as shown 
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Figure 6.15: Breakdown of Institutional Investor Capital Invested in Hedge Funds by 
Investor Type 
Source: Preqin (2015: 2) 
 
In South Africa, the financial sector is matured enough to offer hedge funds. Investors in hedge 
funds in South Africa are mostly funds of funds. From 2006 to 2014, the AuM of South African 
hedge funds have grown at a CAGR of 16.9% (Figure 6.16) (PwC, 2015). New legislation 
bringing hedge funds under the regulations of CIS is projected to significantly increase the 
AuM of hedge funds by making hedge funds which were previously only available to 
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Figure 6.16: Evolution of AuM of Hedge Funds in South Africa 
 
Source: Adopted from Novare Investment, cited in PwC (2015: 24) 
6.4.4 Venture Capital (VC) And Private Equity (PE) 
Venture capital (VC) is money that is offered to fund development-stage, emerging as well as 
emerging growth companies. VC funds provide funding for companies an in return, receive 
equity stakes in the companies. Such companies usually have a business model in the high 
technology industries or an innovative technology. Usually, venture capital investments take 
place after a seed funding round which is the initial amount of capital injected into the selected 
company to finance growth with the objective of generating returns when there is an eventual 
exit through a sale or an IPO of the particular company. A VC is also another kind of private 
equity (Bailyn, 2011). 
Venture capital, just like equity crowdfunding, angel investing and other seed funding avenues, 
is appealing to new companies that have short operating history and are not big enough publicly 
to raise capital in financial markets and are also unable to secure loans from banks or offer debt 
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instruments. The venture capitalist takes a significant control of the decision-making process 
and also a significant portion of ownership in exchange for taking on the high risk of investing 
in a less mature and smaller company. 
 
General George Doriot is credited with creating in 1946, the first institutional venture capital 
fund, regularising the establishment and helping shape companies into organised business and 
in the process, setting a standard for the VC industry (Doriot and Gupta, 2004, Ante, 2008, 
Mason, 2012). However, in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) speech titled The 
Future of Securities Regulations, the general counsel of the SEC Brian Cartwright (2007) 
pointed out that, venture capital funds “came into their own” in the 1960s when the pivotal 
funding of Fairchild Semiconductor funded by Venrock Associates in 1959 to develop the first 
practical and commercially viable integrated circuit. Laurence S. Rockefeller, the fourth of the 
six children of John D. Rockefeller, founded Venrock in 1969 as a means to permit the other 
children of Rockefeller to gain exposure to the investments of venture capital (Singh, 2009). 
Venrock concentrates its investments on start-up and early-stage companies in emerging 
technologies and information technology. These include: Intel, Apple, StrataCom, 
DoubleClick, 3Com Corporation, etc. and also has a major venture in the field of nascent 
nanotechnology, providing the initial funding of Nanosys and the nanotechnology division of 
Du Pont (Feder, 2004). 
 
By June 2015, the private capital AUM of the PE industry reached $4.2 trillion (Preqin, 2016). 
VC and PE managers (general partners, or GPs) operate in a similar manner by raising investor 
capital from investors who are classified as limited partners (LPs) to acquire, optimize, and 
eventually sell the acquired companies to make profits. LPs commit the bulk of the capital of 
a fund. GPs also commit around 1%–5% of the capital of the fund with the objective of aligning 
the interests of the GP with those of the LP. The lifespan of majority of PE funds is 
approximately 7–10 years which may be subject to extension, with the first few years spent in 
acquiring 10 or more target companies with a potential to grow. Unlike most asset managers 
who trade in public securities, PE and VC funds often adopt a hands-on approach to the 
companies in their portfolios. They apply a combination of financial engineering, placing their 
own board and executive members and make significant contributions in the development of 
the business strategy of the firms in their portfolio. The final stage, which is also known as the 
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“exit” or “harvesting” phase, occurs when the fund proceeds to profitably dispose of its 
portfolio of firms through an IPO, a sale to another PE fund or a private sale to a competitor 
(“strategic buyer”). Table 6.3 shows the top PE managers as at March 2014. 
 
Table 6.3: Largest PE Managers, Five-Year Fundraising Totals as of March 2014 ($ bn)  
 
Source: Growth Business, “Ten Biggest Private Equity Firms in the World”, (May 2014) 
http://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/banking-on-the-cloud-and-saas-rise-in-europe-2401382/ 
 
• The Private Equity and Venture Capital Industry in South Africa 
According to a KPMG and SAVCA (2015) survey, the private equity industry of South Africa 
had R171.1 billion in funds under management as at December 2014. This figure includes of 
undrawn commitments of R54.9 billion. This reflects a R1.8 billion increase from R169.3 
billion as at 31 December 2013 with a 11.3% compounded annual growth rate of funds under 
management which excludes undrawn commitments since the survey began in 1999. 
The South African PE industry is relatively small when compared to that of the United States 
and United Kingdom, however, it is locally significant and well established. The KPMG and 
SAVCA (2015) report that South Africa has an investment activity as a percentage of GDP 
0.21 % in 2014 and 0.17 in 2013. The calculation is only in relation to the annual investments 
by Independents so as to make a direct comparison with the Emerging Markets Private Equity 
Association information.  As a percentage of GDP, South Africa’s PE investment is higher than 
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China (0.15), India (0.19%), Brazil (0.12%) and Russia (0.01%). It is still however below that 
of the United States (1.23), the United Kingdom (0.81%) and Israel (1.64%). 
 
Figure 6.17: Total funds under management at year end, split by undrawn commitments 
and investments (Rbn)  
Source:  KPMG and SAVCA (2015: 20) 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Private Equity annual investment by independents as a percentage of GDP 
(2013 and 2014) 
Source:  KPMG and SAVCA (2015: 25) 
In 2014, 25.5% of investments made were in the infrastructure sector, 24.7% and 18.2% in the 
other sector and in the Banks, financial services and insurance sectors respectively. Figure 6.19 
presents investments in the various sectors in 2014. 
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Figure 6.19: Investments made during the year, analysed by sector (2013 and 2014) 
Source: KPMG and SAVCA (2015: 35) 
 
PE firms raise revenues through various means: 
• Management fees 
PE firms charge AUM-based fees that is between 1% and 2% calculated on the committed 
capital which sometimes may step down a number of years into the period of investment of a 
fund or, calculated based on the net invested capital. 
• Investment income:  
These are the gains that are generated on capital contributed by the GP to the fund. 
• Transaction and monitoring fees 
 Fees paid to the GP by the companies in the portfolio for the various structuring and corporate 
services. In most cases, a percentage of this fee goes to the LPs as an offset to management 
fees.  
• Incentive Fees (Carried interest) 
This represents the share of the GP’s gains which is usually 20%, on the sales of portfolio 
companies. Distribution of the proceeds from the sales is subject to certain “distribution 
waterfall” terms. In a European-style distribution waterfall, the GPs receive their fees only after 
the LPs have received distributions that is equivalent to their committed capital in addition to 
a hurdle or preferred return that is usually between 5%–8%. In some instances, a GP “catch-
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up” may where as long as the GP provides the LP with the preferred return, the GP claims all 
the profits or a majority of the profits up until the profit split which was agreed upon, as 
prescribed by the carried interest is reached. After the payment of the preferred return to LPs 
as well as the GP catch-up, the remaining distribution follows the normal split of 80/20 carried 
interest allocation. In some distribution waterfall structures where the calculation of carried 
interest is on a deal-by-deal basis, it is necessary to take into consideration the scenario where 
there will be a “clawback” clause in the case of a negative performance by the fund.   
 
6.4.5 Insurance Companies 
By the end of 2013, insurers worldwide held over $13 trillion in AUM, the United States 
represents the largest market with more than $5.5 trillion (Concannon, 2015). Many insurance 
companies operate an in-house portfolio management team that takes responsibility for the 
management of general account assets (assets made available for the payment of claims and 
benefits). Other insurers however, outsource their portfolio management duties to third-party 
investors, sometimes via separately branded subsidiaries (Concannon, 2015).  
Figure 6.20: Total Assets of Insurance Undertakings per Country* ($bn) 
 
Source: Adopted form PwC Market Research Centre analysis based on National Authorities 
data, cited in PwC (2015: 10) 
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Insurance companies are progressively outsourcing some of their portfolio management duties 
relating to general account portfolios to unaffiliated managers. They mainly outsource 
managing of complex alternative asset classes. In the United States, for example, the trend is 
especially striking: The percentage of outsourced AUM over the past four years ending 2013 
increased by 54% to over $2.8 trillion (Diamond, 2014). 
In Africa, the industry is growing rapidly. Africa however, has a low average penetration rate 
of about 3.5% of GDP in terms of premiums collected, with the exception of South Africa 
which is over 15% (PwC, 2015). Serious growth of the insurance industry in other African 
countries only began recently as a result of lack of financial awareness among consumers as 
well as the religious beliefs of some countries in North Africa PwC, 2015). Figure 6.20 shows 
the total AuM of selected African countries. 
In South Africa, the long-term insurance industry had a total asset of R2.2 trillion with a total 
liability of R2.1 trillion as at 31 December 2014 (figure 6.21) whereas the short-term insurance 
industry had R119 billion in assets and R 61 billion in liabilities (ASISA, 2015, SAIA, 2015).  
 
Figure 6.21: Long-Term Insurance Statistics (South Africa) 
 
Source: ASISA (2015) 
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6.4.6 Pension Funds 
A pension fund, in some countries also called a superannuation fund, is any fund, plan or 
scheme that provides income for retirement. Pension funds major investors in both listed and 
private companies as they generally have substantial amounts of money to invest.  
By the end of 2013, worldwide pension assets reached $32 trillion by the end of 2013. The 
United States is the largest marketplace for pension in the world, making up over 58% of global 
pension assets (Tower Watson, 2014). Table 6.4 illustrates, pension assets held by thirteen 
different countries 
 
Table 6.4: Global Pension Assets 
 
Source: Tower Watson, “Global Pensions Asset Study -2014” (February 2014), 
https://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2014/02/Global-
Pensions-Asset-Study-2014 
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The pension fund sector in some African countries grew steadily from 2006 to 2014 (Figure 
6.22) and this growth expected to continue. As the economies of these country mature, pensions 
are expected to become more significant part of their respective financial sector, though many 
African countries still have essentially no private pension schemes (PwC, 2015).  
A pension plan may be either defined benefit (DB) or a defined contribution plan. 
• Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Plan 
A DB pension plan is a kind of pension plan that has a sponsor or employer making a 
commitment to make monthly payments upon retirement according to a formula that is based 
on the age of the employee, earnings history and period of service and is not directly dependent 
on investment returns of amounts contributed over the years by both the employer and 
employee (Goldhaber and Grout, 2016). A DB plan is termed 'defined' because the formula for 
the benefit determination is defined and also known in advance.  
Figure 6.22: Total Pension Fund Assets in Selected African Countries* ($Bn) 
 
  
Source: Adopted from PwC Market Research Centre analysis based on National Authorities 
data, cited in PwC (2015: 9) 
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DB plans are dogged with many operational challenges ranging from accounting, actuarial, 
liquidity, and regulatory challenges and have wide variations in sophistication and asset 
allocation.  The outlook in the long-term for the DB pension plans is negative as many sponsors 
of pension plans are steering clear of the risk, complexity and expenses involved managing DB 
plans. DB plan sponsors are increasingly closing plans to their new employees as well as 
freezing benefits for participants (Concannon, 2015, Keele and Alpert, 2015).  
 
• Defined Contribution Pension Plan 
In a defined contribution (DC) plan, the employee, employer or both make regular 
contributions and individual accounts are established for the members with benefits based on 
the amounts that are credited to these accounts in addition to any earnings on investment that 
accrue to the amounts in the account. Unlike a DB plan, in a DC plan, only the contributions 
by the employer are guaranteed, and not the future benefits. The future benefits in a defined 
contribution plan, fluctuate in line with investment earnings (Sialm et al., 2015). DC plans are 
the dominant form of retirement plans in the United States and Australia and they are now 
gaining substantial momentum in Japan, the Netherlands and Canada (Tower Watson, 2014). 
 
6.4.7 Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
SWFs are state-owned investment funds that are commonly funded by the revenues from export 
of commodities or from foreign exchange reserves. The assets of SWF doubled to more than 
$1 trillion from 2000 to about $7 trillion in 2015 (The City UK, 2015). SWFs, unlike DB 
pension plans, normally do not manage specific liability obligations, and have a long-term 
investment horizon as well as allocations to alternative investments that is considered above 
average. Majority of the assets in SWFs are clustered in resource-rich economies in the Middle 
East and Asia. Table 6.5 lists the top 10 SWFs. 
 
The SWF phenomenon is spreading throughout all the emerging regions and not just Asia and 
the Middle East, but also Latin America and Africa as well. Currently, there are 114 known 
sovereign wealth funds in operating worldwide according to ESADEgeo Sovereign Wealth 
Funds Ranking 2015 (ESADEgeo, 2015). 
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Table 6.5: Top 10 Global Sovereign Wealth Funds (AUM) 
Top 10 Global Sovereign Wealth Funds (AUM) 
No. Country Sovereign Wealth Fund AUM (US$ bn) 
    
1 Norway Government Pension Fund Global 869.0 
2 China China Investment Corporation 652.7 
3 UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 589.0 
4 China State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(Investment portfolio only) 
456.0 
5 Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority (“KIA”) 386.1 
6 Singapore GIC Private Limited 315.0 
7 Quartar Quartar Investment Authority 304.4 
8 Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (investment 
portfolio only) 
210.0 
9 Singapore Temasek Holdings  177.2 
10 UAE Investment Corporation of Dubai 159.8 
Source:  Barbary et al. (2014: 8) 
 
Investments by SWFs continue to be concentrated, the major fuds account for majority of 
transactions. The conventional receiving sectors of real estate and financial services, attracted 
new capital. Investments in real estate well exemplifies specifically the paradox many 
institutional investors in the sector face i.e., the funds grow in average size therefore making 
them more competitive. Conversely, this increase in size also presents a difficulty in efficiently 
investing ever larger amounts of capital (KPMG, 2014). 
SWFs that are funded by export of commodities, mainly oil exports, account for about 60% of 
the overall assets of SWFs. Non-commodity SWFs are mainly funded by the transfer of assets 
from government budget surpluses, official foreign exchange reserves, pension reserves and 
privatisation revenue make up the remaining 40%. Non-commodity SWFs however, are likely 
to take over a growing percentage of the market in coming years (The City UK, 2015). 
It is possible that flows into certain funds could turn negative. The Growth of assets in SWFs 
is closely related to the price of oil, this is because about 60% of SWF assets are from 
commodity exports. Major oil producing economies pumped their reserves of foreign exchange 
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into funds with the aim of stabilizing their economies as well as paying for pensions. The 
decline in oil prices from the second half of 2014 led to a shortfall in cash for some of these 
countries and if low oil prices persist for a long period, these oil exporting countries may 
channel monies from their SWFs for the stabilisation of their economies as well as financing 
budget shortfalls. 
 
Figure 6.23: SWF Assets under Management 
Source: TheCityUK (2015: 18) 
 
Slowing growth in China’s GDP may possibly constrain the growth in assets. Transfer of assets 
from foreign exchange reserves as well as budget surpluses and revenues from privatization 
are the source of funds for non-commodity SWFs. The growth in official foreign exchange 
reserves particularly in a some of Asian countries, shave led to their monetary authorities to 
conclude that their foreign reserves exceed their immediate needs. The global foreign exchange 
reserves were about $11.8 trillion as at 2014 year-end and around a quarter of these reserves- 
$2.8 trillion - were held in SWFs (TheCityUK, 2015). 
The share of Non-commodity SWFs of global SWFs assets has improved over the past decade, 
with the 41% share as at 2014 year-end is expected to increase further in subsequent years. 
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Regardless of the economic slowdown, a number of Asian countries, notably China, have 
increasingly accumulated foreign exchange reserves. About a decade ago, central banks in Asia 
had accumulated a third of the official currency reserves and by 2014 year-end, had 
accumulated around two-thirds of official reserves. The growth is mainly as a result of current 
account surpluses. Germany and China currently hold the biggest current account surpluses in 
the world, far ahead of the oil-exporting countries as well as other developed countries 
(TheCityUK, 2015). 
At the end of 2104, China had a total of about around $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, 
that is over one-third of the global reserves. Japan’s is also 11% of the global total with Saudi 
Arabia and Switzerland with around 6% and 5% respectively (TheCityUK, 2015). 
 
6.4.8 Real Estate 
Among all alternative asset classes, the most ubiquitous is the private real estate debt which 
accounts for approximately half of all the global alternative assets investments are made 
directly and indirectly in assets such as land, office properties and family housing (Hewitt 
EnnisKnupp, 2014).  
Investing directly and indirectly in assets such as land, urban office properties, single-family 
and housing, multifamily housing have for a long time, been a mainstay for investors. Real 
estate assets generally have featured low correlations with fixed income and equities and are 
considered as long-term assets with relatively stable cash flows that are usually positively 
correlated with inflation. 
 
As an asset class, real estate forms a significant role in portfolios of all kinds of investors and 
usually display unique investment characteristics when compared to the conventional assets, 
like as stocks and bonds, especially over long time periods. Investments in real estate offer the 
benefits of diversifying the portfolio of an investor portfolio for asset class allocations as well 
as geographic allocations. As at 2013 year-end, the global real estate industry had $1150 trillion 
in residential properties with $50 trillion in investable residential properties and $100 trillion 
in non-investable residential properties. The commercial real estate sector was valued at $30 
trillion with $20 trillion in investable properties, and $10 trillion in non-investable properties 
(Figure 6.24). 
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Figure 6.24: The Value of the World’s Real Estate as at Year end 2013 
 
Source: Based on data from Savills Research, cited in Younus (2015: 6)  
 
Peter Westerheide (2006) conducted a study in 2006 aimed at examining real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) and securities with REIT characteristics in eight countries, which included 
Japan, the United States and Australia and concluded that, real estate securities appear to be 
representative of an asset class that is distinct from stocks and bonds in most countries. They 
appear in the long run to mirror the performance of actual real estate investments and offer 
further portfolio diversification opportunity. Table 6.6 gives a breakdown of investment 
markets in selected countries as a percentage of the global investment market, the commercial 
real estate market of the selected countries as a percentage of the global commercial real estate 
market, GDP and population as a percentage of the global GDP and population respectively. 
Comparing REITs with bonds and stocks, whereby a single share or in the case of bonds, a 
minimum number of units can be acquired, real estate assets are generally expensive. Real 
estate investors seldom pay entirely in cash for the property. In most cases, a greater percentage 
of the acquisition price is financed by some kind of debt or financial instrument such as 
mortgage loan with the property itself used as a collateral. 
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Size15 GDP3 Population3 
United States 52.4% 36.7% 22.2% 4.4% 
Japan 7.5 11.6 6.5 1.8 
United Kingdom 7.2 9.8 3.5 0.9 
France 3.1 6.2 3.7 0.9 
Canada 3.4 4.8 2.4 0.5 
Germany 3.0 7.2 4.9 1.1 
Other 23.4 23.7 56.7 90.4 
Source: Based on data from MSCI, Investment Property Databank (IPD), the World Bank, and 
the Population Reference Bureau, cited in Younus (2015: 7)   
 
The portion of the acquisition price that is financed by debt is called leverage while the amount 
which the investor finances by himself is the equity. In most cases however, the investor may 
not have all the cash to acquire a large real estate like office buildings. In such situations, the 
formation of a collective investment scheme becomes necessary to pool equity together.  
Investments in real estate generally can be made directly, through unlisted real estate vehicles 
                                                          
14 Data are as of February 2015 
15 Data are as of 2013 
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such as open-ended and close-ended funds or through listed real estate instruments like REITS, 
REOCS or PropCos i.e. real estate operating companies. 
 
Figure 6.25: Allocations to Real Estate Investment Styles 
 
Source: Based on data from IPD and MSCI, cited in Younus (2015: 17)  
Real estate investments are also an important class of alternative funds in South Africa. There 
are two categories of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in South Africa namely, company 
and trust. Majority of South African REITs invest a greater percentage of their assets in South 
Africa, but they are allowed to invest in the continent as a whole and globally. Currently, 32 
REITs are listed on the JSE, with R 350bn ($28.9bn) in market capitalisation (PwC, 2015).  
 
6.5 Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) 
Financial crises are now a recognisable part of the economic cycle, even though they rarely 
repeat themselves in an exact manner. In the 1980s there was the crisis in Latin America; then 
Russia and South-East Asia in the late 1990s; then the housing and banking crisis in 2007-08 
in the United States. Now, there is an increasing concern that the asset-management industry 
may be the next locus of financial crisis (The Economist, 2014). 
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A SIFI is an insurance company, bank, or any other financial institution whose collapse may 
cause a financial crisis. The unfolding of the global financial crisis has moved the international 
community to safeguard the financial systems by averting the failure of SIFIs, or, in the event 
of one failing, limiting the devastating effects of its failure. The Financial Stability Board in 
November 2011, published a catalogue of global systemically important financial institutions 
(G-SIFIs). (FSB, 2011). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision further introduced new 
regulations - Basel III - that also targets specifically the SIFIs. The regulations focus mainly 
on increasing bank capital requirements and also to introduce surcharges on capital for 
systemically important banks (BCBS, 2011). Some economists however, have warned that the 
tighter capital regulation, which is based primarily on risk-weighted assets, might further affect 
the stability of the financial systems negatively (Slovik, 2012, Allen, Chan, Milne and Thomas, 
2012). 
 
According to the Economist, the asset management industry manages $87 trillion, which makes 
it three-quarters the size of banks with the biggest fund manager, - BlackRock - running $4.4 
trillion of assets, which is more than any bank boasts on its balance-sheet (The Economist, 
2014). After the financial crisis, tight regulatory measures have been implemented on banks, 
among other regulations, is a requirement that banks hold more capital and possess sufficient 
liquidity to deal with short-term pressures. 
 
The asset management industry has run into crisis in the past for example, the collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management in 1998, led to a rescue by the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, the 
failure of two hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns led to its collapse in 2008. On September 
16, 2008, The Reserve Primary Fund on September 16, 2008 “broke the buck” (imposing loss 
on investors) when the fund’s net asset value (NAV) plunged to 97 cents per share. In the 
history of investing, this was one of the first times that a retail money market fund had ever 
failed to maintain a NAV of $1 per share sending shockwaves through the industry which 
prompted the Fed to offer a backstop yet again. 
There is a fear among regulators that herding among fund managers may trigger a general sell-
off, similar to that experienced in 2008 with mortgage securities. The asset management 
industry is now becoming more concentrated, due to the persistent growth of passive funds 
which track an index. Regulators are now faced with the complex task of anticipating future 
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crises, which may not be similar to crises of the past meaning they may have to regulate 
segments of the industry which in the past have not been a source of problems.  
 
Another issue of concern is that regulatory bodies may be stuck in a game of whack-a-mole 
where hammering risk down in one section may lead to it popping up somewhere else. For 
example, some of the problems that regulators worry about, like the illiquidity of the market 
for corporate-bonds, are as a result of the regulations that have been imposed since the crisis. 
If they now turn their attention to funds or the fund managers, they might just cause another 
problem somewhere else (The Economist, 2014). 
 
Danielsson and Zigrand (2015b) however argue that systemic risk is an inescapable part of any 
market economy. Systemic risk cannot be entirely eliminated, the agenda for policy makers 
and researchers should therefore be focused on creating a more robust financial system that is 
less disposed to catastrophic crises and provides economic and societal benefits. The recent 
crisis has revealed the flaw in assuming that as long as each segment of the financial system is 
secured, then the whole system must also be safe. This assumption comes with the possibility 
of regulatory bodies committing a ‘fallacy of composition’ suggested by Milton Friedman 
(1980): 
“The great mistake everyone makes is to confuse what is 
true for the individual with what is true for society as a 
whole. This is the most fascinating thing about economics. 
In a way, economics is the most trivial subject in the world, 
and yet it is so hard for people to understand. Why? I 
believe a major reason is because almost any interesting 
economic problem has the following characteristic: what is 
true for the individual is the opposite of what is true for 
everybody together.” 
 
Figure 6.26 illustrates how regulating all banks to be prudently run can lead to systemic risk if 
it triggers a sale of risky assets in reaction to an external shock forcing a downward spiral of 
the price of assets forcing more disposals which further depress prices culminating in a crisis. 
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Figure 6.26: How Individual Prudence Results in Systemic Crisis 
 
Source: Danielson and Zigrand (2015b), “A proposed research and policy agenda for 
systemic risk”, http://voxeu.org/article/systemic-risk-research-and-policy-agenda 
 
According to Danielsson and Zigrand (2015b), attempting to minimise risks associated with 
any single institution and curtailing the natural volatility of financial markets in the short term 
causes a ‘Great Moderation’ (a façade of a state of permanent stability). However, this illusion 
of stability is by itself, the source of accumulation of hidden systemic imbalances resulting in 
the validation of Hyman Minsky's assertion that ‘stability is destabilising’ (Minsky, 1982). 
Danielsson and Zigrand (2015a) further suggest that designating asset managers as systemically 
important financial institutions would be impulsive and most likely ill-conceived since the 
motivation for such a step emanates from inappropriately applying the macro-prudential 
thought from banking, instead of the underlying externalities that may lead asset managers to 
be part of a systemic risk. They further argue that regulatory bodies are silent on the important 
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question of what the SIFI designation in practice should mean, despite the inherent connection 
between identification and remedy.  
 
In the banking world, there is a vast body of policy and academic literature on how banks can 
contribute to systemic risk, this facilitates sophisticated discussions on the reasons for the 
regulating banks, and then how the regulations should be. In the asset management industry on 
the other hand, such formal analysis is almost non-existent and most ensuing SIFI discussion 
seems to be based on only anecdotal examples and often only referring to Long-Term Capital 
Management as opposed to hard analysis. With the exception of a very few, discussions are 
normally silent on why in the first place, asset management is systemic, as if this issue was 
self-evident. There is therefore no basis to believe that generally, the kind of systemic risk that 
banks create is the same as the systemic risk posed by asset managers (Danielsson and Zigrand, 
2015a). 
 
6.6 The Future of The Asset Management Industry16 
The Global financial crisis that occurred between 2008 and 2009 affected millions of people, 
but only caused a temporary set-back in the long-term growth trajectory of the asset 
management industry. The global assets under management (AuM) at year end 2014 totalled 
$63.9 trillion by 2020, projected to grow to around $101.7 trillion amounting to a nearly 6% 
compound growth rate. This prediction is based on an examination of the correlation between 
AuM and several economic factors over a thirteen-year period that includes two financial crises 
i.e. the Dotcom crash of the late 1990s and the great depression of 2008-2009. There is a strong 
correlation between overall AuM growth and nominal gross domestic product (GDP), 
especially that relating to the fund management industry. Growth in one region can influences 
the AuM in another region as economies have become increasingly dependent on each other 
as such, the effect of the growth in strong regions such as the United States is factored into the 
forecast for 2020 assuming a nominal global GDP growth of 5.15% between 2012 and 2020. 
The assets of pension fund are projected to grow at 6.6% a year to reach about to $57 trillion 
                                                          
16 Unless otherwise indicated, the information on The Future of Asset Management was obtained  from PWC. 
2014. Asset Management 2020: A Brave New World. Available: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/asset-
management/publications/pdfs/pwc-asset-management-2020-a-brave-new-world-final.pdf [Accessed 01 
November 2015]. 
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by 2020 rising form $21.3 trillion as at 2004 to $33.9 trillion in 2012. Majority of Defined 
Benefit (DB) schemes will be phased out but DB scheme will still persist for the remainder of 
this half-century and will still represent a significant proportion of AuM. 
 
Table 6.7: Global AuM (USD Trillion)  
Source: Adopted from PwC analysis. Past data based on Hedge Fund Research, ICI, Preqin, 
Towers Watson and The City UK, cited in PwC (2014, 8) 
 
 
Table 6.8: Client AuM USD Trillion 
 
Source: PwC (2014: 9) 
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The increase in AuM of pension schemes in general though will be mainly from Defined 
Contribution (DC) schemes created in prosperous and fast-growing countries and by 2020 and 
will be the preferred model for savings for retirement, the DB schemes will form a far smaller 
albeit significant pool of assets. As countries, both developed and developing try to include 
more savers in retirement schemes, total assets managed by pension funds will experience 
significant growth with the strongest growth coming from Asia Pacific and Latin America with 
above 9% growth rate each. North America and Europe however will have above $30 trillion 
and $14 trillion respectively in AuM making up the largest pool of funds in 2020.  
 
A growing middle-class is projected to fuel the growth in mutual funds at a rate of 5.7% per 
annum with mandates growing at 5.7% mainly through institutional investors like pension 
funds and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) as well as high net-worth clients.  
• Game changers projected to redefine the industry 
In 2020, the asset management industry will operate in a significantly changed environment. 
The six Game changers that will redefine the industry are: 
1. Asset Management will play a Pivotal Role: The insurance and banking industries 
have long overshadowed the asset management industry this will however change in 
2020 as the asset management industry will emerge to take centre stage. 
2. Regional and Global Platforms projected to Dominate and Redraw Distribution: 
South Asian, North Asia, Europe and Latin America will develop distinct regional 
blocks of fund distribution allowing pan-regional sale of products as well as developing 
trade and regulatory links with each other and in the process transforming the views of 
asset managers on distribution channels. 
3. Transformation of Fee Models: The fee models of most asset managers currently 
embed management and distribution fees in some form or shape that are misaligned 
with the objectives of the investors. 
4. Proliferation of Passively Managed Funds and ETFs as Alternative investments 
become Mainstream: Growth in traditional active management will decline but still 
remain a core of the asset management industry while passive management and 
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alternative strategies will grow rapidly reducing the overall share of active management 
and traditional assets under management. 
5. Emergence of New Class of Global Managers: A new class of managers will emerge 
from both traditional funds and alternative funds with platforms that are highly 
streamlined, stronger and trusted brands and targeted customer solutions.  
6. Asset Management in the 21st Century: Although it is a virtual business, the asset 
management industry operates in a comparatively low-tech infrastructure. It is 
projected that by 2020, technology will be very essential in driving the engagement of 
customers, data mining for clients and potential clients’ information, with operational 
efficiency, regulatory and tax reporting also becoming critical issues. Cyber risk will 




The asset management industry continues to play a significant role in financial markets as well 
as in the lives of individuals all over the world. Apart from efficient allocation of capital, the 
industry is responsible for diversity of activities ranging from providing adequate retirement 
during old age through retirement funds, indemnifying clients in times of losses or accidents 
through long-term and short-term insurance as well as creating and protecting wealth through 
mutual funds, hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds. The industry therefore remains a very 
crucial in various respects and recently have been the subject of consideration as a systemically 
important financial institution (SIFI).  
 
The following chapter presents methodologies that study the behaviour of financial markets 
and the activities of a segment of the asset management industry – the mutual fund industry - 
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This chapter discusses the Johannesburg Stock exchange, the stock exchange selected for this 
study. The JSE is the 19th largest stock exchange in the world by market capitalization, it is the 
largest and the first stock exchange in Africa established in 1887 during the first gold rush in 
South African with 383 listed companies and $ 997.17 billion in market capitalization as at 
June 2016 (JSE, 2013b, WFE, 2016). In 1947, The Stock Exchange Control Act was passed to 
govern the activities of the stock exchange. 
7.1 Introduction 
The JSE became a member of the World Federation of Exchanges (WEF) in 1963 and a 
founding member of the African Stock Exchanges Association (ASEA) established in 1993. 
The Securities Services Act was passed in 2004 and replaced The Stock Exchanges Control 
Act and the Financial Markets Control Act. In the same year, The Social Responsibility Index 
(SRI) was established in May, aimed at measuring the policies of companies, performance as 
well as reporting relating to the three fundamentals of the ‘triple bottom line’ namely, 
economic, environmental and social sustainability (JSE, 2013b). 
The JSE sets and enforces requirements for listing, membership requirements and trading rules. 
The Financial Services Board (FSB) oversees the JSE in the execution of its regulatory duties. 
Significant changes in the regulatory environment are however expected in future, as South 
Africa seeks to establish a twin peaks model of oversight where the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) will take on the supervisory role whiles the FSB carries out regulations on 
market conduct regulation (ASEA, 2016). South Africa is ranked number one in terms of 
securities exchange regulations out of 144 countries according to the World Economic Forum’s 
2014-2015 Global Competitive Index Survey making it the fifth consecutive year the JSE has 
remained number one in the survey, also ranked number three in the ability to raise capital 
through the local equity market, number three again in terms of the effectiveness of corporate 




 THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE (JSE) 
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Figure 7.1: JSE Number of Listed Companies 
 
Source: Based on data from World Federation of Exchanges (2016) 
 
Figure 7.2:  Market Capitalization of the JSE 
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Currently the JSE is the only operating stock exchange in South Africa although the ZAR X 
Stock Exchange has been granted an operation licence by the FSB (BizNews, 2016). Since 
inception, the JSE has witnessed major changes relating to location, ownership, management, 
systems of trading, and regulations. 
Figure 7.3: JSE Group Structure 
 
Source: JSE (2013a: 2) 
The JSE witnessed significant changes in 1995 after the political changes that occurred in South 
Africa. Notable among such changes was the elimination of financial sanctions (Jefferis & 
Okeahalam, 2000). During the same year, a number of amendments to the legislation governing 
the stock exchange were made which resulted in the deregulation of the JSE (JSE, 2013b). In 
1999, The Insider Trading Act was passed in line with the recommendations of the King Task 
Group on Corporate Governance, and the first ETF tracking the top 40 shares on the JSE – 
Satrix 40 - was listed on the JSE in 2000 (JSE, 2013). On September 2000, the JSE relocated 
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to its current location in Sandton, Gauteng. In 2001, An agreement between the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and the JSE allowed cross-trading between the two exchanging, resulting in 
the JET system being replaced with that of the LSE (JSE, 2013b). 
 
7.2 JSE Sens 
In August 1997, a real-time Stock Exchange News Service (Sens) was launched to enhance 
investor confidence and market transparency. Initially, companies listed on the JSE could opt 
to use the Sens services for a trial period of two months. However, from 15 October, the JSE 
listing requirements made it mandatory for companies to publicize on the Sens all their 
corporate information as well as all price-sensitive information before reaching out to any other 
news outlet (JSE, 2013). 
7.3 JSE Strate 
In 2002, the Strate was launched and the JSE has experienced zero “failed trade record” since 
its inception (JSE, 2013).  Strate Ltd is an accredited Central Securities Depository (CSD) for 
settlement of financial instruments electronically in South Africa. The purpose of Strate is to 
minimise risk while ensuring the efficiency of South African financial markets as well as 
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Figure 7.4:  JSE Business Model 
 
Source: JSE (2013a: 3) 
7.4 Demutualization 
The JSE on July 2005, made some structural changes through a process of demutualisation. 
Before this date, the exchange was mutually owned therefore it was used, owned and 
exclusively ran by member firms, who made decisions by voting on a one-member-one-vote 
basis (Mongalo and Mateele, 2009). An Initial Public Offer (IPO) was made and the JSE 
became listed on itself. Demutualisation allows a maximization of potential market 
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MUTUAL SOCIETY 
Figure 7.4: The Process of Demutualization  
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7.5 JSE TradElect 
The JSE TradElect is an electronic trading system which operates under a license from the 
LSE. The system was designed purposely to meet the requirements of the JSE. In April 2007, 
the JSE TradElect replaced the JSE SETS, which was also a replacement for the JSE JET in 
May 2002 (JSE, 2013).  
7.6 JSE Clear 
The JSE Clear is a JSE-owned derivative central counterparty (CCP), a system for risk 
management that enables the clearing, settlement and recording of transactions. On 1 February 
2016, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), announced that JSE Clear, has 
been acknowledged as “equivalent” to CCPs in the European Union. The JSE Clear was also 
among the first be granted Qualifying Central Counterparty (QCCP) by the International 
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7.7 The JSE and Market Efficiency 
Academics and investment professionals continue to debate the economic underlying the 
pricing of financial assets. This debate is mainly centred on efficient market hypothesis which 
argues that the market prices of financial securities fully incorporate all available information. 
The robustness or otherwise of the efficient market hypothesis is of immense practical 
relevance. This for example will imply that the study of patterns and trends of time series of 
asset prices will not permit the correct prediction of future performance of asset prices, 
therefore, the activities of technical analysts have no value to investors. Again, the activities of 
fundamental analysts cannot also be expected produce any consistent superior investment 
performance. The depth of this argument becomes even clearer given the importance of the 
two categories of analysts in the traditional style of portfolio management. 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the JSE with regards to its efficiency with 
inconclusive results. Strebel (1977) argues that at best, the EMH applies to 50% of shares 
traded on the JSE. These are shares with a trading volume of at least 250 000 and the other 
50% of shares have very low volumes making their market risk volume-dependent, rendering 
invalid, the ex-post CAPM as a framework of market equilibrium therefore rendering the 
general test of market efficiency useless. Furthermore, the existence of longer runs, 
marketability and higher returns, at low volumes point out that the assumption of competitive 
market necessary for the EMH breaks down (Strebel, 1977). Gilbertson and Roux (1977) 
conducted an evaluation of the evidence for and against market efficiency on the JSE and also 
conclude that the evidence supports market efficiency.  
Hadassin (1976) provided evidence against the EMH applying the Von Neumann serial 
correlation and runs tests to analyses the number of upward price variations and downward 
price variations occurring in succession before the occurrence of opposite price variation or no 
variation, to ascertain whether share returns of 30 listed companies on the JSE exhibited 
random walk. The study reported correlation between future and historical price variations and 
concluded that the JSE does not exhibit random walk and is not efficient (Hadassin 1976). This 
study however used a short sample period (January 1971–December 1973) and could be 
affected by a bias of time-period as the evidence may only reflect the economic situation 
existing at that time period. Another study tested for independence in price movements, 
applying run tests and serial correlation tests (Roux and Gilbertson, 1978). Both tests reported 
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that variations in prices may not entirely be independent. These dependencies were however 
small and inconsistent, and therefore may not permit continuously profitable trades by investors 
(Roux and Gilberston 1978).  
Doyle and Chen (2013) applied the overlapping serial test (OST) to test for efficiency on the 
JSE ALSI, and concluded that from the period of January 1996 to June 2012, the index was 
characterized by non-randomness for a two-day window length and exhibited randomness for 
the remainder of the window lengths. 
Many studies that provide evidence in favour of the EMH used linear dependencies tests in 
stock returns, overlooking the prospect of non-linear dependencies (Lim, 2007). Studies that 
test returns for dependencies on the JSE mostly investigated linear serial dependence (Noakes 
and Rajaratnam, 2014). Recently however, Kruger et al. (2012) tested for nonlinear dependence 
in price movements on the JSE over the period January 2002 to December 2009. The study 
tested 109 stocks using various full period tests as well as episodic tests, and reported linear 
and nonlinear dependence in stock returns although such dependence was not observed 
regularly or consistently over time. This study concluded that the JSE was generally efficient 
with short periods of inefficiency over the sample period (Kruger et al. 2012). Mangani (2007) 
tested the properties of distribution of the JSE from February 1973 to April 2002, using the 
weekly closing prices and reported that returns on the JSE were non-linearly dependent and 
therefore can be forecasted over time. Kruger et al. (2012) however argue that Mangani (2007) 
only applied one of the several nonlinear dependency tests available and had a small sample 
size. 
Jefferis and Smith (2005), applying a time varying generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) as a test of evolving efficiency (TEE), tested the JSE Actuaries 
ALSI for changing efficiency over time and concluded that over the period of January 1990 to 
June 2001, the JSE was constant weak form efficiency with no sign of changing efficiency. 
Bonga-Bonga (2012) also concluded that the JSE was weak form efficient over the period of 
March 1995 to December 2009 using a time varying GARCH model on weekly prices.  
Variance ratio tests (VRT) have also been applied to test for a proof of random walk. The 
advantage of applying the VRT is that it can be applied even when the price time series are not 
normally distributed (Jefferis and Smith 2004). Smith et al. (2002) applied multiple variance 
ratio tests to investigate whether the JSE ALSI exhibits a random walk. Using weekly stock 
Page | 168  
 
price data from January 1990 to August 1998, and concluded that the JSE ALSI follows a 
random walk. Over the period of April 1996 to March 2001, in a similar study but including a 
time-varying GARCH, Jefferis and Smith (2004) concluded that the JSE indices made up of a 
mostly large cap shares, were weak form efficient. The smaller cap indices were mostly 
inefficient with tests of evolving efficiency showing no signs that these smaller indices were 
becoming efficient. 
Noakes and Rajaratnam (2014) tested for market efficiency on the JSE using the overlapping 
serial test to assess the efficiency of large mid and small cap indices on the JSE using index 
level as well as individual company level data over a stable period as well as a period that 
includes the global financial crisis. The study concludes that share prices of small cap 
companies are characterized by high degree of non-random movements. Mid cap stocks also 
exhibit inefficiencies albeit to a much lesser extent while large cap stocks displayed higher 
degree of efficiency 
 
7.7 Spillover Effects of International Financial Markets on The 
JSE 
A vast body of studies have shown that over time, there are co-movements among international 
financial markets (Kim et al., 2015, Li and Giles, 2015, Rejeb and Arfaoui, 2016, Kim, 2015, 
Mensi et al., 2016). The recent financial crisis again points out how no market is totally immune 
to the effects of spill-overs from other international markets. Collins and Biekpe (2003) find 
evidence that the JSE experienced contagion effect during the Asian financial crisis. Using an 
aggregate-shock (AS) model, Heymans and Da Camara (2013) confirm spill-over effects on 
returns and volatility of the London, Hang Seng, New York, Paris and Frankfurt equity markets 
on the JSE. The study further confirms the returns on the JSE All share index are directly 
affected by contagion of the economic region where these crises emanate. Heymans and Da 
Camara (2013), however conclude that in recent times, South Africa has progressed in 
protecting JSE against financial crises. 
Sui and Sun (2016) examined the relationships among interest differentials, foreign exchange 
rates, local stock returns of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and U.S. 
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S&P 500 returns and discovered that foreign exchange rates have significant spill-over effects 
on to stock returns in the short-run, although not vice versa. Shocks from the S&P 500 
significantly influence equity markets in South Africa, Brazil and China. The study also 
confirms that during the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009, there was a strong spill-over 
effects between stock returns and exchange rates. 
7.8 Summary 
The JSE is the 19th largest stock exchange in the world by market capitalization, it is the largest 
and the first stock exchange in Africa. South Africa is ranked number one in terms of securities 
exchange regulations according to the World Economic Forum’s 2014-2015 Global 
Competitive Index Survey and also number two in protecting the rights of minority 
shareholders as well as number three in the ability to raise capital through the local equity 
market and number three again in terms of the effectiveness of corporate boards (African 
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the data selected for the study and the methodology the study adopts in 
investigating the low volatility anomaly as well as testing for non-linearity and chaos on the 
JSE. Once the existence of chaos or otherwise is established on the JSE, it also sets out to 
investigate how the FMH describes the behaviour of the JSE. 
 
8.2 Data 
The data for this study were obtained from the database of McGregor BFA, based in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. McGregor is a prominent provider of stock exchange and 
accounting data to firms and researchers. McGregor has standardised financial data dating from 
1972, and has information for all companies and industries on the JSE. Data on the components 
of the selected FTSE/JSE indices were obtained from the JSE. This study investigates the 
existence of the low-volatility anomaly on the JSE over the period June 1995 to December 
2014. 
Daily price data from June 1995 to December 2014 of the indices selected for the study is well 
above the 2500 simulated data observation, below which Feder (1988) posits that such 
observations become questionable.  As at December 2014, the FTSE/JSE All Share index had 
a total market capitalisation or R 9.9 trillion, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 had a market capitalisation 
of R 8.3 trillion and the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index had a market capitalisation of R 307 billion. 
Table 8.1 presents the market capitalisation of the selected indices. 
  




FTSE/JSE TOP 40 R 8,283,699 MILLION 12 DECEMBER 2014 
FTSE/JSE ALL SHARE R 9,899,880 MILLION 12 DECEMBER 2014 
FTSE/JSE SMALL CAP     R 306,991 MILLION 12 DECEMBER 2014 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
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Source: McGregor BFA (2015) 
The indices investigated are the daily returns of the FTSE/JSE All Share (J203), which 
represents 99% of the full market capitalisation of all eligible shares listed on the main board 
of the JSE; FTSE/JSE Top 40 (J200), which represents the largest 40 companies on the JSE 
ranked by market capitalisation; and FTSE/JSE Small Cap (J202), which consists of all the 
remaining companies after the selection of the top 40 and mid cap companies. The study takes 
8 cycles of sub-samples from a large sample of n = 4840, with n = 2420 in the second cycle 
with 2 sub-samples, and so on until 20 sub-samples of n = 242. 
The study obtains data on quarterly mutual fund portfolio holdings from the database of Profile 
Data from January 2004 to December 2014. Profile Data carries out research and provides 
financial data including data on mutual funds holdings which are only available on a quarterly 
basis. Data on the components of the selected indices is obtained from the JSE Ltd. The study 
covers the population of all domestic equity mutual funds registered with the Association for 
Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA). Excluded from the population are fund of funds 
to avoid double counting. 
 
ASISA defines domestic equity funds as funds that have at least 80% of the market value of 
the portfolios invested in equities with capital appreciation as the primary goal. The study does 
not include fund of funds as this will amount to double counting. Unclassified funds are also 
excluded from this study because they do not make up a significant proportion of the universe 
of equity funds and do not have a specific benchmark against which performance among the 
group can be measured. Table 8.2 presents the total assets under management of the various 
domestic funds in South Africa. As at September 2016, equity funds had R 368.5 billion assets 
under management. General equity funds were the largest fund in this category of funds with 
R 322.5 billion assets under management making up approximately 87.5% of assets under 
management. Multi asset funds are the largest category of domestic funds with R900 billion in 
assets under management as at September 2016. During this period, the total assets under 
management of the mutual fund industry in South African was R 1.8 trillion. 
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Table 8.2: Total Domestic Funds AUM 
 30/09/2016 30/06/2016 31/03/2016 31/12/2015 
 Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % 
EQUITY FUNDS                 
General funds 322,506 18 315,232 18 317,984 19 301,459 18 
Large Cap funds 23,003 1 21,116 1 18,539 1 17,576 1 
Mid & Small Cap funds 6,952 0 6,790 0 6,798 0 6,783 0 
Unclassified funds 1,057 0 1,186 0 1,123 0 1,125 0 
Resources & Basic Industries funds 3,763 0 3,497 0 3,223 0 2,571 0 
Industrial funds 7,672 0 8,067 0 8,278 0 8,702 1 
Financial funds 3,563 0 3,703 0 3,910 0 3,194 0 
SUB TOTAL 368,517 21 359,591 21 359,854 21 341,409 21 
MULTI ASSET FUNDS                 
Target Date funds 2,333 0 2,096 0 1,985 0 2,097 0 
Low Equity funds 236,365 13 235,878 14 230,927 14 229,490 14 
Medium Equity funds 51,221 3 49,706 3 48,466 3 50,933 3 
High Equity funds 428,666 24 419,653 24 414,338 24 396,823 24 
Flexible funds 59,270 3 54,278 3 50,533 3 55,391 3 
Income funds 122,032 7 125,658 7 126,376 7 119,813 7 
SUB TOTAL 899,887 51 887,270 51 872,624 51 854,546 52 
REAL ESTATE FUNDS                 
General funds 69,964 4 68,102 4 69,644 4 65,667 4 
SUB TOTAL 69,964 4 68,102 4 69,644 4 65,667 4 
INTEREST BEARING FUNDS                 
Variable Term funds 51,235 3 52,989 3 49,700 3 48,979 3 
Short Term funds 95,131 5 94,148 5 88,250 5 87,413 5 
SUB TOTAL 146,366 8 147,137 8 137,950 8 136,392 8 
TOTAL (excluding Money Market) 1,484,734 84 1,462,100 84 1,440,072 84 1,398,013 84 
Money Market funds 293,263 16 275,618 16 267,473 16 259,853 16 
TOTAL (Including Money Market) 1,777,997 100 1,737,718 100 1,707,545 100 1,657,867 100 
                      Source: ASISA 
ASISA represents the majority of South Africa’s mutual fund management companies, asset 
managers, and life insurance companies. According to ASISA, the total assets under 
management in South Africa as at 30 June 2015 was R1.781 trillion, and the total number of 
registered funds as at June 2015 was 1225. Mutual funds in South Africa had R 77 billion net 




Page | 173  
 
8.3 Statistical Analysis Techniques 
This section discusses the various statistical techniques the study used. The study compares the 
mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum daily returns of the selected indices. The 
study further tests for skewness and kurtosis to test the distribution of the time series of the 
selected indices. The Anderson-Darling test is also used to test the normality of distribution. 
 
8.3.1 Risk-Adjusted Returns 
The study compares the annualised returns of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 to the annualised returns 
of the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index over the period June 1995 to December 2014. To test for the 
existence of the low volatility anomaly on the JSE, the study adopts the well-publicised risk-
adjusted returns measure, the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio measures the excess return or the 
risk premium per unit of deviation (risk) in a security developed by Nobel laureate economist 





                                                              [1] 
Where 𝑅𝑎 is the return of the asset, 𝑅𝑏 is the return on the benchmark asset (the risk-free rate) 
which in this study is the South Africa 10-Year Bond Yield and 𝜎𝑎is the standard deviation of 
the returns of the asset. The Sharpe ratio describes how well the return of a security 
compensates an investor for a given level of risk taken. A portfolio with a higher Sharpe ratio 
offers a better return for the same level of risk or the same return for a lower risk. 
The study further compares the P/E ratios, dividend yields and earnings yields of the FTSE/JSE 
Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index to ascertain whether there are any differences in 
these metrics. This approach is referred to as the method of comparables. In using this method, 
the study would be able to reach a conclusion on the similarity or otherwise of the selected 
indices. For example, if both indices possess similar profit margins, risk and prospects for 
growth, an index with a P/E of 20 will be construed to be relatively undervalued compared to 
the index with a P/E of 30 (Pinto et al., 2015). 
 
Page | 174  
 
8.3.2 The BDS Test17 
This study applies the BDS test for independence as explained by Brock, Dechert, Scheinkman 
and LeBaron (1996) which is a portmanteau test for time-based dependence in a time series 
and also applied to test for deviations from independence be it chaos, non-linear dependence 
or linear dependence. The test can also be used on a series of estimated residuals to determine 
if such residuals are independent and identically distributed (iid).  
One can for example, test the series of residuals from an ARMA model to determine whether 
there exists any dependence that is non-linear after fitting the linear ARMA model. The aim 
behind such a test is simple. To proceed with this test, we select a distance, 𝜖, then select a pair 
of points. If the series are in fact iid, then for any given pair of points, the probability that the 
distance between such points being equal to or less than epsilon will remain constant. This this 
probability is denoted by 𝑐1(𝜖). 
Sets that consist of multiple pairs of points can also be considered. These sets of pairs can be 
chosen by moving orderly through the consecutive observations of the sample. Therefore, 
given observations 𝑠, and 𝑡 of a series X, a set of pairs of the form: 
{{𝑋𝑠, 𝑋𝑡}, {𝑋𝑠+𝑡, 𝑋𝑡+1}, {𝑋𝑡+2, 𝑋𝑠+2}, … , {𝑋𝑠+𝑚−1, 𝑋𝑡+𝑚−1}}                       [2] 
can be constructed, with m being the number of consecutive points that are used in the set, or 
the embedding dimension. The joint probability of every set of points in the set that satisfies 
the epsilon condition is denoted by the probability 𝑐𝑚(𝜖). 
Under the assumption of independence, the BDS test further by notes that this probability is 
the product of the probabilities for each individual pair. Therefore, if the series are independent, 
𝑐𝑚(𝜖) = 𝑐1
𝑚(𝜖)                                                      [3] 
𝑐1(𝜖) or 𝑐𝑚(𝜖) are not directly observable but can only be estimated from the sample thus, this 
relationship does not to hold perfectly, but only with some error therefore, the larger the error, 
the less probable it is that the error is as a result of random sample variation. The BDS test 
gives a formal basis for evaluating the size of this error. 
                                                          
17 As described in IHS GLOBAL INC 2013. EViews User Guide. Irvine, California: IHS Global Inc  
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In estimating the probability for any given dimension, one simply goes through all conceivable 
sets of that length drawn from the sample while counting the sets that satisfy the 𝜖 condition. 
The estimate of the probability is provided by dividing the ratio of the number of sets that 
satisfy the condition, by the total number of sets. This condition, in a series X with n sample of 








𝑗=0 (𝑋𝑠+𝑗, 𝑋𝑡+𝑗)                [4] 
Where 𝐼𝜖 is the indicator function: 
𝐼𝜖(𝑥, 𝑦) = {
1
0
 {    
𝑖𝑓 |𝑥 − 𝑦| ≤ 𝜖
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                         [5] 
𝑐𝑚,𝑛 are also called correlation integrals. These sample estimates of the probabilities can be 
used to estimate a test statistic for independence: 
𝑏𝑚.𝑛(𝜖) = 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝜖) − 𝑐1,𝑛−𝑚+1(𝜖)
𝑚                                    [6] 
The last observation is eliminated by the second term so that it is based on the same number of 
terms as the first statistic. This statistic is expected to be close to zero under the assumption of 
independence.  Brock et al. show it as: 
(√𝑛 − 𝑚 + 1)
𝑏𝑚,𝑛(𝜖)
𝜎𝑚,𝑛(𝜖) .
→ 𝑁(0,1)                                        [7] 
Where 
𝜎𝑚,𝑛
2 (𝜖) = 4(𝑘𝑚 + 2 ∑ 𝑘𝑚−𝑗𝑐1
2𝑗
+ (𝑚 − 1)2𝑐1
2𝑚 − 𝑚2𝑘𝑐1
2𝑚−2𝑚−1
𝑗=1 )                 [8] 
and 𝑐1can be calculated using𝑐1,𝑛.  The probability of any triplet of points lying within 𝜖of each 









𝑟=𝑠+1                                     [9] 
(𝐼𝜖(𝑋𝑡, 𝑋𝑠)𝐼𝜖(𝑋𝑠, 𝑋𝑟) + 𝐼𝜖(𝑋𝑡, 𝑋𝑟)𝐼𝜖(𝑋𝑟, 𝑋𝑠) + 𝐼𝜖(𝑋𝑠, 𝑋𝑡)𝐼𝜖(𝑋𝑡, 𝑋𝑟)) 
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To apply the FMH to describe the low volatility anomaly on the JSE, the study first tests for 
chaos on the stock exchange by using the BDS test to test for correlation integral - the main 
concept behind the BDS test (Zivot, 2006) to measures how frequent temporal patterns are 
repeated in a given time series. The BDS test is designed to spot non-linear dependence 
(Oppong et al., 1999).  
One advantage of the BDS test is that it requires no distributional assumptions on the series to 
be tested. 
 
8.3.3 The Rescaled Range Analysis (The Hurst Exponent) 
To establish the fractal nature of the selected indices, the study applies the rescaled range 
analysis. In proposing the FMH, Peters (1994) applied a modified rescaled range (R/S) 
procedure, which was pioneered by Hurst (1951). Peters (1994) and Howe, Martin and Wood 
(1997) review the steps for computing the R/S analysis. First, the index series of the JSE is 
converted into logarithmic returns, St, at period t of the JSE index series. 
 
Using raw daily price data in stock markets has many limitations because prices are generally 
non-stationary (Mehta, 1995) and therefore interfere with estimating the H exponent. The series 
is therefore converted into logarithmic rates of returns to overcome the problem. 
 
In line with Peters (1994), the study divides the period into A contiguous sub-periods with a 
length of n, so that A × n = N, with N being the length of the series 𝑁𝑡. The study labels each 
sub-period 𝐼𝑎 where a = 1,2,3…, A. The study further labels each element in 𝐼𝑎  is categorised 








                      [10] 
The range 𝑅𝐼𝑎 is given as the maximum minus the minimum value𝑋𝑘,𝑎, within every sub-period 
𝐼𝑎 given as: 
𝑅𝐼𝑎 = max(𝑋𝑘,𝑎) − min(𝑋𝑘,𝑎) , where 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛, 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝐴, 
Page | 177  
 
                      [11] 
with 
𝑋𝑘,𝑎 = ∑(𝑁𝑖,𝑎 − 𝑒𝑎), 𝑘 = 1,2,3, … 𝑛,
𝑘
𝑖=1
    
                                [12] 
being the time series of the accumulated divergence from the mean for each sub-period. Each 
range 𝑅𝐼𝑎is divided by the sample standard deviation 𝑆𝐼𝑎 that corresponds to it to normalise the 











                      [13] 
The mean R/S values for length n is given as: 
(𝑅 𝑆⁄ )𝑛 = (
1
𝐴




                                                                                                                                               [14] 
Finally, an OLS regression is applied with log(R/S) as the dependent variable and log(n) being 
the independent variable. The Hurst exponent, H, is obtained from the slope coefficient of the 
regression. An H of 0.5 denotes the series under investigation exhibits characteristics in line 
with the random walk theory. An H greater than 0.5 denotes persistence while an H lower than 
0.5 denotes anti-persistence. According to Peters (1991), the Hurst exponent describes the 
probability of two consecutive events occurring therefore an H of 0.6 implies a 60% probability 
that if the last move was negative, the next move will also be negative.  
Once H is computed, the autocorrelation within the time series is computed as: 
𝐶𝑁 = 2(2ℎ−1) − 1 
                                                                                                                                               [15] 
According to Peters (1994), the CN represents the percentage of movements in the time series 
that can be explained by historical information. A CN = 0 signifies randomness in the time 
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series under consideration pointing to a weak-form efficient market where historical 
information cannot be relied on to outperform the market. 
8.3.4 The Variance Ratio Test 
To test the statistical significance of the estimated Hurst Exponent, the study applies the 
variance ratio test (VRT) to check if the whether the Null-hypothesis of H = 0.5 can be rejected 
(Steffen et al., 2014).  The VRT has also been applied to test for evidence of a random walk. 
The advantage of applying the VRT is that it can be applied even when the price time series 
are not normally distributed (Jefferis and Smith 2004). Lo and MacKinlay (1988) developed 
this test statistic and more details see can be found in Lo and MacKinlay (2001).  
Given that the time series {𝑌𝑡} = (𝑌0, 𝑌1, 𝑌2, … , 𝑌𝑛)satisfies  
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜖𝑡                                                             [16] 
With 𝜇 being a random drift parameter. The key characteristics of a random walk to test are 
𝐸(𝜖𝑡𝜖𝑡−𝑗) = 0 for any positive j and 𝐸(𝜖𝑡) = 0 for all t. 
The Basic Test 
Two test statistics were developed by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) for properties of random walk 
applicable under different sets of assumptions of null hypothesis about 𝜖𝑡: 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) first assume the 𝜖𝑡 are iid. Gaussian with 
variance 𝜎2 although the assumption of normality is not strictly necessary. Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988) refer to this as the homoscedastic random walk hypothesis, also referred to as the iid 
null. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) alternatively describe a heteroskedastic random walk hypothesis 
with the assumption of iid. weakened and allow for rather general forms of dependence and 
conditional heteroskedasticity. A hypothesis which is sometimes referred to as the martingale 
null, because it provides a set of sufficient but not necessary, conditions for 𝜖𝑡 to be a 
martingale difference sequence (m.d.s.). 
The estimators for the mean of first difference and the scaled variance of the q-th 
difference can be defined as: 


















                                            [17] 





.                                                              [18] 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) suggest that the variance estimators may be adjusted for bias by 
replacing T in Equation 18 with in the drift case or the no-drift case. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) show that the variance ratio z-statistic: 
𝓏(𝑞) = (𝑉𝑅(𝑞) − 1) ∙ [?̂?2(𝑞)]−1/2                                     [19] 
is asymptotically N(0,1) for suitable choice of estimator ?̂?2(𝑞). 
Under the hypothesis of  iid., the estimator is given as: 
?̂?2(𝑞) =
2(2𝑞 − 1)(𝑞 − 1)
3𝑞𝑇
 
                                                                  [20] 
under the assumption of m.d.s. however, we use the kernel estimator, 









                                                             [21] 
Where 
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                                                                                                                                               [22] 
The approach by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) uses an overlapping variance ratio test, which 
examines the predictability of a given time series by comparing the variances of the log 
difference of the series calculated over different intervals. The statistic tests whether the 
equation 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝓏(𝑡) − 𝓏(𝑡 − 𝜏))
𝜏𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝓏(𝑡) − 𝓏(𝑡 − 1))
= 1  
                                                            [23] 
can be accepted or not. Therefore, if we hypothesize that our selected price series are in fact 
stationary, then, over time, the variances of the series will not increase. However, if the series 
contain unit roots and therefore non-stationary, the estimated variances for each series will 
increase over time. The variances of subsets of the price series that are differently sampled will 
then be compared over time to determine what happens with the obtained ratios of the variance 
(see equation 16). The variances of the price series are calculated at ∆𝑡 time periods. If we 
sample every 𝑘 × ∆𝑡k periods, it is expected that the variance be 𝑘𝜎2 under a random walk, 
therefore, equation 16 holds. 
Joint VRT 
Because the variance ratio constraint holds for every difference q > 1, the statistic is commonly 
evaluated at several selected values of q. Chow and Denning (1993) proposed a conservative 
test statistic which analyzes the absolute maximum value for a group of multiple variance ratio 
statistics to control the size of the joint test. Using m variance ratio statistics, T degrees of 
freedom and parameter m, the probability for the Studentized Maximum Modulus (SMM) 
distribution bounds from above, the p-value for the Chow-Denning statistic. In line with Chow 
and Denning (1993), the study approximates this bound applying the asymptotic (𝑇 = ∞) 
SMM distribution. 
Wild Bootstrap 
Kim (2006) provides a wild bootstrap methodology to enhance the properties of small sample 
of variance ratio tests. this method involves estimating the individual as well as the joint 
variance ratio test statistics on samples generated by weighting the original data by variance 1 
and mean 0 random variables, and applying the outcome to create bootstrap distributions of the 
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test statistics. The p-values are directly calculated from the fraction of replications that fall 
outside the range defined by the statistic calculated. 
In summary, equation 16: 
• is equal to 1 if the price series follows a random walk, 
• is (strictly) less than 1 under mean reversion (stationarity), 
• and is (strictly) larger than 1 under mean aversion (trending up- or downwards). 
 
8.3.5 Analysis of Portfolio Holdings 
Baker et al. (2011) argue that two of the reasons for the low-volatility anomaly are the structure 
of managers’ remuneration and agency problems that cause fund managers to include high 
volatility stocks in their portfolios. This study obtains information from quarterly mutual funds 
holdings from the January 2004 to December 2014. This period is selected because it is the 
only period for which data was obtained on the complete mutual fund holdings. For the other 
periods, quarterly mutual fund holdings below 1% are aggregated together and presented as 
holdings less than 1%. The study analyses the quarterly holding of funds to ascertain the 
percentage of portfolio allocation to companies in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE 
Small Cap. This is to confirm whether South African fund managers contribute to the low-
volatility anomaly on the JSE. The analysis of portfolio holdings of South African equity funds 
covers a relatively shorter period of January 2004 to December 2014 a period that can be 
described as turbulent due to the Global Financial Crisis and this may have a possible influence 
the portfolio holding of these funds.  
 
8.3.6 Analysts Coverage 
The study compares the number of analysts covering stocks in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the 
FTSE/JSE Small Cap indices using data from McGregor BFA. As of 31st December 2015, the 
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8.3.7 Frequency of Publication 
Using data from McGregor BFA, the study counts the number of publications for companies 
in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE Small Cap over the previous one year from 1st 
January 2015 to 31st December 2015. A broad definition of publications is used. This according 
to McGregor BFA, includes news from sources such as newspapers, online publications and 
journals as well as JSE issued news and historical company new as they relating to a company.  
 
8.3.8 Normalized Volume of Trade 
In order to compare the volume of trade between the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE 
Small Cap, the study normalizes the volume of trade for both indices by dividing the total 
volume of trade for each index for the year ended 31 December 2002 to 31 December 2014 
2014 by the total free float stocks in the index in line with Ranguelova et al. (2015). The study 
applies this normalized measure of volume of trade to work out an average monthly number 
for each index. 
 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed the data and methodology applies to achieve the five objectives of the 
study.  Data for the study is obtained from Profile Data, the JSE and BFA McGregor.  The 
study applies the Sharpe ratio to investigate the low volatility anomaly on the JSE, the first 
objective of the study. The BDS test is also applied to determine whether the time series of the 
selected indices are iid, this is the second objective of the study. The study also applies the 
rescaled range analysis to investigate the fractal nature of the selected indices to achieve the 
third objective of the study.  The study further investigates   factors that contribute to the low 
volatility anomaly on the JSE as well as ascertaining whether the FMH explains this anomaly.




This chapter presents the findings of the study and provides interpretations to the findings. 
 
9.1 Results and Discussion 
Table 9.1 shows the statistical properties of the data used in the study.  The FTSE/JSE Small 
Cap index had the highest daily mean return and lowest standard deviation over the period of 
the study. The FTSE/JSE Top 40 recorded the lowest negative return as well as the highest 
positive daily return over the period of the study. 
The kurtosis values for the indices selected are all larger than 3, which is the value for normal 
distribution signifying that all the series of the indices have fat tails compared to a normal 
distribution and leptokurtic in line with the FMH. The returns of the indices therefore have 
frequent extremely large deviations from the mean with the FTSE/JSE Small Cap exhibiting 
the highest leptokurtosis. The series of all the indices are also negatively skewed, again with 
the FTSE/JSE Small Cap displaying the highest (in absolute terms) of negative skewness.  
 
Table 9.1: Summary Statistics for FTSE/JSE Indices 
STATISTIC 
 
FTSE/JSE All Share FTSE/JSE Top 40 FTSE/JSE Small 
Cap 
N 4840 4840 4840 
Mean 0.000209 0.000203 0.000212 
Standard deviation 0.005393 0.005934 0.002919 
Skewness -0.477473 -0.403190 -1.769811 
Kurtosis 9.284673 9.290103 17.63013 
Minimum -0.055112 -0.062047 -0.033932 
Maximum 0.032238 0.036685 0.017227 
p – value* 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Anderson-Darling 
(A2) Test 
44.56388 41.43948 81.56400 
p-value for A2 Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*Significant at 0.01 level 
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The Anderson-Darling test also rejects the null hypothesis of normality at the 0.01 significance 
level. The implications of these findings are that the series of indices considered in this study 
show significant and frequent deviations from the mean, and therefore applying statistical 
models that do not take fatter tails into consideration will underestimate the likelihood of very 
good or very bad outcomes. 
 
9.2 FTSE/JSE Small Cap Outperforms FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index 
The first research objective of the study is to investigate the existence of the low volatility 
anomaly on the JSE. Contrary to the fundamental concept in classical finance that risk is 
compensated by expected returns, the study confirms the existence of low-volatility anomaly 
on the JSE. The FTSE/JSE Small Cap index is less risky and outperforms the FTSE/JSE Top 
40 on a risk-adjusted basis. Over the period June 1995 to December 2014, the FTSE/JSE Small 
Cap index outperformed the FTSE/JSE Top 40 by 0.6% per annum. Although the absolute 
outperformance of the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index is not phenomenal, its outperformance of 
the FTSE/JSE Top 40 on a risk adjusted basis is phenomenal with a Sharpe ratio of 9.93 to 
3.88. Figure 8.1 illustrates to growth of R100 over the period of the study. Table 9.2 illustrates 
the absolute and risk-adjusted performance of the two indices.  
The findings of this study are in line with Jensen et al. (1972), Haugen and Heins (1972), Blitz 
and Van Vliet (2007) and Li et al. (2016) who confirmed the existence of the low-volatility 
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Figure 9.1: Growth of R 100 (June 1995 - December 2014) 
   
Source: McGregor BFA (2015) 
 
Table 9.2: Summary Statistics – Performance (June 1995 - December 2014) 
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Annualised  11.7% 12.3% 
Minimum -25.93% -34.34% 
Maximum 74.92% 47.85% 
Sharpe Ratio 3.88 9.93 
Source: Author 
Figure 9.2 shows the volatility for measures for the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE Small 
Cap index. As predicted by the FMH, the small cap index which has an H of 0.68 has 
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Figure 9.2: Volatility (June 1995 - December 2014) 
 
Source: McGregor BFA (2015) 
Furthermore, over the period of the study, the P/E ratio of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 was higher 
than the P/E ratio of the FTSE/JSE Small Cap. Figure 9.3 and table 9.3 present the P/E ratios 
of both indices. 
Figure 9.3: P/E Ratio (June 1995 - December 2014) 
 























































































































































































































































































TOP 40 SMALL CAP




Table 9.3: Summary Statistics - P/E Ratio (June 1995 - December 2014) 
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Average 14.86 13.47 
Median 9.08 5.94 
Minimum 19.81 12.87 
Maximum 15.2 39.81 
Source: McGregor BFA (2015) 
 
The theory regarding price multiples like the P/E ratio is that one cannot evaluate the price of 
a stock in isolation. The evaluation must be done in relation to what it can buy in terms of net 
assets, earnings, or some other evaluation of value. By dividing the price of a stock by a per 
share measure of value gives the price to buy a unit of value in whatever means of measuring 
the value. A P/E of 30 for example, means it takes 30 units of currency say R 30, to buy a unit 
of earnings (for example, R 1 of earnings). Comparison among stocks can then be done through 
such scaling of price per share by value per share. A stock with a P/E of 25 is therefore more 
expensive than a similar stock with a P/E of 20 even if they both sell for the same price. In 
using this method of comparables, an analyst would conclude that if the shares are closely 
similar, for example, if they possess similar profit margins, risk and prospects for growth, the 
stock with the P/E of 20 is relatively undervalued compared to the stock with a P/E of 30 (Pinto 
et al., 2015). 
The law of one price, is the economic rationale behind the method of comparables. This is the 
principle that assets that are identical should sell at the same price. The method of comparables 
is possibly the most widely applied technique for analysts who report valuation judgments 
based on price multiples. The use of multiples in valuing assets is sometimes seen mainly as a 
kind of relative-valuation method (Pinto et al., 2015). A higher Sharpe ratio together with a 
lower P/E ratio therefore implies that the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index is not only outperforms 
the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index but also relatively less expensive or undervalued. The dividend 
yields as well as the earnings yield of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 was lower than the FTSE/JSE 
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Small Cap over the period of the study. Figure 9.4 and Table 9.4 presents the dividend yields 
for both indices over the period. Figure 9.5 and Table   9.5 present the earnings yield of the 
two indices. 
Figure 9.4: Dividend Yield (June 1995 - December 2014) 
 
Source: McGregor BFA (2015) 
 
Table 9.4: Summary Statistics - Dividend Yield (June 1995 - December 2014) 
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Average 2.68 3.86 
Median 2.56 3.60 
Minimum 1.77 2.51 
Maximum 2.56 6.94 
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Figure 9.5: Earnings Yield (June 1995 - December 2014) 
 
Source: McGregor BFA (2015) 
 
Table 9.5: Summary Statistics - Earnings Yield (June 1995 - December 2014) 
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Average 6.98 8.28 
Median 6.59 7.81 
Minimum 5.17 2.51 
Maximum 11.01 16.84 
Source: McGregor BFA (2015) 
 
The findings of this study are in line with the assertion that small cap companies are less 
explored or totally ignored by many analysts and a large population of investors, and therefore 
the market for small stocks tend to be inefficient compared to their large cap counterparts, 
leading to prices deviating from fair values (Fundamental Index 2008; Foley 2014; Credit 
Suisse 2014). Kuppor (2013) argues that small cap markets require less efficiency, otherwise 
this market that historically has created jobs, brought about break-through technologies while 
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9.2 BDS Test 
The second objective of the study is to determine whether the times series of equity prices on 
the JSE are independently and identically distributed (iid) and the BDS test is applied to achieve 
this objective. EViews version 8 was used for the BDS test. The results for the BDS test on the 
three indices are presented in tables 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4. All BDS test statistics are presented at the 
0.01 significance level. The BDS test is a powerful statistical tool for differentiating non-linear 
stochastic systems or deterministic chaos from random independent and identically distributed 
systems.  
Table 9.6: BDS Test for FTSE/JSE Top 40 (June 1995 – December 2014) 
Dimension BDS Statistic Std. Error z-Statistic Prob 
2 0.020296 0.001263 16.06869 0.0000 
3 0.043829 0.002005 21.86348 0.0000 
4 0.061754 0.002384 25.90133 0.0000 
5 0.071797 0.002482 28.92776 0.0000 
6 0.076036 0.002391 31.80620 0.0000 
7 0.076134 0.002188 34.79629 0.0000 
8 0.073571 0.001931 38.09098 0.0000 
9 0.069521 0.001660 41.88956 0.0000 
10 0.064655 0.001397 46.29486 0.0000 
 
Table 9.7: BDS Test for FTSE/JSE All Share (June 1995 – December 2014) 
Dimension BDS Statistic Std. Error z-Statistic Prob 
2 0.020446 0.001272 16.07334 0.0000 
3 0.044719 0.002019 22.15165 0.0000 
 4 0.063110 0.002401 26.28666 0.0000 
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5 0.073500 0.002499 29.40969 0.0000 
6 0.077907 0.002407 32.36510 0.0000 
7 0.078095 0.002203 35.44835 0.0000 
8 0.075613 0.001945 38.88169 0.0000 
9 0.071584 0.001671 42.84050 0.0000 
10 0.066711 0.001406 47.44444 0.0000 
 
Table 9.8: BDS Test for FTSE/JSE Small Cap 
Dimension BDS Statistic Std. Error z-Statistic Prob 
2 0.024080 0.001291 18.64708 0.0000 
3 0.045668 0.002046 22.31723 0.0000 
4 0.061074 0.002430 25.13436 0.0000 
5 0.068026 0.002526 26.93400 0.0000 
6 0.070060 0.002429 28.84341 0.0000 
7 0.068195 0.002220 30.72152 0.0000 
8 0.064567 0.001957 33.00075 0.0000 
9 0.059558 0.001679 35.47940 0.0000 
10 0.054089 0.001411 38.34702 0.0000 
   
The series are examined up to 10 dimensions in line with Oppong, Mulholland and Fox (1999) 
and Bhattacharya and Sensarma (2006). The z—statistic is given as the BDS test divided by 
the standard error and is the final step that is used to test the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
of iid is not accepted if the z-statistic is greater than 2.58 at 0.01 level of significance.  
Given that the z-statistics tables 9.6, 9.7 and 9.8 are all greater than 2.58 for all the ten 
dimensions for the indices selected and p-values of 0.0000, the study concludes that the times 
series of returns for all the three indices do not exhibit randomness at 0.01 significance level.                
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9.3 Rescaled Range Analysis (Hurst Exponent) 
The third objective of the study is to establish the fractal characteristics of the JSE by applying 
the rescale range analysis (Hurst exponent). Hypothetically, the H suggests some trading 
strategies, for example, H greater than 0.5 signifies persistence in the time series, and an H less 
than 5 signifies reversion to the mean, and H = 0.5 signifies randomness in the time series, 
therefore the more divergent the H, the less efficient the market is.  Tables 9.9 and 9.10 present 
the outcome of the R/S analysis of the FTSE/JSE indices selected for the study.  
The FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE All Share exhibit slight reversion to the mean with 
an H of 0.461 and 04634, respectively. The correlation coefficients are -0.0526 and -0.0495 for 
the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE All Share, respectively, implying that only 5.26% of 
the movements in the time series of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 are dependent on historical data and 
4.95% for the FTSE/JSE All Share index. The FTSE/JSE Small Cap, however, displays 
significant persistence with an H of 0.6790 and a correlation coefficient of 0.2817, implying 
that 28.17% of movements in this index are dependent on historical information.  
Table 9. 9. Average R/S for Each Value of n 
N FTSE/JSE Top 40 FTSE/JSE Small Cap FTSE/JSE All Share 
4840 69.63505 190.7382 73.78643 
2420 53.53300766 138.1191622 56.1917233 
1613 52.50887127 103.6487477 53.50605385 
1210 42.71046899 82.26782126 44.12135614 
968 34.4884864 63.74142505 35.87497224 
605 28.48231733 44.88302406 29.2172694 
484 25.71719924 41.59856064 27.10216567 
242 18.36267392 28.20862672 19.21426979 
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    Table 9.10. Hypothesis Test for H 
 FTSE/JSE Top 40 FTSE/JSE Small Cap FTSE/JSE All Share 
C = exp (𝑏0) 0.179338 -0.193979 0.189598 
H = 𝑏1 0.460994 0.679026 0.463352 
CN -0.052637863 0.281693572 -0.049535852 
𝑅2 0.973949 0.987767 0.980835 
SE (C) 0.093843 0.030850 0.080617 
SE (H) 0.030779 0.030850 0.026442 
T-test (C)* 1.911052 -2.062362 2.351825 
T-test (H)* 14.97736 22.01089 17.52357 
Prob (C) 0.1046 0.0848 0.0569 
Prob (H) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*significant at 1% level 
Given that the FTSE/JSE All Share is a free-float market weighted index, the time series of its 
returns will be significantly influenced by the large caps companies and therefore the H for the 
series will be similar to that of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 as can be seen from table 9.10. 
A high H according to Peters (1991), implies less risk, clearer trend and less noise and therefore 
the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index can be construed to be less risky than the FTSE/JSE All Share 
and FTSE/JSE Top 40 contrary to the popular notion that small cap indices and stocks are 
riskier. Jefferis and Smith (2005), Van Heerden, Rodrigues, Hockly, Lambert, Taljard and Phiri  
(2013) and Phiri (2015) conclude that the JSE is weak form efficient. The efficient market 
hypothesis in its pure form does not accept only iid observations and does not necessarily entail 
independence over time, asserting that “if returns are random then the market is efficient. The 
converse may not be true, however.” (Peters, 1991:18). The study corroborates the conclusions 
of Smith (2008), that the JSE does not exhibit a random walk over the period of June 1995 to 
December 2014. 
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9.4 FTSE/JSE Top 40 More Volatile than FTSE/JSE Small Cap 
Index 
 
9.5 Variance Ratio Test 
To test for the statistical significance of the estimated Hurst Exponent for the three indices, the 
study applies the Variance Ratio Test developed by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) to the Null-
hypothesis of H = 0.5. Multiple values (k) can be tested for various sampling periods (usually 
k = 2,4,8,16,32,...), this allows us to observe the intervals at which a price series may be mean 
reverting or trending. This study chose the interval of k =2,4,8,16, 32, 64, 128. 
The study computes the basic Lo and MacKinlay variance ratio test which assumes 
heteroskedastic increases to the random walk. The estimations also provide for a non-zero 
innovation mean and bias correct the variance estimates. The study also applies the original Lo 
and MacKinlay test that is based on the innovations from the original data. 
 For the three indices, the study takes the log difference of each price series over the period of 
the study. Three tests are conducted for each index. The first round of tests is illustrated in 
Tables 9.11, 9.12 and 9.13.  The test probabilities are computed using the default Asymptotic 
normal results (Lo and MacKinlay 1988). 
The first part of Table 9.11 illustrates the overall results of the test for the FTSE/JSE All Share 
Index.  Since the study specifies more than one test period, are two sets of test results are 
presented. The “Joint Tests” presents the tests of the joint null hypothesis for all the periods, 
and the “Individual Tests” represent the variance ratio tests for individual periods. Here, the 
Chow-Denning maximum statistic of 4.401947 is associated with the period 2 individual test. 
The approximate p value of 0.0001 is obtained using the studentized maximum modulus with 
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Table 9.11: Variance Ratio Test for FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
 
Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE All Share Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)* 4.401947 4872 0.0001 
Wald (Chi-Square) 39.43581 7 0.0000 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.063065  0.014327  4.401947  0.0000 
4 
 1.088623  0.026803  3.306468  0.0009 
8 
 1.021741  0.042379  0.513016  0.6079 
16 
 1.028573  0.063062  0.453087  0.6505 
32 
 1.050171  0.091385  0.549007  0.5830 
64 
 1.031304  0.130793  0.239340  0.8108 
128 
 0.992763  0.186066 -0.038895  0.9690 
*Probability approximation using studentized maximum modulus with parameter value 7 and infinite degrees of 
freedom 
 
However, the individual tests for periods 8,16,32,64 and 128 are all greater than 0.05 and 
therefore at these periods, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This is in line with the FMH 
which argues that the more divergent the H from 0.5, the less efficient the market and vice 
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Table 9.12: Variance Ratio Test for FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index 
 
Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)* 
 3.338213  4872 
0.0059 
Wald (Chi-Square) 
 36.22743  7 
0.0000 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.047826  0.014327  3.338213  0.0008 
4 
 1.054685  0.026803  2.040268  0.0413 
8 
 0.961102  0.042379 -0.917867  0.3587 
16 
 0.937219  0.063062 -0.995539  0.3195 
32 
 0.931303  0.091385 -0.751733  0.4522 
64 
 0.919195  0.130793 -0.617814  0.5367 
128 
 0.906084  0.186066 -0.504743  0.6137 
*Probability approximation using studentized maximum modulus with parameter value 7 and infinite degrees of 
freedom 
 
The first part of Table 9.12 illustrates the overall results of the test for the FTSE/JSE Top 40 
Index.  Again, the study specifies more than one test period, and therefore two sets of test 
results are presented. The Chow-Denning maximum statistic of 3.338213 is associated with the 
period 2 individual test. The approximate p value of 0.0059 is obtained using the studentized 
maximum modulus with infinite degrees of freedom so that we reject the null of a random 
walk. 
However, the individual tests for periods 8,16,32,64 and 128 are all greater than 0.05 and 
therefore at these periods, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This is in line with the FMH 
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which argues that the more divergent the H from 0.5, the less efficient the market and vice 
versa. The FTSE/JSE Top 40 index, with an H of 0.46 can also be construed to be fairly 
efficient. 
 
Table 9.13: Variance Ratio Test for FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index 
 
Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 32)* 
 26.15458  4872 
0.0000 
Wald (Chi-Square) 
 806.0579  7 
0.0000 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.243349  0.014327  16.98570  0.0000 
4 
 1.565328  0.026803  21.09212  0.0000 
8 
 1.988815  0.042379  23.33268  0.0000 
16 
 2.645518  0.063062  26.09369  0.0000 
32 
 3.390147  0.091385  26.15458  0.0000 
64 
 3.747656  0.130793  21.00775  0.0000 
128 
 3.667735  0.186066  14.33755  0.0000 
*Probability approximation using studentized maximum modulus with parameter value 7 and infinite degrees of 
freedom 
 
The first part of Table 9.13 illustrates the overall results of the test for the FTSE/JSE Small 
Cap index.  Just as the other two indices, the study specifies more than one test period, and 
therefore two sets of test results are presented. The Chow-Denning maximum statistic of 
26.15458 is associated with the period 32 individual test. The approximate p value of 0.0000 
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is obtained using the studentized maximum modulus with infinite degrees of freedom so that 
we strongly reject the null of a random walk. 
Unlike the previous two indices tested, the null hypothesis is also strongly rejected for the 
individual tests. This is also in line with the FMH which argues that the more divergent the H 
from 0.5, the less efficient the market vice versa. The FTSE/JSE Small Cap 40 index, with an 
H of 0.68 can therefore be construed to be the least efficient among the indices selected for this 
study.  
The findings of this study are in line with Smith et al. (2002) who applied multiple variance 
ratio tests to investigate whether the JSE ALSI exhibits a random walk from January 1990 to 
August 1998, and concluded that the index indeed follows a random walk. Again, Noakes and 
Rajaratnam (2014) tested for market efficiency on the JSE using the overlapping serial test to 
investigate the efficiency of large, mid and small cap indices on the JSE over a stable period 
as well as a period that includes the global financial crisis. The study also concluded that the 
stock prices of small cap companies are characterized by high degree of non-random 
movements. Mid cap stocks also exhibit inefficiencies albeit to a much lesser extent with large 
cap stocks displaying higher levels of efficiency. 
Appendix C1 presents the variance test ratios for the selected indices by computing 
probabilities using a wild bootstrap Kim (2006) with a two-point error distribution, a 1000 
replications and a Knuth random generator. The null hypothesis of random walk is only weakly 
rejected for the FTSE/JSE All Share with a probability of 0.0480 while the null could not be 
rejected for the FTSE/JSE Top 40 with a probability of 0.1470 whereas the null hypothesis is 
strongly rejected for the FTSE/JSE Small Cap with a probability of 0.0000.  
 
Appendix C2 presents the variance test ratios for the selected indices by computing 
probabilities using a wild bootstrap Kim (2006) with a Rademacher error distribution, a 1000 
replications and a L’Ecuyer random generator. The null hypothesis of random walk is again 
only weakly rejected for the FTSE/JSE All Share with a probability of 0.0360 while the null 
could not be rejected for the FTSE/JSE Top 40 with a probability of 0.1440 and again the null 
hypothesis is strongly rejected for the FTSE/JSE Small Cap with a probability of 0.0000.  
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9.6 Factors That May Contribute to The Low Volatility Anomaly 
on the JSE 
The fifth objective of the study is to ascertain the factors that may contribute to the low 
volatility anomaly on the JSE. The following section presents four factors that may contribute 
to this anomaly. 
9.6.1 Publication Frequency is Lower for Small Caps 
The FMH argues that different investors interpret information differently and it this difference 
in the interpretation of information that creates liquidity for the proper functioning of the 
market. Information distribution is therefore asymmetric. A symmetric distribution and 
assimilation of information into asset prices would lead to investors interpreting and reacting 
to information in the same way therefore creating crashes and explained by the FMH in times 
of crises when all market participants with differing time horizons seek to exit the market 
leading to a liquidity dry-up and subsequently, a market crash. 
This section presents the distribution of information on the JSE. The study investigates how 
often stocks are reviewed or receive published reports. Again, the study used the data from 
BFA McGregor to count the number of publications for companies in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 
and the FTSE/JSE Small Cap over the previous one year from 1st January 2015 to 31st 
December 2015. We used a broad definition of publications, which according to McGregor 
BFA includes news from sources such as newspapers, online publications and journals as well 
as JSE issued news and historical company new as they relating to a company. The results are 
reported in Table 9.11. The study finds a substantial difference in the frequency of publications 
for the constituents of the two indices. On average, there were 85 updates for the stocks in the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 whereas stocks on the FTSE/JSE Small Cap received 33 of such publications 
with a ratio of 2.6 to 1. Barry and Brown (1984) find that stocks for which there is little 
information available tend to yield higher returns. Peress (2014) concludes 
that the media contributes to stock market efficiency as it improves the 
information dissemination among investors and the incorporation of such information into 
stock prices. 
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The5) re is an asymmetric distribution of information among the Top 40 companies and Small 
Cap companies. The relative lack of information is part of the reason for the persistent 
inefficiency in the FTSE/JSE Small Cap. This persistent inefficiency leads to more uncertainty 
around pricing and earnings estimates for such companies and therefore creating opportunities 
for the generation of alpha by skilled stock-pickers.  
 
Table 9.14: Number of Publications   
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Average 85 33 
Median 54 30 
Minimum 12 6 
Maximum 893 116 
Source: McGregor BFA (2016) 
 
Given that large cap stocks receive more publications than small cap stocks, large cap stocks 
are more susceptible to overreaction by market participants who herd into (out) of these stock 
whenever there is favourable (unfavourable) news. This is part of the reason for the high 
volatility of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 relative to the small cap index.  
Information remains primal for market efficiency. Given that the FTSE/JSE Top 40 receives 
relatively higher information, the assimilation of information into prices of equities on this 
index ensures efficiency evident in the weak rejection of the null hypothesis of random walk 
using the the basic Lo and MacKinlay and the non-rejection of the null for the two subsequent 
tests when the study applied a two-point error distribution, a 1000 replications and a Knuth 
random generator as well as a Rademacher error distribution, a 1000 replications and a 
L’Ecuyer random generator. 
The findings of this study corroborate the assertions of McLean and Pontiff (2016) who argue 
that mispricing may exist in financial markets and investors learn about these mispricings from 
publications. Financial markets can therefore not be construed to incorporate all relevant 
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information since factor models purely reflect risk-return trade-offs and should not be affected 
by the publications.  
9.6.2 The Number of Analysts Covering Small-Cap Equities is 
Smaller Than for Large-Cap 
Asymmetric distribution of information does not only affect investors but also analyst, as more 
analysts tend to cover the Top 40 companies than the Small Cap companies. The study 
compares the number of analysts covering stocks in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE 
Small Cap indices. As of 31st December 2015, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 includes the 43 largest 
companies with common stock listed on the JSE. In that period, the market capitalization of 
companies in the FTSE/JSE Top ranged from R 1.77 trillion to R 16.96 billion, with a median 
of R 95.96 billion and an average market capitalisation of R 215.97 billion. 
As of 31st December 2015, the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index included the smallest 61 companies 
listed on the JSE. During that period, the market capitalisation of stocks in the FTSE/JSE Small 
Cap index ranged from R 9.45 billion to R 2.14 billion with a median of R 4.84 billion and an 
average market capitalisation of R 5.01 billion. The study used data from BFA McGregor to 
count the number of analysts tracking each stock in the respective index, as shown in Table 
9.12. The median count of analysts covering FTSE/JSE Top 40 stocks was seven compared to 
two for FTSE/JSE Small Cap stocks. Some stocks in the FTSE/JSE Small Cap, had no sell-
side analyst coverage at all. In contrast, Shoprite, Woolworths Holdings, Naspers, and 
Vodacom, were the most widely covered stock in the S&P 500, followed by 11 analysts which 
is almost two times the number of analysts covering Lewis Group and Mpact Ltd the most 
widely covered in the FTSE/JSE Small Cap, covered by 6 analysts.    
Table 9.15: Analyst Coverage 
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Average 6 2 
Median 7 2 
Minimum 1 0 
Maximum 11 6 
Source: McGregor BFA (2016) 
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The differences in analyst coverage is corroborated by Bhushan (1989) who concludes that 
some company characteristics have influence on the demand and supply of analyst services and 
names firm characteristics such as the structure of ownership, size of firm, number of lines of 
business, variability of returns and the correlation between market return and firm return as 
factors that influence the demand and supply of analyst service.  
Again, given that there is a larger number of analysts that cover large cap stocks relative to 
small cap stocks, and the higher number of publications received by the top 40 index relative 
to the small cap index, any mispricing in large cap stocks are quickly arbitraged away whiles 
mispricing in small cap stocks persist. However, the relative informational efficiency of the top 
40 index also leads to higher volatility. Fischer Black, posits that financial markets become 
progressively volatile as they become more efficient. This is as a result of market participants 
reacting in the same manner anytime unanticipated new information is available, therefore, 
causing larger swings in market prices. Efficiency and volatility according to Fisher, are not 
alternatives but complements. Consequently, given the volatility of expectations of market 
participants, prices are not as volatile as they should be (Black, 1995). 
 
9.6.3 General Equity Funds Gravitate to Large Caps  
Over the period of January 2004 to December 2014 for which quarterly fund holdings was 
obtained, the study finds that components of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 make up a significant 
percentage of holding of general equity funds. This implies that greater research time is 
dedicated to just the largest 40 companies listed on the JSE. Possibly, the relatively larger 
analyst coverage and publications make it easy for fund managers to identify such stock. The 
noteworthiness of the stocks coupled with the agency problems and nature of managers’ 
compensation (Baker et al., 2011) may explain why general equity funds dedicate significantly 
large proportion of their portfolios to the stocks in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 stocks although the 
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Table 9.16: Percentage of Fund Holdings (January 2004 – December 2014) 
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Average 67.76% 3.12% 
Minimum 44.66% 0.00% 
Maximum 86.44% 12.54% 
   
The study finds that large managers gravitate towards large cap stocks and dedicate a 
disproportionally smaller percentage of their portfolios to small cap equities. Such 
disproportionate holdings may be as a result of analysts’ and professional managers’ ability to 
conveniently defend the inclusion of such stocks to clients. Also, their payment structure may 
encourage inclusion of such stocks in their portfolios as argued by Baker and Haugen (2012). 
Given that institutional managers account for a very high participation rate on the JSE, 
accounting for 40% of shareholding and the largest shareholders on the JSE being government 
employees through the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) (Ambrosi, 2014), a high 
demand for the FTSE/JSE Top 40 shares by institutional investors can therefore drive up prices 
as well as volatility whiles supressing returns. 
Arbel and Strebel (1982) and Arbel and Strebel (1983) found that companies that were 
relatively ignored or least researched by security analysts showed better performance relative 
to those intensively researched with the average annual return (dividends included), for the 
most ignored group of stocks on the S&P 500 being about 18% and 7% for the group that 
received relatively higher attention. The neglected group also showed persistent higher risk-
adjusted returns which did not disappear even after factoring beta coefficients as a measure of 
market risk. Barber and Odean (2008) argue that individual investors are net purchasers of 
attention-grabbing shares. These are shares in the news, shares with high abnormal volume of 
trade and shares with one-day returns that are extreme. Share purchases that are attention-
driven are due to the difficulty investors face when searching the thousands of shares that they 
can potentially purchase. On the JSE, it appears that professional fund managers also make 
attention driven purchases as they disproportionately hold shares in the FTSE/JSE Top 40, 
which also happens to be the index that receives greater attention. 
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Given the influence of asset managers on the JSE, they may be construed to be Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) as herding among these managers may trigger a general 
sell-off, similar to the one experienced in 2008 with mortgage securities.  
Furthermore, as at 31 March 2016, there were seven ETFs and 6 index funds that tracked the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 whereas no ETFs or index funds are dedicated to the FTSE/JSE Small Cap 
index. Total AUM for these funds increased from R 4.70 billion in 2008 to R 11.00 billion by 
31 March 2016 (ETF SA, 2016). The growth of ETFs dedicated to the FTSE/JSE Top 40 
increases demand pressure on the index relative to the FTSE/JSE Small Cap therefore driving 
up its price and volatility whiles repressing returns. As concluded by Bolla et al. (2016), ETFs 
are a still in their development stages in South Africa and therefore the large cap companies 
will be the most affected by risk commonalities. 
 
Figure 9.6 JSE Top 40 ETFs AUM January 2008 – March 2016 (R Million) 
 
Source: (ETF SA, 2016) 
 
The asset management industry is poised to becoming more concentrated, as a result of the 
persistent growth of passive funds in South Africa. Regulators in future may face the complex 
task of forecasting and preparing for future crises, which might not be similar to previous crises 
and may have to regulate certain segments of the industry which previously had not been a 
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9.6.4 Small Cap Index Exhibit Less Liquidity Than Large Cap 
Index 
Classical finance theories assume that there are no frictions in financial markets and therefore 
perfectly liquid, dismissing the question of market liquidity as a friction or adding transaction 
cost to the fundamental value to account for market liquidity. Market liquidity is typically 
included as transaction cost. The FMH however emphasizes the impact of liquidity and 
investment horizons on asset prices. 
Comparing the normalised volume of trade and bid-ask spread as a percentage of closing price, 
the FTSE/Small Cap index is less liquid compared to the FTSE/JSE Top 40, the theoretical 
insight offered by the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) on this phenomenon is that in 
equilibrium, securities with less liquidity are allocated to investors with longer investment 
horizons this is what they describe as the clientele effect. The longer horizons palliate the extra 
costs in bid-ask spreads on less liquid securities. Possibly, the high cost of transaction 
associated with the small cap index deters speculators from participating in this market giving 
way for long term investors. 
Figure 9.7: Volume of Trade from June 2002 – December 2014 (Absolute Values)  
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Furthermore, the standard deviation of the normalised volume of trade of 3.62% for the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 is almost twice as large as that of the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index. This 
implies that investors of small cap stocks are twice as likely to hold onto their stocks as those 
of the top 40 companies corroborating the assertions of Amihud and Mandelson (1986) that 
less liquid investments attract long-term investors.  
The study normalizes the volume of trade for both indices by dividing the total volume of trade 
for each index for the year ended 31 December 2002 to 31 December 2014 by the total free 
float stocks in the index in line with Ranguelova et al. (2015). The longer investment horizons 
also explain why the FTSE/JSE Small Cap is less volatile as there is minimal reaction to short-
term price changes. Long-term investors may hold onto small cap stocks with the hope that 
such companies over time, will grow into large cap stocks and are therefore less prone to 
reacting to short-term price changes. The concentration of a greater percentage of portfolio 
holding by fund managers to top 40 companies as well as the dedication of ETFs to top 40 
companies provide a relatively higher liquidity for the top 40 index. 
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Table 9.17: Normalised Volume of Trade 
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Average 16.69% 11.39% 
Median 15.80% 11.91% 
Minimum 13.12% 6.87% 
Maximum 25.93% 13.78% 
Standard Deviation 3.62% 1.82% 
 
Strebel (1977) posits that at best, the EMH is applicable to half of the stocks traded on the JSE. 
These are stocks with a trading volume of at least 250 000 and the other half have very low 
volumes making their market risk volume-dependent, and thereby invalidating, the ex-post 
CAPM as a framework of market equilibrium which in turn makes the general test of market 
efficiency useless. 
 
Table 9.18: Bid-Ask Spread as a Percentage of Closing Price 
 Top 40 Small-Cap 
Average 0.18% 1.74% 
Median 0.13% 0.85% 
Minimum 0.01% 0.01% 
Maximum 0.60% 15.80% 
 
The FMH postulates that asset prices are a reflection of technical trading of short-term nature 
and long-term fundamental valuation. Short-term price changes therefore are likely to exhibit 
more volatility or noise than long-term-trades. Furthermore, short-term trends are likely as a 
result of herd behaviour because short-term trends have no relationship with long-term 
economic trends (Peters, 1994). 
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The expected returns of an asset can be affected in many ways by market liquidity, or lack of 
liquidity. There is a transaction cost to each trade if markets are not fully liquid, therefore, the 
required return on the transaction must increase in a way to compensate traders for this friction. 
Illiquid investments should therefore provide higher expected returns (Adler, 2012). Ibbotson, 
Diermeier, and Siegel (1984), Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud, Mendelson, and 
Pedersen (2012) argued that the “marketability” (this includes liquidity) of an asset affects its 
expected return and the bid–ask spread as a proxy for liquidity to conclude theoretically that 
(1) such transaction costs must be priced and (2) investors who have long time horizons should 
hold illiquid assets in order to benefit from the assets’ higher expected returns.  
The FTSE/JSE Top 40, with an H of 0.46 signifies a more efficient market according to the 
FMH and signifies randomness in the time series whereas the FTSE/JSE Small Cap with an H 
of 0.68 represents a less efficient the market. The availability of information and information 
efficiency coupled with high liquidity and low bid-ask spreads (another characteristic of an 
efficient market) however come with attendant problems. Market participants tend to overreact 
to information and therefore a highly liquid financial market with increasing availability of 
information tends to experience high volatility and underperformance as market participants 
drive prices up beyond what the fundamentals may dictate and in the process supressing 
returns. As Chang (2012) argues, a highly efficient market can also be problematic. Innovations 
do not simply make financial markets highly efficient but also efficient in generating short-
term profits to the detriment of long-term growth. As experienced in the 2008 global financial 
crisis, new financial innovations caused financial systems as well as the overall economy to be 
more unstable. Furthermore, high liquidity of assets, lead market participants to respond too 
quickly to change, making it tough for ‘real-sector’ companies to hold on to the ‘patient capital’ 
required for long-term development. It is in line with this argument that economist James 
Tobin, the 1981 Noble laureate proposes a need to “throw some sand in the wheels of our 
excessively efficient international money markets” (Tobin, 1978: 4).  
 
9.6.5 Can Portfolio Managers Exploit This Anomaly? 
A major argument against the exploitability of the low volatility anomaly on the JSE is that 
asset managers hold huge amounts of money whereas small cap companies have very small 
market capitalisation making it impractical to exploit this anomaly. Secondly, the low liquidity 
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of the small cap index coupled with high bid-ask spread makes it relatively costly to exploit 
this anomaly. This argument was raised at the 2017 Southern African Finance Association 
Conference (Ward, 2017). However, at as 31st December 2015, the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index 
had a total of 64 listed companies with a gross market capitalization of R 320 billion, an average 
free float of 65% and a net market capitalization of R 215 billion. Over this same period, the 
total AuM of domestic general equity funds was R 301 billion (ASISA, 2016) whereas the 
number of domestic general equity funds was 272 excluding fund of funds with 94 funds having 
an average AuM of over R 1 billion and 48 funds with average AuM of over R 3 billion. The 
size of the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index is therefore significantly large and therefore 
economically viable to be considered for the exploitation of this anomaly. With regards to 
liquidity, Ibbotson, Diermeier, and Siegel (1984), Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud, 
Mendelson, and Pedersen (2012) suggest that investors who have long time horizons should 
hold illiquid assets in order to benefit from the assets’ higher expected returns. Given the 
relatively high risk-adjusted returns of the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index, domestic general equity 
fund managers may benefit in the long term from increasing their portfolio holdings in small 
cap companies. 
 
9.7 The FMH and the Low Volatility Anomaly 
This study has established that the low volatility exists on the JSE, the time series of the selected 
JSE indices are not iid, and, the FTSE/JSE Small Cap exhibits significant persistence (H= 0.68) 
and non-randomness (applying the VRT), whereas the FTSE/JSE Top 40 can be construed to 
be relatively efficient with its H = 0.46 and the the null hypothesis of random walk cannot be 
rejected using the VRT. In this section, the study proceeds to explain the low volatility anomaly 
on the JSE using the fundamentals of the FMH. 
Peters (1994) following up on his earlier criticism of the EMH, proposed the FMH. The main 
statistical tool for the FMH is the re-scaled range analysis where the Hurst exponent is used to 
determine the fractal nature of a given time series.  Whereas the EMH offers no explanation 
for the low volatility anomaly on the JSE, the FMH appears to provide reasons for this anomaly. 
Small cap stocks are construed to be riskier and therefore should provide higher returns to 
compensate for the higher risk. Investors are assumed to be rational and therefore will not hold 
assets with higher risks but relatively lower returns.  The FMH on the other hand posits that 
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assets with higher Hurst exponents are less risky and less efficient than assets with lower Hurst 
exponents. On the JSE, this is evident in the fact that the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index with the 
higher Hurst exponent is less risky and less efficient relative to the FTSE/JSE Top 40. 
The FMH is built on three main fundamentals namely the impact of information, time horizon 
and liquidity. Information is interpreted differently by investors with different time horizons 
according to the FMH whereas the EMH assumes information is interpreted the same way by 
rational investors. The availability bias corroborates the assertion of the FMH that different 
investors interpret the same information differently. The relatively minimal availability of 
information on the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index companies means investors are less familiar 
with such companies and trade less in their stocks therefore these stocks are relatively illiquid 
and also relatively less volatile. The low demand for these stocks also ensures that their prices 
remain below what traditional asset pricing models may suggest and therefore tend to produce 
relatively higher risk-adjusted returns.  
In line with the affect heuristic, given the familiarity of companies in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 as 
a result of larger analyst coverage and publications, investors perceive these companies as low 
risk whereas the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index as a result of the minimal analyst coverage and 
publications are misconstrued to be high risk. Furthermore, given the traditionally accepted 
assertion of risk-reward trade-off backed by models and theories propounded by highly 
influential finance academics, there is a general perception of risk-reward trade-off in the world 
of investment and finance. The 2013 Economics Nobel Prize winner and father of modern 
finance – Eugene Fama – and other laureates such as Harry Markowitz, Robert Merton, and 
Myron Scholes are stalwarts in the development of modern finance, the works of these scholars 
are taught in both undergraduate and graduate finance curriculums in South Africa although 
their works were conducted on markets mainly in the United States and to some extent, Western 
Europe. Financial analysts as well as professional investors may therefore evaluate stocks in 
terms of global attitudes toward such stocks and universal finance models while neglecting 
their actual risk/return relationships in the local financial market. This phenomenon provides 
some insight into the low volatility anomaly reported on the JSE.  Furthermore, the availability 
and interpretation of information is affected by investors’ biases and therefore asymmetric.  
Liquidity, another fundamental of the FMH also may also provide another reason for the low 
volatility anomaly on the JSE. Given the different levels of information availability between 
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the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index, investors may trade more FTSE/JSE 
Top 40 stocks than the FTSE/JSE Small Cap stocks. Frequent trading provides liquidity on the 
FTSE/JSE index relative to the Small Cap index therefore making it relatively more efficient. 
Finally, the third fundamental of time horizon is influenced by the first two fundamentals. As 
investors react to new information, they keep trading frequently to such new information. 
Given that the top 40 companies receive more coverage and publications, there is a higher 
availability of information which attract more traders frequent trading and consequently more 
short term traders than the small cap companies which receive relatively less coverage and 
publications. 
Risk is a fundamental factor in every investment strategy therefore a suitable evaluation of risk 
that is based on empirical evidence instead of theoretical postulations will offer practitioners a 
more comprehensive knowledge of risk in the markets in which they operate. Furthermore, 
with fractal statistics, it becomes possible to expand risk management models and offer 
alternative analysis of financial markets that differs from the neoclassical assumptions of 
rationality, equilibrium, the mathematical hypotheses of continuity and symmetry and efficient 
markets. Fractal science and Chaos Theory provides a description of the fractal characteristics 
and messiness of financial markets and again, offer sufficient prospects and the statistical tools 
necessary to analyse it. These tools will be of benefit to finance theories as they provide more 
realistic models and assumptions of the behaviour of financial markets.  
 
9.8 Summary 
The EMH fails to explain the low volatility anomaly on the JSE. However, the FMH offers an 
explanation for this low volatility anomaly. All selected indices for this study exhibit fat tails 
in line with the FMH whereas the EMH postulates that financial markets exhibit normal 
distribution. Further, the more efficient FTSE/JSE Top 40 index with an H of 0.46 exhibits 
more volatility, more liquidity and less returns relative to the FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index. 
Again, whiles the EMH offers no explanation for this phenomenon, the FMH provides 
explanation for this phenomenon. Emphasizing liquidity, and different investment 
horizons/holding periods, the less liquid small cap index attracts longer term investors and 
therefore are not as susceptible to short-term price variations thus exhibiting less volatility than 
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the large cap index. The relatively high availability of information on large cap companies 
compared to small cap companies and the inclination of institutional managers to dedicating a 
greater percentage of their portfolios to top 40 companies creates a huge demand for these 
stocks therefore driving up prices while supressing returns. 
 
The FTSE/JSE Top 40 is relatively highly researched and information readily available on the 
companies that make up the index. As equity asset managers gravitate towards large cap 
companies, a Darwin’s wedge is created whereby rational decision by individual managers to 
overweight top 40 shares aggregate badly, pushing up the price and volatility of the index 
relative to the FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index which receives less news and analyst coverage and 
therefore exploitable inefficiencies persisting among components of this index. According to 
Ranguelova et al., (2015), small-cap equities provide more attractive opportunities for alpha 
by investing in “under the radar” equities that talented stock pickers discover therefore 
investors who focus on small and mid-cap equities benefit from the “structural alpha” that 
exists in this segment by taking advantage of lingering inefficiencies like the quality of 
information. For example, fewer analysts’ coverage and less frequent publication of research 
reports on small cap stocks, as well as the limited volume and, from a playing field that is less 
crowded relative to that of large cap equities. 
Again, the concentration of equity ETFs on the FTSE/JSE Top 40 creates additional demand 
for components of the index disregarding individual company fundamentals. The proliferation 
of index funds is as a result of active managers persistently underperforming the market. 
However, as investors rationally switch to funds that track the index, the aggregate is an 
increase in demand for all the companies in the index increasing the price and volatility. 
 
The EMH does not offer any explanation for the phenomenon of low risk assets offering higher 
risk adjusted returns than high risk asset. This phenomenon is therefore referred to as the low 
volatility anomaly. Applying the principles of FMH however, this phenomenon is not as 
anomalous as reported but rather a consequence of the availability or otherwise of information. 
The FMH encompasses rather than debunk the EMH to some extent in that, investors can only 
trade on availability of information therefore less known assets receive less coverage and 
therefore little information on which investors trade. Classical economics, which provided the 
bedrock for classical finance even lay emphasis on the asymmetries between different social 
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classes in terms of the differences in political power, economic property and access to 
knowledge and information (Kurz, 2016). Availability of information therefore differs among 
investor classes and companies. Investors who hold assets for which information is not readily 
available happen to trade less as there is seldom new information on which to trade or adjust 
expectations and discount rates - the reason for excess volatility in financial markets as Fama 
(2016) argues) - and therefore tend to be long term investors.  
 
Coupled with the lack of information is the relative illiquidity which repels a class of investors 
with a given horizon – short-term – as these investors will require a quick exit at minimal cost. 
Lack of information and illiquidity therefore leads to the domination of illiquid small stocks 
by long-term investors who are in the long-run compensated for their patience. Under the 
assumption of investor rationality, investors will hold less liquid stocks only if they are 
compensated for taking on such illiquidity risk – illiquidity premium. Readily available 
information on the other hand attracts lots of investors with different time horizons who take 
opposite sides of each trade thereby providing high liquidity on which efficient markets 
function. The readily available information in an efficient market however leads to rational 
investors constantly adjusting their expectations and discount rates therefore creating high 
volatility with the potential of suppressing returns as forecasting expected returns is not an 
exact science and fraught with miscalculations to which investors constantly recalibrate. The 
high volatility and subsequent underperformance can therefore be attributed to the cost of 
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Figure 9.9: A Summary of FMH 
 
 Source: Author 
Another major difference between the FMH and the EMH is on the concept of bubbles and 
crashes. Whereas such crashes are not explained by the EMH, the FMH posit that in times of 
panic, there is a disproportionate shift to short term horizon leaving insufficient investors to 
take the opposite side of a trade therefore drying up liquidity which further exacerbates the 
panic forcing fire sale of assets and consequently a crash. In periods of novel developments or 
discoveries, the excitement and availability of information generates into irrational exuberance 
where investors over-estimate expected returns which kick starts rapid appreciation of asset 
price and attracts more investor seeking to make a quick profit thereby feeding into the rapid 
price acceleration. New investors disregard the sustainability of such rapid price acceleration, 
and only buy with the intention to sell at an even higher price. As the rapid acceleration ceases, 
followed by a decline in prices, panic ensues and a rush to dispose of such assets is stifled by 
the lack of buyers creating illiquidity which further drives down prices leading to a bust. 
 
Theoretical physicist and 1965 Physics Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman is reported to have 
said that “It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are. If 
it doesn't agree with experiment, it's wrong.” (Zichichi, 2016). The assertion that risk is 
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compensated by returns may sound intuitive and logical in markets where participants are 
assumed to be rational, however, empirical evidence reports otherwise. Whereas the EMH does 
not explain the low volatility anomaly, the FMH provides an explanation for this phenomenon. 
Paul Wooley, a senior fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science opines 
that it is long overdue for professional investors to ditch the EMH as the basis of most strategies 
of asset management, arguing that the EMH does not address the “three perversities of 
investing” namely, short-termism, momentum, and risk-return inversion (Larrabee, 2013).  
Furthermore, on 15 July 2015, the Financial Stability Board, which is made up of financial 
regulators from major countries/regions, agreed to except the asset management industry from 
systemic risk regulation a focus rather on market liquidity (Walter, 2015). Evidence from the 
JSE proves that information, liquidity and time horizon are the major factors that drive financial 
market efficiency and changes in these variables are the cause of inefficiencies and crashes. 
In an interview with the CFO Magazine, William Sharpe points out that, “If there is a reward 
for bearing risk, it almost has to be that. Otherwise, the world makes no sense at all…Will a 
new theory come along eventually and blow out the lights? Undoubtedly there will be one. I 
haven’t the foggiest idea about what it will be or what area it will be in. If I did, I would be 
working on it.” (Sharpe, 2000). 
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This chapter discusses the study, its contributions to literature, recommendations and finally a 
conclusion. 
 
10.1 Main Outline of the Study 
The recent Global Financial Crisis has rekindled debate on market efficiency and the validity 
of the underlying assumptions of classical finance particularly investor rationality and the 
market efficiency. Peters (1991) proposed the FMH as an alternative to the EMH. The fractal 
markets hypothesis (FMH), is centred on empirically observed features of the financial markets 
and posits that financial markets consist of heterogeneous investors who react to information 
according to their investment horizon. What may be considered a negative information and a 
sell signal for investors with short-term horizon might be a buy signal for investors with long-
term horizon and vice versa. The existence of adequate number of buyers and sellers ensure 
that markets are efficiently cleared ensuring a smooth functioning of the market. The FMH 
therefore argues that adequate liquidity ensures market efficiency. A uniform representation of 
investors with differing horizons means the supply and demand are met, markets work 
efficiently and remain stable. On the other hand, when an investment horizon becomes 
dominant, buy and sell orders are not cleared efficiently which can lead to the occurrence of 
extreme events. FMH proposes that critical events are connected to one investment horizon 
becoming dominant. 
 
The phenomenon of less risky stocks outperforming riskier stocks have also attracted numerous 
studies recently after it was discovered by Jensen, Black and Scholes (1972) and Haugen and 
Heins (1972). This is contrary to what is expected according to traditional finance theories. 
This study applies the FMH to offer an explanation to the low volatility anomaly. The study 
first investigates and confirms the existence of chaos on the JSE applying the BDS test and 
also the re-scaled range analysis. Further, the study investigates the flow of information among 
the selected indices as well as the liquidity of the indices. The study finds that the efficiency of 
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the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index consequently leads to relatively higher volatility whereas the less 
efficient FTSE/JSE Small Cap is less volatile since information is relatively not readily 
available for companies on the index with regard to news coverage, publications and analyst 
coverage. The study concludes that, the JSE does not exhibit random walk. The study further 
finds that information distribution on the JSE is not symmetric as the FTSE/JSE Top 40 
companies receive more publications and coverage than FTSE/JSE Small Cap companies. 
Equity managers also commit a greater percentage of their portfolios to the Top 40 companies 
and the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index is riskier and offers less returns relative to the FTSE/JSE Small 
Cap index therefore confirming the low volatility anomaly on the JSE. 
 
10.2 Summary of Literature Reviewed 
The study reviewed theoretical and empirical and literature from extant studies on classical 
finance in chapter 3, behavioural finance in chapter 3, Chaos Theory and the Fractal Market 
Hypothesis (FMH) in chapter 4 and the asset management industry in chapter 5. A framework 
for the theories of traditional finance, behavioural finance and the FMH was established to 
provide the background to this study.  
 
10.2.1 Classical Finance 
This chapter begins with a discussion of literature on the historical background of classical 
finance theories and explores the fundamental theories of classical finance that have been 
advanced over the years and how such theories have become very influential both in academia 
in the finance industry. Among other classical finance theories, the chapter discusses the 
efficient market hypothesis, the modern portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model, mean 
variance theory multifactor pricing models and the arbitrage pricing theory. The chapter further 
points to empirical evidence accumulated over time that points out the inadequacy of the 
existing classical finance theories to explain major financial crises that have dogged financial 
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10.2.2 Chaos Theory and Fractal Market Hypothesis 
Chapter 3 presents an alternative theory on the behaviour of financial markets which provides a 
different hypothesis on the behaviour of financial markets. Velasquéz (2009) argues Chaos 
Theory and Fractal Science better explain financial phenomenon and the “messiness” of 
financial markets. The FMH developed by Peters (1991) is based on Chaos Theory and offers a 
robust theoretical contribution that provides an explanation of the turbulence, discontinuity, and 
non-periodicity that characterize capital markets. The FMH describes a financial market as a 
place where investors meet to find buyers or sellers of securities. To permit investors with 
different time horizons to efficiently trade, it is essential to ensure sufficient liquidity in the 
market. A liquid market guarantees that there will be no crash or panic if demand and supply 
are imbalanced. The major function of financial markets is to provide stability, in the form of a 
liquid environment, to facilitate trading activities. This stability comes in the form of investors 
with differing time horizons, differing information sets, and different concepts of fair price. A 
shift in time horizons leading to one dominant horizon leads to market instability and crashes. 
 
10.2.3 Financial Crises 
Chapter 4 discusses the causes of financial crises and details a selected history of financial crises 
from the Tulip mania to the recent Global Financial Crisis. 
 
10.2.4 Behavioural Finance 
Chapter 5 discusses behavioural finance and its development over the years and the alternative 
theories it offers in explaining financial market behaviour. Behavioural finance can be simply 
defined as applying principles of psychology to finance and is based on the assumption of 
‘normal people’ instead of ‘rational people’ in classical finance and promulgates behavioural 
portfolio theory and behavioural asset pricing instead of mean-variance portfolio theory and 
CAPM and other classical finance models which suggest that expected returns are only 
determined by risk (Statman, 2014). The chapter also discusses the works of behaviourists as 
Gerd Gigerenzer who argue certain behavioural biases or heuristics are not necessarily 
detrimental to rational decision making as proposed by many behaviourists. 
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10.2.5 The Asset Management Industry 
With an increasing call for certain segments of the asset management industry to be classified 
as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), a move to protect the global financial 
systems by averting the failure of such SIFIs, or, in the event of a failure, curbing the 
subsequent adverse effects, the industry has become the centre of attention for regulators both 
nationally and internationally. Chapter 5 presents a general overview of the asset management 
industry, the development of the industry over the years, recent trends as well as expected 
future trends of the industry. 
10.3 The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
Chapter 7 gives an overview of the JSE from its history to the various innovations that has 
taken place at the stock exchange since its establishment. The chapter further discusses the 
spillover effects of international markets on the JSE. 
10.4 Data and Research Methodology 
Chapter 8 discusses the data selected for the study and the methodologies adopted. The study 
obtains data from the JSE Ltd, McGregor BFA and Profile Data. The study applies the Sharpe 
ratio to test for the low volatility anomaly on the JSE. The study then applies the BDS test as 
well as the re-scaled range analysis to investigate chaos on the JSE. The study proceeds to 
investigate the availability of information for companies in the selected indices, the liquidity 
as well as the extent to which fund managers dedicate portions of their portfolios to the selected 
indices.  
 
10.5 Summary of Findings and Interpretation 
The first objective of the study is to investigate the existence of the low volatility anomaly on 
the JSE and selects three indices, the FTSE/JSE All Share, FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE 
Small Cap. The low volatility anomaly was discovered from both an academic and an applied 
investment source (Marmer, 2015). From the academic source, the anomaly was discovered 
through the empirical testing of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by academics who 
found that “high-beta securities had significantly negative intercepts and low-beta securities 
had significantly positive intercepts, contrary to the predictions of the traditional form of the 
model.” (Jensen, Black and Scholes, 1972: 44). From the applied investment perspective, 
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Haugen and Heins (1972) reported that monthly returns of stocks with lower variances over 
the long run, outperform stock portfolios with higher variance. Baker et al. (2011) grouped the 
top 1000 stocks by market capitalization tracked by the CRSP using trailing volatility and beta 
into five quintiles and reported that stocks with the lowest volatility also had the highest returns 
and concluded that over the long-term, low-risk portfolios outperforming high-risk portfolios. 
Blitz and Van Vliet (2007), Baker and Haugen (2012) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) 
significantly contributed to the literature on the low volatility effect and documented similar 
results in global equity markets, as well as distinguishing and disentangling a volatility effect 
different from the classic value, size and momentum effects, and offering possible explanations 
for this effect. The first evidence of the low volatility anomaly on the JSE was reported by 
Rensburq and Robertson (2003), who found that there is a negative correlation between a 
stock’s beta and its return. Strugnell et al. (2011) also confirmed the existence of the low 
volatility anomaly on the JSE applying a more refined estimate of beta.  Khuzwayo (2011) also 
reported that low beta portfolios outperformed both high beta portfolios and the ALSI during 
periods of overall market underperformance in the market 
Applying the risk-adjusted measure of Sharpe ratio, the study confirms that the FTSE/JSE 
Small Cap index outperforms the FTSE/JSE Top 40 on a risk-adjusted basis thereby confirming 
the low volatility anomaly on the JSE.  This has significant implications for asset managers in 
South Africa as the make portfolio selection decisions. The traditional approach to portfolio 
selection based on classical finance models may not be applicable in the South African context 
and may therefore have to include other nontraditional approaches such as the FMH in their 
portfolio selection processes.  
The study applies the BDS test on the selected indices to investigate the existence of chaos in 
the selected indices this is also to determine whether the times series of the selected indices are 
independently and identically distributed (iid). This was the second objective of this study. 
Evidence of long-run persistence in the share returns will mean that future returns are 
influenced by past returns at least in the long term (Bendel, Smith & Hamman, 1996) which 
will then mean there will be a need for further investigations into the behaviour of stock price 
time series in modern economies. According to Peters (1996,6), financial markets exhibit non-
linear dynamic systems characterised by positive feedback and fractals, and therefore “what 
happened yesterday influences what happens today”.  This study applied the BDS test, a 
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portmanteau test for time-based dependence in a time series for independence as explained by 
Brock, Dechert, Scheinkman and LeBaron (1996) which can also be used to test for a variety 
of deviations from independence be it chaos, non-linear dependence or linear dependence. The 
BDS test can also be applied on a series of estimated residuals to investigate whether such 
residuals are independent and identically distributed (iid).  
In this study, the selected series are examined up to 10 dimensions in line with Oppong, 
Mulholland and Fox (1999) and Bhattacharya and Sensarma (2006). The z—statistic is given 
as the BDS test divided by the standard error and is the final step that is used to test the null 
hypothesis. The z-statistics were all greater than 2.58 for all the ten dimensions for the indices 
selected and p-values of 0.0000, the study therefore concluded that the times series of returns 
for all the three indices do not exhibit randomness at 0.01 significance level. 
The third objective of this study was to establish the fractal nature of the selected indices on 
the JSE. The study applied the rescaled range analysis. In proposing the FMH, Peters (1994) 
used a modified rescaled range (R/S) analysis, pioneered by Hurst (1951). Peters (1994) and 
Howe, Martin and Wood (1997) reviewed the steps for computing the R/S analysis. First, the 
index series of the JSE is converted into logarithmic returns, St, at time period t of the JSE 
index series. The study concluded that with an H of of 0.461 and 0.463, respectively and 
correlation coefficients of -0.0526 and -0.0495 for the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and the FTSE/JSE 
All Share are more efficient than the FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index which has an H of 0.679 and 
a correlation coefficient of 0.2817. The correlation coefficients of - 0.0526, - 0.0495, and 
0.2817 imply that 5.26%, 4.95% and 28.17% of the movements in the time series of the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40, FTSE/JSE All Share and the FTSE/JSE Small Cap respectively are 
dependent on historical data. Since risk is a major factor to consider in any investment strategy, 
a proper evaluation of risk based on empirical evidence as opposed to theoretical postulations 
will offer investment practitioners a comprehensive understanding of risk in the particular 
markets in which they operate. Again, with fractal statistics, it becomes possible to further 
enhance financial risk models and offer alternative arguments of financial markets different 
from the classical assumptions of perfect markets, equilibrium, rationality and the 
mathematical hypotheses of symmetry. Fractal science and Chaos Theory provide a more 
accurate narrative of the messiness and the fractal characteristic of capital markets and 
sufficient perspective together with the mathematical tools necessary to analyse it. These tools 
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will be of benefit to finance practitioners as they offer more appropriate and realistic 
assumptions and models of the behaviour of financial markets.  
The fourth objective of the study is to ascertain the factors that contribute to the low volatility 
anomaly on the JSE. Several explanations have been given to the low risk anomaly. Among 
the explanations give are agency problems, the types of manager compensation and 
overconfidence bias (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 1977; Alpert and Raiffa 1982, Baker 
and Haugen, 2012). This study concludes that the frequency of publication, the number of 
analysts’ coverage, managers’ propensity to hold Top 40 stocks and liquidity may be some of 
the factors that contribute to the low volatility anomaly on the JSE. The more coverage and 
exposure given to the Top 40 companies attracts more investors and consequently more trade 
volume and volatility relative to the companies in the Small Cap index. Large companies are 
also, according to traditional asset pricing models, assumed to be less risky. 
The findings of this study is corroborated by Shefrin (2016) who posits that on average, 
investment professionals construe expected return and risk to be negatively correlated, contrary 
to what is described in textbook finance. Shefrin (2016) argues that the affect heuristic and 
representativeness are responsible for this phenomenon. The findings of this study are in line 
with Solt and Statman (1989) who reported that investors who assume the shares of good 
companies to be representative of good investments depend on the representativeness bias that 
a good stock is a stock of a good company. In line with classical finance assumptions, investors’ 
perception that small-cap equities are riskier than large-cap equities on average causes the 
realized returns of small-cap equities to be greater than that of large-cap equities (Shefrin, 
2016). Again, perceptions about the risk-size interaction deepen after periods of negative 
sentiment which lead to larger size effects during such periods (Shefrin, 2016). 
The study concludes that the FMH provides an explanation for the low volatility anomaly on 
the JSE (fifth objective). In line with the FMH, lack of information and the illiquidity of the 
FTSE/JSE Small Cap attracts long-term investors who become the dominant class of investors 
on the index and are compensated for taking on the risk of illiquidity in the form of illiquidity 
premium and low volatility. The highly liquid FTSE/JSE Top 40 coupled with the relatively 
high availability of information on the other hand attracts different classes of investors with 
differing horizons who take opposite sides of each trade as different classes of investors 
interpret the same set of information differently. The high liquidity and information leads to 
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high volatility as investors continually adjust their holding in line with the emergence of new 
information. The high volatility and subsequent underperformance of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 
therefore is a cost of efficiency and liquidity (liquidity discount). 
 
10.6 Contribution 
The low volatility anomaly is one of the major anomalies that put the fundamental assumption 
in classical finance of market efficiency into question. After the Global Financial Crises, 
renewed critiques of these assumptions have sprung back into the spotlight with increasing 
number of studies prying into the flaws of these fundamental assumptions. From the 
behaviourist quarters, the argument against these fundamental classical finance assumptions is 
that market participants are fraught with several behavioural biases that inhibit optimal decision 
making and therefore cannot be construed to make rational choices all the time with the aim of 
maximizing satisfaction.  Several centuries of the history of financial crises point to repeated 
patterns of irrational exuberance in times of booms that create bubbles and subsequent bursts 
with   devastating consequences reaffirming the behavioral biases of markets participants that 
lead to sub-optimal decision making. 
 
Proponents of the FMH, offering an alternative to the EMH argue that financial markets exhibit 
fractal nature that is why financial crises keep recurring at frequencies beyond what theories 
of traditional/classical finance proposes. Benoit Mandelbrot, argues that the “very heart of 
finance fractal”. Applying the principles of chaos theory, Edgar Peters argues that the FMH 
offers a better alternative to the EMH. Central to the FMH are investor heterogeneity, whereby 
different investors with differing investment horizons take opposite sides of a trade to ensure 
the smooth functioning of financial markets; again, the path of the market is determined by 
past events therefore exhibiting deterministic order which makes short-term predictions 
possible and also argue that distribution of returns of financial assets are not normally 
distributed but exhibit fat tails. 
 
Studies on the FMH generally concentrate on market crashes. This study applies the FMH to 
offer an explanation to a phenomenon other than a market crash - the low volatility anomaly - 
on the JSE. Among the explanations given for the low volatility anomaly are the behavioural 
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bias of overconfidence, agency problems and the type of manager compensation. This study 
contributes to the literature on the low volatility anomaly and the FMH literature by offering a 
synthesis of the FMH and the low volatility anomaly. There is no known synthesis of this 
anomaly and the FMH either in South Africa or internationally. 
 
In this novel study, the findings point to the conclusion that the bedrock of the FMH – 
information, liquidity and time horizon -  plays a major role in creating the low volatility 
anomaly on the JSE. The relative informational efficiency of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index to 
the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index means information is readily available and immediately 
assimilated into prices of stocks that make up the top 40 index. The quick assimilation of such 
information creates excess volatility on this index as market participants are continually 
reacting to information as they become available. As argued by Fischer Black, market 
participants react in the same way to new information (Black, 1995), therefore creating 
excessive swings in the time series of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index. Volatility therefore is a 
concomitant of efficiency on the FTSE/JSE Top 40 and therefore a cost of efficiency (liquidity 
discount). The less efficient FTSE/JSE Small Cap index on the other hand has less analyst 
coverage and publications and therefore relatively little information available for market 
participants to react to and therefore exhibit less volatility. The lack of information and 
illiquidity dissuades short-term investors therefore this index is dominated by one class of 
investors with a given horizon (long-term).  
 
These investors are compensated for holding such illiquidity risk with an illiquidity premium 
in the form of low volatility and relatively higher returns. The availability of information also 
attracts institutional investors who tend to dedicate a significant proportion of their portfolios 
to the top 40 companies. Herding on the JSE as reported by Sarpong and Sibanda (2014) and 
the growth of ETFs concentrated on the FTSE/JSE Top 40 attract relatively and significantly 
larger volumes of trade, and liquidity albeit at a cost of relatively higher volatility. In line with 
Tobin (1978), this study infers that the illiquidity of the FTSE/JSE Small Cap index serves as 
the “sand” in the wheels of an otherwise excessively efficient financial market that attracts, in 
the words of Chang (2012) “patient capital” of long-term investors (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986) that weathers short-term volatility and turn out to provide superior risk adjusted returns. 
High liquidity on the other hand attracts “impatient capital” which constantly reacts to new 
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information and consequently adjusting discount rates as expectations are adjusted in line with 
new information. 
10.7 Limitations of the Study 
The analysis of portfolio holdings of South African equity funds covered a relatively shorter 
period of December 2008 to December 2012. This period can be described as a period of 
turbulence as a result of the Global Financial Crisis and this may have a possible influence the 
portfolio holding of these funds.  
 
10.8 Recommendations for Further Studies 
Further studies could focus on investigating the low volatility anomaly among the stocks on 
the JSE and further measure the exact value of the illiquidity premium to determine whether 
the low volatility premium is solely as a result of the illiquidity premium or otherwise. Again, 
with the recent proliferation of ETFs and index funds, future studies could focus on 
investigating the extent to which such funds increase volatility on the JSE. 
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APPENDIX A: RESULT OF LINEAR REGRESSION OF LOG N AND LOG R/S 
Appendix A APPENDIX A: RESULT OF LI NEAR RE GRESSION OF LOG N AND LOG R/S  
ALL SHARE 
LOG N LOG R/S SLOPE 
3.684845 1.867977 0.463352057 
3.383815 1.749672  
3.207634 1.728403 AUTOCORRELATION 
3.082785 1.644649 -0.049535852 
2.985875 1.554792  
2.781755 1.46564  
2.684845 1.433004  
2.383815 1.283624  
TOP 40 
LOG N LOG R/S SLOPE 
3.684845 1.842828 0.460993959 
3.383815 1.728622  
3.207634 1.720233 AUTOCORRELATION 
3.082785 1.630534 -0.052637863 
2.985875 1.537674  
2.781755 1.454575  
2.684845 1.410224  
2.383815 1.263936  
SMALL CAP 
LOG N LOG R/S SLOPE 
3.684845 2.280438 0.679025691 
3.383815 2.140254  
3.207634 2.015564 AUTOCORRELATION 
3.082785 1.91523 0.281693572 
2.985875 1.804422  
2.781755 1.652082  
2.684845 1.619078  
2.383815 1.450382  
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APPENDIX B: R/S VALUES FOR ALL SUB SAMPLES 
ALL SHARE     TOP 40         SMALL CAP     
n ST DEV MAX – MIN R/S LOG R/S n ST DEV MAX – MIN R/S LOG R/S n ST DEV MAX - MIN R/S LOG R/S 
4840 0.0053925 0.3978948 73.7864305 1.8679765 4840 0.002918 0.556662 190.738196 2.280438 4840 0.005933 0.413146 69.635054 1.842828 
2420 0.0051986 0.2834876 54.5314570 1.7366471 2420 0.003275 0.428759 130.930872 2.117042 2420 0.005762 0.303806 52.725641 1.722022 
2420 0.0055796 0.3227895 57.8519896 1.7623183 2420 0.002512 0.364959 145.307452 2.162288 2420 0.006099 0.331427 54.340374 1.735123 
1613 0.0054215 0.2887256 53.2553927 1.7263636 1613 0.003717 0.309486 83.261101 1.920442 1613 0.006023 0.313837 52.108335 1.716907 
1613 0.0051052 0.2830258 55.4388876 1.7438145 1613 0.002432 0.350253 144.028537 2.158449 1613 0.005584 0.302158 54.108139 1.733263 
1613 0.0056361 0.2920851 51.8238812 1.7145299 1613 0.002398 0.200601 83.656605 1.922500 1613 0.006175 0.316824 51.310139 1.710203 
1210 0.0055018 0.2683413 48.7736630 1.6881854 1210 0.003949 0.249867 63.276024 1.801239 1210 0.006165 0.285934 46.377784 1.666310 
1210 0.0048764 0.2506922 51.4090228 1.7110393 1210 0.002412 0.235417 97.588900 1.989400 1210 0.005328 0.270926 50.848449 1.706278 
1210 0.0067420 0.3318372 49.2197585 1.6921395 1210 0.002982 0.364359 122.199737 2.087070 1210 0.007346 0.339884 46.268318 1.665284 
1210 0.0040998 0.1110338 27.0829802 1.4326965 1210 0.001930 0.088809 46.006624 1.662820 1210 0.004520 0.123619 27.347324 1.436915 
968 0.0054959 0.2497274 45.4392509 1.6574312 968 0.003989 0.257810 64.631356 1.810443 968 0.006202 0.250463 40.387359 1.606245 
968 0.0053513 0.2052827 38.3611762 1.5838919 968 0.002982 0.172588 57.882648 1.762548 968 0.005813 0.227801 39.186015 1.593131 
968 0.0046492 0.1194366 25.6897840 1.4097605 968 0.002231 0.104731 46.942549 1.671567 968 0.005106 0.123564 24.199807 1.383812 
968 0.0070174 0.2822579 40.2223625 1.6044676 968 0.003010 0.298692 99.232803 1.996655 968 0.007651 0.305020 39.867454 1.600618 
968 0.0039437 0.1169786 29.6622876 1.4722046 968 0.001843 0.092169 50.017770 1.699124 968 0.004359 0.125556 28.801797 1.459420 
605 0.0043143 0.1229574 28.5002061 1.4548480 605 0.002746 0.108202 39.402609 1.595525 605 0.004993 0.142780 28.597642 1.456330 
605 0.0064746 0.2588460 39.9784451 1.6018259 605 0.004860 0.240708 49.525216 1.694826 605 0.007147 0.263352 36.847068 1.566403 
605 0.0052941 0.1844669 34.8441750 1.5421302 605 0.002766 0.100117 36.201640 1.558728 605 0.005718 0.196788 34.413215 1.536725 
605 0.0044225 0.1567023 35.4329502 1.5494073 605 0.001944 0.097503 50.153757 1.700303 605 0.004911 0.166851 33.976960 1.531185 
605 0.0051039 0.1201853 23.5477100 1.3719487 605 0.002599 0.113270 43.586294 1.639350 605 0.005550 0.122492 22.071010 1.343822 
605 0.0080465 0.2740678 34.0603709 1.5322494 605 0.003283 0.242867 73.978970 1.869108 605 0.008776 0.297888 33.944275 1.530767 
605 0.0046456 0.0829325 17.8519202 1.2516849 605 0.002027 0.073320 36.170195 1.558351 605 0.005142 0.094077 18.295484 1.262344 
605 0.0034676 0.0676965 19.5223779 1.2905327 605 0.001824 0.054817 30.045512 1.477780 605 0.003796 0.074834 19.712885 1.294750 
484 0.0028919 0.0984486 34.0429441 1.5320271 484 0.001749 0.113995 65.174859 1.814080 484 0.003458 0.098143 28.379391 1.453003 
484 0.0072110 0.2342712 32.4882047 1.5117257 484 0.005358 0.243391 45.427205 1.657316 484 0.008056 0.233557 28.990108 1.462250 
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484 0.0051465 0.1639777 31.8621358 1.5032749 484 0.003323 0.130817 39.365244 1.595113 484 0.005567 0.174479 31.342110 1.496128 
484 0.0055415 0.2260034 40.7839233 1.6104890 484 0.002581 0.069533 26.943618 1.430456 484 0.006040 0.245512 40.649137 1.609051 
484 0.0041634 0.1076754 25.8622603 1.4126665 484 0.001884 0.079011 41.946082 1.622691 484 0.004625 0.109921 23.764678 1.375932 
484 0.0050882 0.0947395 18.6196163 1.2699707 484 0.002530 0.097901 38.694780 1.587652 484 0.005544 0.097021 17.499438 1.243024 
484 0.0081582 0.2385828 29.2444117 1.4660429 484 0.003432 0.191927 55.923059 1.747591 484 0.008885 0.261110 29.386872 1.468153 
484 0.0056302 0.1035413 18.3903333 1.2645896 484 0.002481 0.087178 35.141627 1.545822 484 0.006155 0.108583 17.640457 1.246510 
484 0.0042865 0.0844934 19.7116611 1.2947232 484 0.001770 0.072323 40.858631 1.611284 484 0.004781 0.092380 19.321856 1.286049 
484 0.0035674 0.0714060 20.0161661 1.3013809 484 0.001909 0.050614 26.510502 1.423418 484 0.003891 0.078596 20.197946 1.305307 
242 0.0029407 0.0580807 19.7506103 1.2955805 242 0.001581 0.073929 46.747334 1.669757 242 0.003551 0.057227 16.113776 1.207197 
242 0.0028323 0.0515373 18.1965086 1.2599881 242 0.001899 0.059480 31.329850 1.495958 242 0.003351 0.055151 16.457386 1.216361 
242 0.0069271 0.1813053 26.1732330 1.4178574 242 0.004866 0.196389 40.358023 1.605930 242 0.007845 0.194578 24.801812 1.394483 
242 0.0074833 0.2078417 27.7740440 1.4436391 242 0.005787 0.211651 36.575105 1.563186 242 0.008262 0.199180 24.107543 1.382153 
242 0.0055223 0.1645281 29.7931821 1.4741169 242 0.003761 0.135365 35.990409 1.556187 242 0.006013 0.175145 29.128148 1.464313 
242 0.0047409 0.0768728 16.2148545 1.2099131 242 0.002817 0.062048 22.027845 1.342972 242 0.005082 0.081732 16.083000 1.206367 
242 0.0057818 0.1604602 27.7525211 1.4433024 242 0.002850 0.067596 23.717819 1.375075 242 0.006275 0.176533 28.134392 1.449238 
242 0.0052318 0.1044761 19.9696274 1.3003700 242 0.002279 0.045734 20.066204 1.302465 242 0.005732 0.110459 19.270597 1.284895 
242 0.0045208 0.0737210 16.3071162 1.2123772 242 0.002016 0.050688 25.141075 1.400384 242 0.005005 0.077592 15.501646 1.190378 
242 0.0037707 0.0743714 19.7234325 1.2949825 242 0.001737 0.065367 37.629866 1.575533 242 0.004210 0.077318 18.366903 1.264036 
242 0.0041625 0.0771310 18.5300827 1.2678774 242 0.002092 0.043753 20.916857 1.320496 242 0.004552 0.081243 17.845919 1.251539 
242 0.0058687 0.0919579 15.6691700 1.1950460 242 0.002898 0.091348 31.518543 1.498566 242 0.006383 0.092873 14.549943 1.162861 
242 0.0060011 0.1090205 18.1666638 1.2592752 242 0.003100 0.098789 31.864967 1.503313 242 0.006529 0.114460 17.532285 1.243839 
242 0.0098375 0.1870536 19.0143923 1.2790824 242 0.003702 0.090237 24.373617 1.386920 242 0.010718 0.203952 19.028976 1.279415 
242 0.0064420 0.0895998 13.9087078 1.1432868 242 0.002693 0.076846 28.532931 1.455346 242 0.007038 0.094052 13.363327 1.125915 
242 0.0046721 0.0701171 15.0076342 1.1763122 242 0.002246 0.054052 24.063185 1.381353 242 0.005114 0.074196 14.508619 1.161626 
242 0.0051598 0.0652270 12.6414330 1.1017963 242 0.001983 0.045342 22.859828 1.359073 242 0.005747 0.071863 12.503739 1.097040 
242 0.0031723 0.0484491 15.2724674 1.1839092 242 0.001503 0.031706 21.100377 1.324290 242 0.003553 0.056782 15.980517 1.203591 
242 0.0038730 0.0581168 15.0056835 1.1762558 242 0.001929 0.039669 20.566036 1.313151 242 0.004231 0.060461 14.290721 1.155054 
242 0.0032326 0.0627583 19.4140312 1.2881157 242 0.001885 0.035432 18.792664 1.273988 242 0.003519 0.069262 19.684227 1.294118 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPONENTIAL RANDOM WALK; ORIGINAL DATA; WILD BOOTSTRAP; 
BOOTSTRAP DISTRIBUTION TWO-POINT; 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE All Share Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Test probabilities computed using wild bootstrap: dist = two point, reps=1000, rng = kn, 
seed=335508759  
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)* 
 4.401947  4872  0.0480 
Wald (Chi-Square) 
 39.43581  7  0.0310 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.063065  0.014327  4.401947  0.0190 
4 
 1.088623  0.026803  3.306468  0.0610 
8 
 1.021741  0.042379  0.513016  0.7700 
16 
 1.028573  0.063062  0.453087  0.7810 
32 
 1.050171  0.091385  0.549007  0.7320 
64 
 1.031304  0.130793  0.239340  0.8660 
128 













Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Test probabilities computed using wild bootstrap: dist = two point, reps=1000, rng = kn, 
seed=1410272969  
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)* 
 3.338213  4872  0.1470 
Wald (Chi-Square) 
 36.22743  7  0.0310 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.047826  0.014327  3.338213  0.0790 
4 
 1.054685  0.026803  2.040268  0.2520 
8 
 0.961102  0.042379 -0.917867  0.5990 
16 
 0.937219  0.063062 -0.995539  0.5400 
32 
 0.931303  0.091385 -0.751733  0.6170 
64 
 0.919195  0.130793 -0.617814  0.6500 
128 

















Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE Small  Cap Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Test probabilities computed using wild bootstrap: dist = two point, reps=1000, rng = kn, 
seed=885052725  
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 32)* 
 26.15458  4872  0.0000 
Wald (Chi-Square) 
 806.0579  7  0.0000 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.243349  0.014327  16.98570  0.0000 
4 
 1.565328  0.026803  21.09212  0.0000 
8 
 1.988815  0.042379  23.33268  0.0000 
16 
 2.645518  0.063062  26.09369  0.0000 
32 
 3.390147  0.091385  26.15458  0.0000 
64 
 3.747656  0.130793  21.00775  0.0000 
128 
 3.667735  0.186066  14.33755  0.0000 
 
 
EXPONENTIAL RANDOM WALK; ORIGINAL DATA; WILD BOOTSTRAP; 
BOOTSTRAP DISTRIBUTION TWO-POINT; 
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Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE All Share Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Test probabilities computed using wild bootstrap: dist = rademacher, reps=1000, rng = le, 
seed=2068825208  
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 32)* 
 4.401947  4872  0.0360 
Wald (Chi-Square) 
 39.43581  7  0.0310 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.063065  0.014327  4.401947  0.0170 
4 
 1.088623  0.026803  3.306468  0.0640 
8 
 1.021741  0.042379  0.513016  0.7580 
16 
 1.028573  0.063062  0.453087  0.7670 
32 
 1.050171  0.091385  0.549007  0.7110 
64 
 1.031304  0.130793  0.239340  0.8380 
128 




Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
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Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Test probabilities computed using wild bootstrap: dist = rademacher, reps=1000, rng = le, 
seed=896000583  
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 32)* 
 3.338213  4872  0.1440 
Wald (Chi-Square) 
 36.22743  7  0.0280 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.047826  0.014327  3.338213  0.0700 
4 
 1.054685  0.026803  2.040268  0.2690 
8 
 0.961102  0.042379 -0.917867  0.5960 
16 
 0.937219  0.063062 -0.995539  0.5440 
32 
 0.931303  0.091385 -0.751733  0.6230 
64 
 0.919195  0.130793 -0.617814  0.6800 
128 





























Null Hypothesis: Log of FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index is a random walk 
Sample: June 30 1995 to 31 December 2014 
Included Observations: 4872 (after adjustments) 
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Use biased variance estimates 
Lags: 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Test probabilities computed using wild bootstrap: dist = rademacher, reps=1000, rng = le, 
seed=995946675  
Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 32)* 
 26.15458  4872  0.0000 
Wald (Chi-Square) 
 806.0579  7  0.0000 
Individual Tests 
Period Variance Ratio Standard Error z-Statistic Probability 
2 
 1.243349  0.014327  16.98570  0.0000 
4 
 1.565328  0.026803  21.09212  0.0000 
8 
 1.988815  0.042379  23.33268  0.0000 
16 
 2.645518  0.063062  26.09369  0.0000 
32 
 3.390147  0.091385  26.15458  0.0000 
64 
 3.747656  0.130793  21.00775  0.0000 
128 
 3.667735  0.186066  14.33755  0.0000 
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APPENDIX D: SOUTH AFRICAN COLLECTIVE INVESTMENTS INDUSTRY 
                                  
 TOTAL ASSETS SALES 
                  
 30/09/2015 30/06/2015 31/03/2015 31/12/2014 30/09/2015 30/06/2015 31/03/2015 31/12/2014 
 Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % 
                                  
SOUTH AFRICAN FUNDS                                 
Equity 339,896 21 356,740 22 361,256 23 335,155 22 31,134 5 23,368 5 55,236 14 35,768 7 
Multi Asset 803,133 50 788,634 49 778,926 49 754,869 49 122,811 21 84,276 19 104,254 26 86,178 17 
Real Estate 67,850 4 64,764 4 67,756 4 57,592 4 8,122 1 7,871 2 10,710 3 7,254 1 
Interest Bearing 406,578 25 391,723 24 394,086 25 389,922 25 418,949 72 336,210 74 237,140 58 390,810 75 
                                  
SUB TOTAL 1,617,457 100 1,601,861 100 1,602,024 100 1,537,538 100 581,015 100 451,724 100 407,340 100 520,010 100 
WORLD WIDE FUNDS                                 
Equity 1,968 6 1,773 6 745 3 713 3 353 14 1,057 35 294 19 385 16 
Multi Asset 31,541 94 30,039 94 28,748 97 27,597 97 2,241 86 2,004 65 1,214 81 2,017 84 
                                  
SUB TOTAL 33,509 100 31,812 100 29,493 100 28,311 100 2,594 100 3,061 100 1,508 100 2,402 100 
REGIONAL FUNDS                                 
Equity 10,093 56 10,502 57 10,605 54 8,389 46 736 80 833 69 1,202 70 792 67 
Multi Asset 5,939 33 6,272 34 7,494 38 8,468 46 14 1 232 19 300 18 232 20 
Real Estate 367 2 380 2 342 2 316 2 27 3 47 4 45 3 74 6 
Interest Bearing 1,582 9 1,344 7 1,227 6 1,244 7 143 16 101 8 167 10 81 7 
                                  
SUB TOTAL 17,981 100 18,497 100 19,667 100 18,417 100 920 100 1,213 100 1,715 100 1,180 100 
GLOBAL FUNDS                                 
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Equity 74,404 56 73,572 57 70,465 57 60,426 55 10,410 58 7,637 56 13,662 69 6,247 53 
Multi Asset 50,748 38 48,271 37 45,906 37 44,284 40 5,222 29 4,940 36 4,804 24 4,953 42 
Real Estate 6,975 5 5,470 4 5,567 5 4,438 4 1,258 7 849 6 1,340 7 489 4 
Interest Bearing 1,844 1 1,506 1 1,447 1 1,381 1 1,116 6 136 1 94 0 77 1 
                                  
SUB TOTAL 133,970 100 128,818 100 123,384 100 110,530 100 18,006 100 13,561 100 19,899 100 11,765 100 
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 REPURCHASES NET INFLOW 
                   ANNUAL 
 30/09/2015 30/06/2015 31/03/2015 31/12/2014 30/09/2015 30/06/2015 31/03/2015 31/12/2014 AS AT 30/09/2015 
 Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % 
                                      
SOUTH AFRICAN FUNDS                                     
Equity 30,728 6 22,178 5 46,440 12 21,151 4 406 1 1,190 8 8,797 91 14,617 40 25,009 25 
Multi Asset 101,222 19 70,827 16 99,910 25 61,328 13 21,589 54 13,448 87 4,344 45 24,849 68 64,231 63 
Real Estate 7,359 1 6,396 1 7,657 2 6,634 1 762 2 1,475 10 3,053 32 620 2 5,910 6 
Interest Bearing 401,921 74 336,877 77 243,655 61 394,101 82 17,028 43 -668 -4 -6,515 -67 -3,291 -9 6,554 6 
                                      
SUB TOTAL 541,230 100 436,279 100 397,662 100 483,215 100 39,785 100 15,445 100 9,678 100 36,795 100 101,704 100 
WORLD WIDE FUNDS                                     
                                      
Equity 108 6 25 1 8 1 9 1 244 37 1,032 92 286 187 375 56 1,938 74 
Multi Asset 1,817 94 1,917 99 1,347 99 1,724 99 424 63 88 8 -133 -87 293 44 672 26 
                                      
SUB TOTAL 1,925 100 1,941 100 1,355 100 1,734 100 668 100 1,120 100 153 100 669 100 2,610 100 
REGIONAL FUNDS                                     
Equity 255 31 175 14 130 9 323 16 481 458 658 -3,165 1,072 438 469 -55 2,680 -513 
Multi Asset 427 52 1,012 82 1,125 77 1,677 83 -413 -394 -781 3,755 -825 -337 -1,445 170 -3,463 664 
Real Estate 44 5 15 1 30 2 7 0 -17 -16 32 -155 16 6 68 -8 98 -19 
Interest Bearing 88 11 31 3 185 13 24 1 54 52 70 -335 -18 -7 57 -7 163 -31 
                                      
SUB TOTAL 815 100 1,234 100 1,470 100 2,031 100 105 100 -21 100 245 100 -851 100 -522 100 




                 
                                  
 NO OF ACCOUNTS NO OF FUNDS 
                   
 30/09/2015 30/06/2015 31/03/2015 31/12/2014 30/09/2015 30/06/2015 31/03/2015 31/12/2014 
 # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
                                  
SOUTH AFRICAN FUNDS                                 
Equity 926918 35 1034956 36 900912 35 1030009 37 268 25 256 25 258 25 248 25 
Multi Asset 840854 32 898920 31 803516 31 837942 30 613 57 590 57 587 57 568 57 
Real Estate 69303 3 65927 2 61043 2 57373 2 49 5 46 4 44 4 42 4 
Interest Bearing 830184 31 868528 30 830031 32 890103 32 141 13 142 14 139 14 135 14 
                                  
SUB TOTAL 2667259 100 2868331 100 2595502 100 2815427 100 1071 100 1034 100 1028 100 993 100 
WORLD WIDE FUNDS                                 
                                  
Equity 30 0 19 0 15 0 7 0 5 8 3 5 2 4 4 8 
GLOBAL FUNDS                                     
Equity 8,877 63 5,386 60 7,689 56 4,778 46 1,533 39 2,251 49 5,973 95 1,469 104 11,226 69 
Multi Asset 4,324 31 2,968 33 5,277 39 5,134 50 1,056 27 2,197 48 -45 -1 1,136 80 4,344 27 
Real Estate 641 5 545 6 582 4 355 3 77 2 75 2 102 2 -80 -6 173 1 
Interest Bearing 208 1 58 1 65 0 86 1 918 23 80 2 52 1 -24 -2 1,026 6 
                                      
SUB TOTAL 14,050 100 8,957 100 13,612 100 10,353 100 3,956 100 4,605 100 6,287 100 1,412 100 16,260 100 
TOTAL 558,020 100 448,410 100 414,098 100 497,331 100 44,514 100 21,149 100 16,363 100 38,025 100 120,053 100 
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Multi Asset 14881 100 14684 100 14098 100 13973 100 58 92 55 95 52 96 47 92 
                                  
SUB TOTAL 14911 100 14703 100 14113 100 13980 100 63 100 58 100 54 100 51 100 
REGIONAL FUNDS                                 
                                 
Equity 5113 81 7110 83 5173 82 6804 83 17 63 17 65 17 65 16 64 
Multi Asset 126 2 135 2 140 2 143 2 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 
Real Estate 66 1 124 1 58 1 102 1 2 7 1 4 1 4 1 4 
Interest Bearing 1008 16 1222 14 922 15 1138 14 7 26 7 27 7 27 7 28 
                                  
SUB TOTAL 6313 100 8591 100 6293 100 8187 100 27 100 26 100 26 100 25 100 
GLOBAL FUNDS                                 
                                 
Equity 106416 73 117860 74 102684 73 119517 74 43 38 41 38 41 40 41 40 
Multi Asset 33027 23 34131 21 33341 24 35339 22 49 43 47 44 45 44 44 43 
Real Estate 66 0 124 0 58 0 102 0 11 10 10 9 8 8 8 8 
Interest Bearing 1409 1 1494 1 1622 1 1872 1 10 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 
                                  
SUB TOTAL 145661 100 159673 100 141587 100 161054 100 113 100 107 100 103 100 102 100 
                                 
TOTAL 2834144 100 3051298 100 2757495 100 2998648 100 1274 100 1225 100 1211 100 1171 100 
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Appendix E: Market value of assets under 
administration as at 30 September 2015 
        
              
       








ENDOWMENTS and VOLUNTARY 
PURCHASE ANNUITIES 
TOTAL 
Local collective investment schemes 390,923,627,457 201,103,490,752 7,412,363,934 283,755,059,741 83,438,258,182 966,632,800,067 
Tied Agents (insurance linked) 82,336,913,079 26,159,252,040 2,899,259,221 52,954,110,966 18,610,750,225 182,960,285,531 
Tied Agents (bank linked) 49,407,030,114 5,769,915,516 0 10,949,617,932 5,719,400,236 71,845,963,798 
Tied Other 4,797,633,621 1,353,039,005 0 1,664,002,283 1,781,480,913 9,596,155,822 
Independent financial advisor 242,305,313,370 147,155,405,716 3,052,585,403 203,753,931,703 55,849,527,666 652,116,763,858 
Direct Clients 12,076,737,273 20,665,878,475 1,460,519,311 14,433,396,857 1,477,099,142 50,113,631,058 
Pensions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Offshore funds/investments 30,075,112,968 691,129,118 0 2,926,972,616 16,563,857,753 50,257,072,455 
Tied Agents (insurance linked) 108,347,773 0 0 0 919,701,483 1,028,049,255 
Tied Agents (bank linked) 46,658,910 3,605,543 0 3,659,929 12,798,133 66,722,514 
Tied Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Independent financial advisor 26,435,515,935 679,774,773 0 2,920,240,028 15,069,678,417 45,105,209,152 
Direct Clients 3,484,590,351 7,748,802 0 3,072,659 561,679,721 4,057,091,533 
Pensions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
              
Local Life funds 1,397,510,449 6,377,311,758 0 12,865,630,514 9,125,009,783 29,765,462,504 
Smoothed bonus life funds 153,163 3,404,028,294 0 6,046,093,872 2,864,481,234 12,314,756,564 
Performance linked life funds 1,397,357,286 2,973,283,464 0 6,819,536,642 6,260,528,549 17,450,705,940 
              
Call accounts 354,630,860 99,581,690 0 93,499,032 105,453,811 653,165,394 
Other  7,793,535,597 6,562,285,910 1,501,633,584 11,261,051,763 4,147,054,903 31,265,561,757 
Assets under administration 1,547,743,198 3,900,140,327 1,486,034,175 7,605,279,961 2,045,373,202 16,584,570,863 
Managed assets 6,245,792,400 2,662,145,583 15,599,409 3,655,771,801 2,101,681,701 14,680,990,894 
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Total Sum of Assets 430,544,417,332 214,833,799,228 8,913,997,519 310,902,213,666 113,379,634,432 1,078,574,062,176 
              
       
( B )  Packaged / risk profiled solutions 15,745,007,235 7,198,465,198 373,800,811 15,716,558,539 875,582,255 39,909,414,038 
              
( C )  Number of accounts 562,151 408,133 12,931 335,708 103,527 1,422,450 
              
( D )  Inflows / outflows for the quarter 5,271,509,655 2,183,086,040 0 1,945,629,414 379,592,921 9,779,818,030 
              








ENDOWMENTS and VOLUNTARY 
PURCHASE ANNUITIES 
TOTAL 
New business 32,478,575,399 15,650,486,292 446,209,066 15,402,317,596 5,559,639,431 69,537,227,784 
Lump sums 30,741,167,081 14,463,477,570 401,268,129 15,389,505,647 5,112,667,788 66,108,086,215 
Tied Agents (insurance linked) 5,494,110,631 2,389,432,046 200,771,940 3,221,638,085 912,035,674 12,217,988,376 
Tied Agents (bank linked) 4,481,212,992 503,539,543 0 796,226,587 532,252,236 6,313,231,358 
Tied Other 713,670,178 167,473,287 0 565,025,827 305,177,647 1,751,346,939 
Independent financial advisor 18,298,152,115 10,069,135,923 115,738,330 10,146,669,804 3,220,053,254 41,849,749,426 
Direct Clients 764,997,954 1,333,896,771 84,757,859 659,945,343 143,148,978 2,986,746,905 
Pensions 989,023,211 0 0 0 0 989,023,211 
Recurring 1,737,408,318 1,187,008,722 44,940,937 12,811,949 446,971,643 3,429,141,569 
Tied Agents (insurance linked) 253,693,740 122,935,862 0 0 148,385,459 525,015,061 
Tied Agents (bank linked) 97,567,023 53,783,426 0 0 1,066,908 152,417,356 
Tied Other 139,249,658 10,100,756 0 0 0 149,350,415 
Independent financial advisor 1,194,307,122 870,095,547 14,203,998 12,811,949 280,471,471 2,371,890,087 
Direct Clients 52,590,775 130,093,131 30,736,940 0 17,047,805 230,468,650 
Pensions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
              
Withdrawals 24,675,803,123 9,128,890,103 308,387,732 29,918,940,627 -17,051,826,078 46,980,195,506 
Regular payments (income) 2,252,574,565 5,100,924 0 16,266,326,587 -4,876,443,736 13,647,558,340 
Lump sums 22,423,228,558 9,123,789,179 308,387,732 13,652,614,040 -12,175,382,342 33,332,637,166 
Tied Agents (insurance linked) 4,614,969,138 1,159,463,138 50,150,412 1,956,932,654 -3,329,317,509 4,452,197,834 
Page | 277  
 
Tied Agents (bank linked) 1,227,239,640 135,686,548 0 66,409,888 14,566,583 1,443,902,660 
Tied Other 768,554,264 228,712,279 0 1,099,058,080 -1,234,718,396 861,606,227 
Independent financial advisor 14,975,293,784 6,595,002,347 175,412,079 10,259,251,184 -7,732,123,561 24,272,835,833 
Direct Clients 812,415,412 1,004,924,866 82,825,241 270,962,233 98,392,871 2,269,520,623 
Pensions 24,756,320 0 0 0 7,817,670 32,573,989 
Net new business 7,802,772,276 6,521,596,189 137,821,334 -14,516,623,031 22,611,465,509 22,557,032,278 
              
New business emanating from income 
(distributions) reinvested 
3,470,583,920 1,622,477,751 85,024,311 2,216,700,887 241,397,682 7,636,184,550 
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